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Abstract 
 
Researchers from Hans Morgenthau and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita have suggested that 
donor countries view foreign aid as a strategic tool in their economic arsenal. In contrast, 
however, donor countries actually describe their foreign aid as purely altruistic, as a way to 
alleviate poverty in the countries that receive aid. I argue this discrepancy exists due to the 
different motivations of donor governments and aid bureaucracies. Strategic and political 
interests often motivate governments, while foreign aid bureaucrats tend to have personal 
altruistic motivations. This divergence creates conflicting goals with governments seeking 
economic and political advantages from foreign aid and aid bureaucracies, the implementers 
of policy, seeking to increase economic and social development in recipient countries. Due 
to these conflicting goals and motivations, the level of autonomy of aid agencies shapes their 
aid allocation decisions. The variation in the institutional designs of these bureaucracies then 
explains the variations we see in the foreign aid policies across donor countries.  
This dissertation demonstrates the importance of bureaucratic autonomy for aid 
outcomes (donor selectivity, policy coherence, and involvement in the aid community) 
across three empirical chapters. Donor selectivity refers to how aid recipients and projects 
are chosen (for example, least developed countries vs. middle income countries, health 
sectors vs. budget support). An aid agency’s policy may be altered when a new government is 
elected; however, an agency with greater autonomy is more likely to retain a consistent 
agenda over time. Bureaucrats with greater autonomy are also more likely to take advantage 
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of that autonomy to increase their role in policy development. Through the creation of a 
novel dataset of aid agency autonomy, I conduct a cross-sectional analysis of twenty 
agencies. I further provide an in-depth comparison of three of these agencies. Finally, I 
conduct a temporal case study of the United States’ Agency for International Development, 
comparing it to the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development.  
The analysis presented provides support for my hypothesis that more autonomous 
aid institutions are more likely to allocate aid based on the development needs of recipient 
countries, have policy coherence across governments, and greater involvement in the 
international community. Bureaucracies are known to be important policymakers in their 
own right in other fields of political science; however, international relations often ignores 
bureaucracies. This work seeks to amend this by illustrating the importance of bureaucrats in 
international political outcomes. The institutional design of these agencies must be taken 
into account given the role it has in determining policy outcomes. Moreover, this dissertation 
expands our knowledge of the aid allocation process specifically. With greater knowledge of 
how aid allocation decisions are made, scholars and practitioners can improve their 
assessment of aid outcomes and encourage more effective aid through changes on the 
institutional level.  
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Chapter 1  
Determinants of Foreign Aid Allocation 
 
From Hans Morgenthau (1962) to Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (2009), researchers 
continue to demonstrate that foreign aid is a strategic tool for donor countries. However, in 
practice, donor countries continue to describe foreign aid as a means of poverty alleviation 
for recipient countries. Why does this discrepancy exist between political science research 
and real world discussion of foreign aid? Are donors merely using cheap talk? Alternatively, 
is current research missing an aspect of donor motivations? I argue the latter, finding this 
discrepancy exists due to the different motivations of donor governments and aid 
bureaucracies. While strategic interests often motivate governments, foreign aid bureaucrats 
customarily have personal interests and altruistic desires in giving development assistance. 
This tension creates conflicting goals with governments seeking economic and political 
advantages from foreign aid and aid bureaucracies, the implementers of policy, seek to 
increase economic and social development in recipient countries. Given these conflicting 
goals and motivations, aid allocation decisions are shaped by the level of autonomy of aid 
bureaucrats. The variation in the institutional designs of these bureaucracies then explains 
the variations we see in the foreign aid policies across donor countries. 
Since bureaucracies are driven primarily by a desire to keep their positions, they tend 
to follow the preferences of the government. This is conditional, however, on the level of 
autonomy given to the aid bureaucracy as bureaucrats have their own personal inclinations 
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about aid. These motivations tend to drive aid bureaucrats towards need-based aid. 
Therefore, with a high level of autonomy, regardless of the government’s preferences, the 
bureaucracy will tend to have an aid policy based on recipient needs. With a low level of 
autonomy, the bureaucracy will follow the government’s presences, which tend to focus 
more on the strategic interests of the donor country. An agency’s aid policy is thus 
conditional on the level of autonomy it has from the government. Using this overall theory, I 
identify a range of specific claims regarding aid policies and the role autonomy has in 
shaping them. 
Foreign aid, as well as the number of actors involved, continues to expand at an ever-
increasing rate. Countries have transitioned from recipients to donors, non-governmental 
organizations have become major players in implementation of and recommendations for 
projects and international organizations are seen as an ordinary vehicle for encouraging 
development. Foreign aid, once seen as a temporary means of geopolitics during the Cold 
War, is an enduring aspect of international relations. Why foreign aid remains a significant 
undertaking resulted in a large scholarship examining donor motivations and whether they 
are based on stated altruistic motivations or rather for strategic interests of the country. 
While this work has taught us a great deal about the foreign aid regime and has now turned 
to a discussion of effective aid, we still know very little about the institutions within donor 
countries that administer foreign aid policy. Given the variation in aid flows from different 
countries as well as variation in aid agencies within these countries, this dissertation asks how 
the institutional design of aid bureaucracies affects aid allocation. 
A clear example of variation across donors is the amount of foreign aid they allocate 
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each year. Since 1970, bilateral donors have agreed to give 0.7% of their GDP in aid each 
year1; however, the amount actually given ranges from 1% of GDP (Luxembourg) to 0.09% 
of GDP (Poland and Slovak Republic)2. Why do developed nations vary so greatly in the 
amount of aid they allocate, given they have all similarly agreed on the "correct" amount? 
Donors also vary in the countries to which they allocate aid. Portugal focuses their aid 
spending almost entirely on former colonies, while the United Kingdom—having many 
former colonies as well—favors giving aid to recipients with a national income of $1,190 per 
person or less.3 Why do the targets of aid vary across donors when there is a known list of 
recipients who need it the most? Another way allocations vary is the type of aid given to a 
recipient (tied aid, technical assistance, etc.).4 Greece gives more than half of its aid each year 
through technical assistance, while Italy continues to rely heavily on tied aid. Why do donors 
vary the types of aid given, especially when there has been some agreement over what is 
more effective? 
The aid agencies within donor countries vary widely in their institutional design. 
Donor countries often have multiple agencies with different institutional designs that are 
responsible for some form of development aid. The United States, for example, has five 
main agencies in charge of some aspect of foreign aid (Agency for International 
Development [USAID], State Department, Defense Department, Treasury Department, and 
the Millennium Challenge Corporation [MCC]). Each of these agencies varies widely in the 
                                                
1 United Nations General Assembly. 1970 
2 OECD 2014 
3 OECD 2014 
4 Tied aid is aid that must be spent in the donor country. Humanitarian aid is given in response to a disaster, natural or man-made. Technical 
assistance is support in the form of donor country expertise. (OECD 2012) 
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structure of their institutions, with State, Defense, and Treasury Departments being 
executive agencies, USAID once being an independent agency and now existing within the 
State Department, and the MCC being a government corporation. Within the US alone, 
there are three distinct agencies structures with different focuses and purposes for aid 
allocation. 
Furthermore, the main official development assistance institutions also vary in the 
structure of these aid institutions. In Denmark, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs administers 
foreign aid. In Ireland, there is a separate directorate (the Development Cooperation 
Directorate) within the Department of Foreign Affairs that manages most foreign aid. In 
Australia and Canada, there were an administratively autonomous agency, the Australian 
Agency for International Development and the Canadian International Development 
Agency, responsible for foreign aid. Today, however, the government has changed these 
institutions giving them less autonomy by merging them with broader foreign policy 
departments. This reorganization demonstrates that governments’ realize that agencies with 
more autonomy give aid in a different way than their own preferences. Along with the 
placement of the institution within the government, structure varies by the amount of 
political appointments, whether there is an advisory committee, requirements for reporting 
to the government, evaluations of the agency, and much more. These differences in structure 
shape the way these agencies allocate aid as they determine their role within the country. 
The importance of institutional design for domestic aid institutions has never been 
clearer than in the recent reorganizations of the aid agencies in Canada and Australia. In 
2013, both the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and Australian Aid 
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(AusAID) were closed and the duties of these organizations were moved into the Canadian 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development and the Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade. The conservative governments, newly in power in these 
countries, claimed there was a need to make aid more efficient and to lessen the costs of the 
bureaucracy. However, by restructuring foreign aid to be part of the country’s general 
foreign affairs and trade, it ties aid to national interests. Officials in these countries have 
touted this as a motivating factor for this change. 
Prior to these reorganizations, CIDA and AusAID were well-respected agencies with 
a high level of autonomy as they were structurally independent from the government. With 
the strength of these bureaucracies, foreign aid was a highly supported sector in these 
countries. These bureaucracies were able to shape the foreign aid policies of these countries, 
promoting untying aid and increasing the budget overall. With these changes, it is clear that 
poverty alleviation is taking a more subordinate role and will no longer have the backing of 
an independent agency. 
Merging these independent aid agencies into their country’s foreign affairs ministries 
represents a clear shift of policy by the governments of these countries. However, it also 
reveals the belief of these governments that these independent aid agencies were and would 
continue to allocate aid based on more altruistic motivations rather than tied to the national 
interests of these countries. The government felt the need to completely dismantle these 
agencies in order to achieve policy adherence with the bureaucracy. Clearly, the aid 
bureaucracies themselves have power to shape policies and have preferences that are 
different from the government. Given these recent organizations and the apparent differing 
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motivations between governments and bureaucrats, it is necessary to look at how 
institutional design matters. 
In this dissertation, I examine the wide variation that exists in how donors allocate 
foreign aid and the variation in the institutional designs of agencies within donor countries. 
While most scholars look at this variation of allocation at the level of states, I argue that one 
must look at the institutions within these states. These bureaucracies are responsible for aid 
allocation through project planning, budget requests, aid management, implementation, and 
evaluation of policy. In order to understand the variation across donors, we must look at the 
institutions within these countries that are responsible for that aid. This dissertation argues 
the institutional design of an aid agency, specifically the level of autonomy, affects the aid 
policy that agency generates. This is due to the differing preferences of the government and 
bureaucracy, which lead them to pursue different types of foreign aid. 
Today there is a large push for donors to provide aid that is effective for 
development; however, one cannot prescribe aid allocation solutions without an 
understanding of aid decision-makers. Recommendations of how to reform aid are not 
practical if one does not first take into account the incentives of carry out those reforms. 
This dissertation examines the decision-making process of foreign aid allocation within 
donors and across countries, informing our understanding of what influence this process. 
With knowledge of the process, scholars and aid practitioners will be able to better assess aid 
outcomes. Then, by taking into account the influence of institutional design, aid policies can 
be made to create aid that is more “effective.” 
I then argue, opposing most principal-agent literature, less control by the principal 
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can lead to more “optimal” results with respect to foreign aid. In this case, more “optimal” 
results are in respect to recipient countries and their development. With the vast amount of 
time and resources donor countries use to research and evaluate aid, there should be an 
incentive to achieve the “effectiveness” that is so often referenced. Perhaps by allowing for 
more discretion, these stated goals could be reached.5 
Donor Motivations 
Donors spend billions of dollars each year on development assistance. The rhetoric 
and stated motivation for foreign aid is similar across all donors – the alleviation of poverty 
and the development of the world. Aid began as emergency funding to help alleviate the 
struggles of countries after World War II. Today, it is a huge international industry with 
multiple actors cooperating (or not cooperating) to raise the level of economic growth of 
developing countries across the globe. However, this motivation has been found by multiple 
studies to not be the true driving force of aid giving (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009; Maizels and Nissanke 1984; McKinlay and Little 1977, 
1978; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998). 
Rather than altruistic goals, scholars have found donors to be motivated by strategic 
interests when allocating foreign aid (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 
1998). These interests may be economic, political, or historical. If donors are motivated by 
recipients’ needs, we would see aid going to least developed countries, aid focused on long-
term growth, and aid that follows the recommended best practices. Instead, we often find 
                                                
5 These are merely the stated goals of donors as demonstrated through their mission statements and international agreements. However, past 
scholarship shows that these statements should not be taken at face value. Governments certainly face other motivations for giving aid than making 
sure it is effective. 
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that donors allocate aid to allies and former colonies, and send tied aid and other types of aid 
agreed as ineffective by the aid community. The rhetoric and stated purpose of foreign aid 
does not match up with actual allocations, leading to ineffective aid and a lack of 
development results. 
Given this finding by scholars and aid practitioners, there have been many 
recommendations put in place to try to improve aid. Some suggestions are for improved 
transparency, greater specialization, and less fragmentation among donors, and more 
selectivity when choosing recipients (Easterly and Pfutze 2008; Easterly and Williamson 
2011). Donors have actually agreed to many of these recommendations through multiple 
pledges (“Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness” 2005; United Nations 2000, 2002). Yet, 
scholars continue to find that donors overall do not follow these recommendations or have 
only shown small improvements. 
While past scholarship has provided a great deal of information on donors’ 
motivations, it has, by in large, focused solely on donors as an anthropomorphized actor 
without looking at the decision-makers within the country. This simplification leads to a lack 
of knowledge of the allocation process within a donor country. It is necessary to understand 
the within-country dynamics of foreign aid to truly understand why variation exists across 
donors. Allocation decisions are made by institutions within these countries and are based 
on the relationship between these institutions, not by a country a single entity. 
Bureaucracy and Foreign Aid 
 The bureaucracy is a key actor in determining policy outcomes for a country. The 
government delegates authority to a bureaucracy over a given area, such as foreign aid, and 
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gives it the task of overseeing the development and implementation of that area. While the 
bureaucracy is often viewed as having a minor role in policy, scholarship has demonstrated 
the important role bureaucracies have in shaping the policies of a country. Due to 
delegation, a bureaucracy receives some control and influence beyond the government’s 
authority and therefore has means to administer policy as they see fit. 
The foreign aid bureaucracy administers the allocation of foreign aid from a donor 
country. While they may not determine aid policies or the budget itself, they are responsible 
for the operation and management of aid programs (Gibson et al. 2005). This can entail 
decisions on creation of assistance programs, the sector funds are allocated, the channel of 
delivery, the type of project, and the future of aid allocations. According to the USAID job 
description, foreign aid officers “assess country needs, prepare strategic plans, design and 
evaluate programs, oversee budgets and contracts, and report on results” (USAID 2012b). 
Most positions also require an advanced degree, representative of the knowledge that 
bureaucrats have over their government in this issue area. An average aid bureaucrat across 
OECD DAC countries conducts 4.3 projects a year with an average project size of $1.1 
million in 2003 (Ovaska 2006, 19). 
As bureaucracies are ultimately responsible for aid allocations from a country, it is 
necessary to examine how these institutions make those decisions. Foreign aid scholars and 
practitioners, in their examination of aid effectiveness, have highlighted this need recently 
(Arel-Bundock, Atkinson, and Potter 2015; Honig n.d.). In particular, scholars have found 
that aid bureaucrats face perverse incentives due to the structure of these institutions 
(Easterly 2002; Martens 2005). The design of these agencies often leads to a disbursement 
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culture, where is it more important to get the money out the door than it is to create 
effective and beneficial projects for recipients. Given these findings, the institutional causes 
of these problematic motives must be understood in order to promote the “best practices” 
suggested by these works – transparency, selectivity, overhead cost, ineffective aid channels, 
and specialization (Easterly and Pfutze 2008; Easterly and Williamson 2011). 
Bureaucratic Autonomy 
The institutional design of these aid agencies matters due to the incongruent 
preferences of governments and bureaucrats. A key consequence in the delegation of power 
from principal to agent is the agent’s ability to shirk, or follow their own preferences rather 
than the principal’s (Coleman and Coleman 1994; Moe 1984; Weingast 1984). The 
government tries to combat an agency’s ability to shirk through control mechanisms, such as 
audits, political appointments, or control of the agency’s budget. So while shirking is always a 
risk given delegation, the risk is greater when agencies have a greater level of autonomy (i.e. 
less government control mechanisms) and the preferences between the government and 
bureaucracy diverge significantly. 
The study of delegation to institutions usually focuses on variation of design in terms 
of different issue areas. Asking questions such as why does the central bank have more 
autonomy than the ministry of foreign affairs? This scholarship attempts to explain these 
differences due to the variation in issue area, usually in terms of a specific country as well. 
My work takes a different focus by holding the issue area constant—foreign aid. The focus 
then becomes the role of the bureaucracy instead of the choice a government makes in 
delegation. Work on the autonomy of aid agencies in the United States demonstrated the 
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importance of this agency variation within a single country (Arel-Bundock, Atkinson, and 
Potter 2015). I expand this work through an examination of the cross-national and inter-
temporal variation in agency design. 
In the case of foreign aid, past scholarship has shown us that governments allocate 
aid mostly for strategic interests rather than altruistic concerns for recipient countries 
(Alesina and Dollar 2000; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007). The preferences of the 
government are then to use aid as a tool for foreign policy, perhaps to strengthen an alliance 
or buy compliance or improve a donor’s image in that country or internationally. Career 
motivations are the primary motivations for bureaucracies, so they will tend to give aid based 
on the government’s preferences. However, since the bureaucracy’s own preference is for 
need-based aid, with high autonomy the aid bureaucracy will go against the government’s 
desire for political aid.  
Aid bureaucrats, contrary to the government, have a much different perspective on 
the purpose of foreign aid leading them to have a greater focus on the needs of recipient 
countries. These civil service employees are experts in the field of foreign aid, often with 
advanced degrees, whose sole focus is foreign aid rather than other foreign policy issues 
(Butterfield 2004; Gibson et al. 2005). As they have dedicated their work to this topic, they 
often strive to create meaningful improvements in the lives of those receiving aid. 
Bureaucrats and governments are therefore at opposite ends of the spectrum in their 
preferences leading to different foreign aid policies for each group. 
Since the aid bureaucracy, if left to its own devices, would create a foreign aid policy 
based on the needs of recipients, and the government would create foreign aid policy based 
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on national interests without delegation, the level of autonomy of the aid bureaucracy is key 
in shaping the actual foreign aid policy of that institution. Autonomy is defined as the degree 
of discretion and freedom of action available to an agent (Hawkins et al. 2006; Pollack 1997, 
2003). Autonomy is therefore the amount of control the government has over the 
bureaucracy with less control mechanisms meaning greater autonomy. With a low degree of 
autonomy, bureaucrats are incentivized to follow the government’s preferences in order to 
maintain their positions. However, with a high degree of autonomy, bureaucrats have the 
freedom to follow their own preferences and motivations in creating foreign aid policy. 
I therefore argue that domestic aid agencies with a high level of autonomy are more 
likely to have a foreign aid policy based on recipients, while agencies with a low level of 
autonomy are more likely to base their policies on the strategic interests of the donor 
country. Following from this primary assertion, I posit specific claims regarding three areas 
of foreign aid policy—selectivity, policy coherence, and involvement in the aid community. 
Donor selectivity refers to how aid recipients and projects are chosen (for example, least 
developed countries vs. middle income countries, health sectors vs. budget support). An aid 
agency’s policy may be altered when a new government is elected; however, an agency with 
greater autonomy is more likely to retain a consistent agenda over time. Bureaucrats with 
greater autonomy are also more likely to take advantage of that autonomy to increase their 
role in policy development. 
Motivation/Importance 
Foreign aid is an important policy tool for donor countries and despite being thought 
of as a product of the cold war, it has remained and grown greatly over time. At the same 
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time, the messages we have regarding foreign aid are persistently mixed. On the one hand, 
donors espouse the need for development across the globe and their desire to improve the 
lives of the world’s poorest. This is also what bureaucrats and aid practitioners often assert 
themselves. However, scholarly work continually finds that donors are not actually 
motivated by their stated altruistic goals, but rather have their own political and strategic 
goals in mind for allocating aid. Despite continual scholarship on foreign aid, we do not have 
a clear way to understand these two competing explanations. 
This topic is important for a number of reasons. It addresses the decision-making 
process of foreign aid allocation within donor countries, which has not been examined 
before on such a large scale. Prior foreign aid literature often focuses on the donor as a 
single entity without consideration of actors within a donor country. This leads to a lack of 
understanding of how allocation decisions are made across domestic actors. Looking at the 
role of aid agencies is an important step in understanding how aid decisions come about and 
has been a topic of recent interest within the field (Arel-Bundock, Atkinson, and Potter 
2015; Easterly 2002; Honig n.d.; Martens 2005). These works have demonstrated the 
importance of the aid bureaucracy as well as the necessity of understanding the aid decision-
making process. I further this work by assessing the role of autonomy in shaping 
development policy. With knowledge of the process, scholars and aid practitioners will be 
able to better assess aid outcomes.  
Furthermore, with this assessment ability, the results presented allow for better 
promotion of effective aid. The international community is pushing donors to provide aid 
that is effective for development. The international aid community has prescribed the “best 
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practices” for development policy and foreign aid allocations. These have been further 
established and committed to by donors in a number of international agreements ("Accra 
Agenda for Action" 2008; "Millennium Development Declaration" 2000; “Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness” 2005). Given the large amount of effort devoted by donors, the 
international community, and scholars on the topic of aid effectiveness, there does appear to 
be an impetus encouraging “successful” aid practices. However, one cannot advise aid 
allocation solutions without an understanding of aid decision-makers. Recommendations of 
how to reform aid cannot fully address their purpose if one does not first take into account 
the incentives of carry out those reforms.  
This dissertation also sheds light on how the domestic bureaucracy affects 
international outcomes. While the bureaucracy is seen as an important actor in many fields, 
its influence has not been a major topic within international relations since the 1970s 
(Allison and Halperin 1972; Hopkins 1976; Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1954). By examining 
the aid bureaucracy of bilateral donors, I bring the bureaucracy back into the field by 
examining the aid decision-making process and provide a clearer path for policy 
recommendation. This gap has been noted by scholars and proposed as a necessary and 
important line of research (Fukuyama 2013). I answer this call by examining how the level of 
autonomy of an agency affects aid allocation outcomes, providing a greater understanding of 
the aid decision-making process as well as the nature of the government-bureaucracy 
relationship. 
Dissertation Outline 
The purpose of this dissertation is to determine the role of bureaucratic autonomy is 
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shaping aid policies of donor countries. In Chapter 2, I present my theory of why 
bureaucratic autonomy is the key determinant in policy outcomes, both generally and with 
regard to foreign aid. I begin from a principal-agent framework in order to explain the 
relationship between governments and bureaucracies. This leads to an important conclusion, 
that these actors have differing motivations over this policy. Due to these differing 
motivations, the level of autonomy given to a bureaucracy plays a key role as it determines 
whether the government or bureaucracy’s motivations are adhered to. With regard to foreign 
aid, the level of autonomy explains whether aid will focus on strategic interests of the donor 
country or the needs of the recipient country. 
In Chapter 3, I examine how agency autonomy affects selection of recipients across 
bilateral donors. I present my newly created dataset of the bureaucratic autonomy of donor 
foreign aid institutions. This dataset set contains an index of the level of autonomy of the 
main aid agencies from the top twenty Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors. I base this on 
two types of autonomy – structural and political– and measured by the amount of control 
mechanisms put in place by the government in order to “check” the bureaucracy. Using this 
dataset, I present a cross-country analysis showing the importance of autonomy in shaping 
where and how aid is allocated. 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I conduct an in-depth examination of the agencies themselves in 
order to understand and compare them more fully. In Chapter 4, I compare three aid 
agencies from Chapter 3 – Spain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC), 
Switzerland’s Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and Sweden’s International 
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Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). By examining these cases comprehensively, I 
present of picture of how autonomy affects policy outcomes beyond aid allocation including 
agenda setting and involvement in the international community. These three aid agencies 
represent a spectrum of the types of agencies that exist. In Chapter 5, I present a temporal 
analysis of the United States’ Agency for International Development (USAID) in order to 
understand how changes in autonomy over time have affect aid allocations. I further 
compare USAID to the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development 
(DFID), as comparison across similar countries with as similarly important agency. These 
comparisons shed light on the role of autonomy historically as well as present a distinctive 
look at how different institutions transition over time. I conclude in Chapter 6 by discussing 
the importance of this work and the applications it has to future work as well as policy 
impactions. 
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Chapter 2  
Autonomy and Foreign Aid Bureaucracy 
 
Foreign aid policy decisions are not made by a single government entity. Rather there 
are multiple actors involved in shaping the development policies of a country. In particular, 
in terms of aid donor decision-making, the aid bureaucracy is ultimately responsible for the 
implementation of development policies. The government’s control over how this policy is 
carried out depends on the level of autonomy an aid agency is given. Due to the differing 
preferences of the government and bureaucracy, an agency’s level of autonomy moderates 
the actions of the bureaucracy either to be more in line with the government’s preferences or 
their own. 
This conditionality is one of the reasons there exists a discrepancy between donors’ 
descriptions of their foreign aid motivations and the scholarly findings of donors’ true 
motivations. Aid bureaucrats often have personal interests and altruistic desires for allocating 
foreign aid. While governments tend to be motivated by the strategic interests that can be 
achieved through foreign aid. This tension creates conflicting goals with governments 
seeking economic and political advantages from foreign aid and aid bureaucracies, the 
implementers of policy, seek to increase economic and social development in recipient 
countries.  
Bureaucratic autonomy is important for a number of different outcomes—selectivity, 
policy coherence, and involvement in the aid community. Donor selectivity refers to how aid 
recipients and projects are chosen (for example, least developed countries vs. middle income 
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countries, health sectors vs. budget support). An aid agency’s policy may be altered with the 
election of a new government; however, an agency with greater autonomy is more likely to 
retain a consistent agenda over time. Bureaucrats with greater autonomy are also more likely 
to take advantage of that autonomy to increase their role in policy development.  
This topic is important for a number of reasons. It examines the decision-making 
process of foreign aid allocation in a more in-depth way than has been done before. It 
provides the potential to create policy solutions for more effective aid. It also brings the 
bureaucracy back into the field of international relations. Furthermore, it was only recently 
established as an important exploration within the foreign aid and bureaucracy literature. 
There have been a few scholars that have similarly explored how an aid agency’s institutional 
design affects aid policies (Arel-Bundock, Atkinson, and Potter 2015; Honig n.d.). These are 
important works that establish the key role autonomy has for foreign aid; however, I further 
develop this by address autonomy in terms of actual agency features and examine agencies 
outside the United States. 
Foreign Aid Bureaucracy 
The study of foreign aid largely focuses on donors as a single entity with uniform 
preferences within them. Donors are viewed solely as the governments within those 
countries making decisions on where foreign aid should go. This simplistic view has led to 
many important findings about donors and their relationships to recipients. In particular, it is 
clear that donors, as a whole, tend not to allocate aid for the benefit of recipients but rather 
for their own strategic interests. Foreign aid scholarship continually demonstrates this 
finding and it importantly demonstrates the difference between donors stated goals and their 
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actual motivations. 
However, we know that this simplistic view is not an accurate representation of 
donors. Countries are not anthropomorphized beings run by a single entity with a clear and 
unchanging perspective on policies. Rather, there are multiple decision-makers within a 
single country responsible for shaping and determining policy outcomes. In the case of 
foreign aid policy, there are many decision-makers involved both within donor countries and 
outside of them. Outside of a donor country, one can think of the interests of recipient 
governments, recipient citizens, the institutions within recipient countries, the implementing 
NGOs, international organizations, and many more. There are also multiple decision-makers 
within a donor country including the government (which can have multiple branches), 
interest groups within the country, citizens of the donor country, and the bureaucratic 
institution delegated responsibility over this policy. 
Clearly, there are many groups involved in shaping foreign aid with varying interests 
over how this aid should be allocated. There are many actors involved in this process from 
international organizations to recipient country citizens to non-governmental organizations. 
Each of these actors has an influence over foreign aid as a whole. However, it is necessary to 
pare these actors down to provide a clear overarching theory. As this dissertation is 
concerned with donors and how their policy outcomes are determined, that is where I will 
focus my attention. This is clearly another simplification regarding policymaking; however, I 
believe it is justified given the structure of foreign aid. Donors really have most, if not all the 
power in determining how their foreign aid is given. While this is changing with more 
recipients having a say in their projects, it is still ultimately the donors that make the final 
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decision. Therefore, it makes sense to look at donors themselves when trying to understand 
foreign aid policy. In future work, I do hope to examine the more complex chain of actors 
that have some influence over the shape of aid. 
While the simplification of assuming uniformity within donors has added to our 
knowledge of aid, I believe we can learn more about differences across donors if we drop 
this assumption. Governments are ultimately responsible for determining their foreign aid 
policy, yet, governments’ delegate responsibility of aid allocation to the bureaucracy. This act 
of delegation empowers another actor, the bureaucracy, to shape foreign aid. 
The foreign aid bureaucracy is responsible for the financial flows, projects, and policy 
implementation for a state (DFID 2012; USAID 2012a). There can be many different 
agencies responsible for aid allocations; the US has almost 40 different government 
organizations funding aid projects in 2006 (Lancaster 2007). The focus of this theory is on 
the primary aid agency.6 The government of a state sets the policy for foreign aid, while the 
bureaucracy handles the actual disbursement of foreign aid, including the operation and 
management of aid programs (Gibson et al. 2005). This can entail decisions on development 
of assistance programs, the sector funds are allocated, the channel of delivery, the type of 
project, and the future of aid allocations. The requires that bureaucrats “assess country 
needs, prepare strategic plans, design and evaluate programs, oversee budgets and contracts, 
and report on results” (USAID 2012b). Given the specialization needed to carryout these 
tasks, many aid bureaucrats have an advanced degree in an aspect of development. 
Depending on the discretion they have over aid, the role of the bureaucracy may be even 
                                                
6 Within the state, there is usually a single agency, which allocates almost all aid, with these other entities focusing on specialization allocations. 
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greater. 
Clearly, aid agencies have a great deal of power in determining these policies. Their 
importance has been noted by scholars as well and has led to an important discussion on 
what the best practices of donor agencies are (Easterly and Pfutze 2008; Easterly and 
Williamson 2011; Easterly 2002). These works are motivated by the many findings that 
foreign aid is ineffective at creating development within recipients as well as the many 
international agreements practices to increase aid effectives (Paris Declaration 2005, 
Millennium Development Goals 2002, Monterrey Convention 2002, etc.). There is a focus 
on the perverse incentives within the aid bureaucracy that leads to a disbursement culture 
rather than being driven by results (Easterly 2003; Martens 2005). This scholarship also 
compares agencies across suggested best policy practices including transparency, selectivity, 
overhead cost, ineffective aid channels, and specialization (Easterly and Pfutze 2008; 
Easterly and Williamson 2011). The institutional designs of aid bureaucracies clearly shape 
their behavior and can shift their practices of allocating foreign aid. These best practices lead 
to information on how aid can be improved and how we can ensure better aid is given in the 
future. 
However, I believe creating these best practices is premature. Before we can state 
how these agencies should change and act, we first must understand why these bureaucracies 
vary across donors. Only when it is clear why some agencies allocate aid following these 
practices and others do not can we make changes to these practices. Therefore, it is first 
necessary to look at the institutional design of these agencies and the relationship between 
the government and the bureaucracy. Clearly some of the practices discussed in the best 
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practices literature focus on the structure of these agencies and the incentives of bureaucrats 
within them, so let’s examines these structures and where these incentives come from. 
Principal-Agent Framework 
In order to understand the relationship between the government and the bureaucracy, 
I adopt the principal-agency framework. The general framework is that a principal (in this 
case, the government) delegates to the agent (in this case, the bureaucracy) a certain task 
(Holmstrom 1979; Shavell 1979; Stiglitz 1987). This basic framework is used across many 
fields to understand the relationship between principals and agents and has been particularly 
useful in studying the bureaucracy (Moe 1989; Wood and Waterman 1993). The delegation 
of control to a bureaucracy provides the government benefits such as specialization, division 
of labor, management of policy externalities, dispute resolution, credibility, and lock-in 
policy bias (D. Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Hawkins et al. 2006; White, Kiewiet, and 
McCubbins 1992). Generally, the government delegates control over tasks that are too costly 
for it to undertake itself due to complexity, lack of knowledge, or time (Huber and Shipan 
2002, 2006). Normally variation in delegation is examined in terms of different issue areas. 
From this perspective, scholars attempt to explain why delegation is different across these 
institutions (e.g. Why does a central bank have more autonomy than a ministry for foreign 
affairs?). My work instead holds the issue area constant in order to examine cross-national 
and inter-temporal variation in delegation. The focus of this examination, therefore, is on the 
role of the bureaucracy rather than the government’s choice in delegation.  
The principal in this scenario is the elected government of a given donor country. As 
a principal, the government delegates the work of foreign aid policy to an agent, here an aid 
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bureaucracy. The government creates this institution to provide expertise about foreign aid 
and to implement its policy objectives. The bureaucracy then reduces the cost and time for 
the government of learning about foreign aid and carrying about actual aid policies. 
Delegation provides benefits for the government in order to decrease the burden over 
creating and implementing policies. Bureaucracies serve to alleviate this burden by taking 
over a certain policy area. It is then necessary for the bureaucracy to have knowledge of 
foreign aid and enough freedom to use this knowledge. 
While there are many benefits from delegation, there are also problems and 
consequences created by the principal-agent relationship (Huber 2000; McCubbins, Noll, 
and Weingast 1989). The PA model has two basic assumptions – the government and 
bureaucracy have different preferences, and there is asymmetric information favoring agents 
(Huber and Shipan 2006). Further complicating this relationship is the fact that the 
government cannot see the bureaucrat’s effort, only the outputs from the agency 
(Sappington 1991). This creates incentives for both government and the bureaucracy to 
focus on easily monitorable outputs. Since the agent has greater knowledge than the 
principal, there is a danger the agent will use this advantage to shirk or diverge in actions 
from the principal’s preferences to its own interests (Coleman and Coleman 1994; Moe 
1984; Weingast 1984). Shirking can be particularly problematic in a government-bureaucracy 
relationship since it can lead to changes in desired policy outcomes. 
Given the possibility of the above problems, the government designs these 
institutions with mechanisms to enhance their control (D. Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; 
White, Kiewiet, and McCubbins 1992). These control mechanisms can include personnel 
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appointments, mandates, administrative procedures, budgets, and monitoring (Kiewiet and 
McCubbins 1991; Lewis 2008; Moe 2005). An often-used means of control is to have clear 
and observable outputs from which the government can measure the bureaucracy’s effort 
and adherence to its preferences (Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 1997; Wilson 1989). The 
observable outputs, however, tend to reflect short-term goals and are often weak proxies for 
the actual policies and long-term goals of these agencies. While these control mechanisms 
help address shirking, they also increase costs for the government and decrease the efficiency 
of the bureaucracy – an important reason for delegation in the first place (McCubbins, Noll, 
and Weingast 1987, 1989; McCubbins and Page 1987). The government then must balance 
the costs of these mechanisms with the cost of agency shirking. 
For foreign aid, there are a number of reasons to believe that this difference in 
preferences is quite large and quite important. The use of control mechanisms by the 
government then becomes a key influence in shaping policy outcomes. With the variation of 
amount and types of control mechanisms used by the government, one can examine these 
outcomes and the importance of this variation. This dissertation explores this variation in 
institutional design by focusing on these two actors—government and bureaucracy—and 
how their differing preferences and powers influence aid policy outcomes. 
Differing Preferences for Foreign Aid 
The principal-agent or government-bureaucracy relationship can clearly be complex 
with both benefits and costs of delegation. Governments must then balance the benefits 
they received from delegation with costs of potential shirking and having to monitor these 
agencies. One key issue to note here is that if the preferences of the government and the 
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bureaucracy were perfectly aligned, then there would be no need for the government to have 
control mechanisms in place. However, in the principal-agent relationship, it is next to 
impossible for the actor’s preferences to align perfectly, similar to the differing preferences 
over foreign aid policy. 
Following the key focus of the foreign aid literature, I categorize aid interests in two 
categories – altruistic or strategic. Altruistic motivations lead an actor to allocate aid based on 
the needs of recipients in order to help that country develop, either economically or socially. 
Recipient need is typically defined as the country’s GDP per capita or a measure of the 
country’s overall development, such as human development index or health indicator 
(Alesina and Dollar 2000; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 
1998). Strategic interests, on the other hand, lead an actor to allocate aid based on what the 
donor country can get out of the transaction. Strategic motivations are measured by the 
relationship between donor and recipient countries, including security alliances, trade level, 
status as a former colony, and amount of aid tied back to the donor country (Alesina and 
Dollar 2000). These two oft-cited and competing motivations for aid allocation represent the 
overall viewpoints actors have for their aid policy preferences and it is these motivations 
around which I structure my theory. 
These interests are clearly on opposite ends of a spectrum and should be thought of 
as ideal types rather than the typical views of actors. Rather than having all strategic or all 
altruistic motivations, both governments and bureaucracies, and the individual actors within 
them, have a range of interests that shape their views on foreign aid policy. As a result, while 
I will classify each actor’s interests as more in line with one or the other of these ideal types, 
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I do not view these as absolute definitions. The government and the bureaucracy each have 
various views of how foreign aid should be allocated and these exist on a spectrum rather 
than as individual categories. That being said, I will argue that each can be grouped as having 
interests more towards one end of this spectrum. 
I use these motivations (political vs. need) to encompass the two preferences each 
actor faces regarding foreign aid policy. This is obviously a simplistic view, as there are many 
different choices to regarding aid—country, sector, amount, implementing agency, etc. 
However, I view these two choices as the overall big policy picture that actors have for aid 
allocation. These two choices then encompass many subsequent choices within them 
regarding specific issues, but they diverge in meaningful ways that I will analyze in this 
dissertation. 
Government Preferences 
The primary concern for the political executive is power and reelection concerns 
(Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 1997). These drive politicians to follow policies approved by 
their constituents or winning coalition, including others within the political elite (Kiewiet and 
McCubbins 1985). Politicians may also have their own preferences regarding foreign aid 
policies (Fenno 1973). These two motivations – reelection and personal preferences – then 
combine to determine whether the government prefers to focus on political, strategic aid or 
aid based on recipient needs. This will depend on the preferences of citizens and political 
elite regarding aid, the salience of this issue compared to others, and a politicians own 
perspective on aid. Following these preferences, governments also favor less cost of having 
delegated (Huber and Shipan 2006). This means they will prefer to have fewer control 
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mechanisms in place, as long as their preferences are being met as stated. 
Donors spend billions of dollars each year on development assistance. The rhetoric 
and stated motivation for foreign aid is similar across all donors – the alleviation of poverty 
and the development of the world. Aid began as emergency funding to help alleviate the 
struggles of countries after World War II. Today, it is a huge international industry with 
multiple actors cooperating, or not cooperating, to raise the level of economic growth of 
developing countries across the globe. However, this motivation has been found by multiple 
studies to not be the true driving force of aid giving (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009; Maizels and Nissanke 1984; McKinlay and Little 1977, 
1978; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998). 
Rather than altruistic goals, scholars have found donors to be motivated by strategic 
interests when allocating foreign aid (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 
1998). These interests may be economic, political, or historical. If donors are motivated by 
recipients’ needs, we would see aid going to least developed countries, aid focused on long-
term growth, and aid that follows the recommended best practices. Instead, we often find 
that donors allocate aid to allies and former colonies, and send tied aid and other types of aid 
agreed as ineffective by the aid community. The rhetoric and stated purpose of foreign aid 
does not match up with actual allocations leading to ineffective aid and a lack of 
development results. 
Given previous findings of donor motivations and the lack of salience of foreign aid 
in most countries (Milner and Tingley 2009), a typical government would tend to favor aid 
based on the political motivations of the state. These motivations will tend to drive aid 
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allocations toward recipients the donor has a strategic partnership with (either through the 
international community or trade) and based on national interest group preferences 
(focusing on tied aid back to these groups). These domestic motivations reflect those 
emphasized in the foreign aid literature (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998). However, 
though this may reflect the majority of states, there are states where aid is highly salient with 
a large degree of approval (Lumsdaine 1993b; Noël and Thérien 1995). In these states, or 
when the government has a strong personal preference for recipient’s needs, aid policy 
would tend to focus on more altruistic motivations and the needs of the recipient country 
(focusing on LDCs and better aid practices). However, governments with preferences 
towards need-based aid are the exception; the typical government is more concerned with 
strategic and political motivations. These preferences of the government—reelection, power, 
and cost—then shape the level of autonomy delegated to the aid agency. 
To reiterate, the government and individual politicians within the government have a 
range of preferences regarding foreign aid. It is likely that some governments, and even more 
likely that some individual politicians, care a great deal about the needs of recipients. These 
governments and politicians would then seek to have aid allocated in a more altruistic way. 
Some scholars have found that the Scandinavian countries do behave more altruistically than 
other donors (Lumsdaine 1993a; Noël and Thérien 1995), though others refute this finding 
(Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998). While it is possible for governments to be more 
altruistic in development, governments and politicians tend to be more strategic in their 
motivations as demonstrated through continued and consistent evidence. This is especially 
when compared to the bureaucracy, as I will discuss below. This tendency is due to the 
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importance of reelection and power that the government has, which are usually viewed as 
much more important than any personal preferences for recipient countries. 
Bureaucracy Preferences 
Bureaucrats are driven by a motivation to keep their job and advance within the 
bureaucracy. This preference drives the bureaucracy to prove itself to the government 
through budget maximization and monitorable outputs (Niskanen 1975; Robinson and 
Brumby 2005), leading to a culture of disbursements within aid agencies (Williamson 2009). 
Adding to these distorted incentives is the unique feature of the foreign aid system – those 
who benefit from allocations and can observe performance cannot provide direct feedback 
(Martens 2005). This broken feedback loop makes it difficult to know whether aid allocation 
are working or not, so disbursements are encouraged without a concern for results (Easterly 
2003). While these perverse goals are often stressed in discussions of the bureaucracy, there 
are other personal motivations driving bureaucrats’ actions.  
Bureaucrats are experts within their field and have an interest in performing their jobs 
to their best of their knowledge. Consequently, bureaucrats tend towards altruistic 
motivations for foreign aid reflecting their desire to allocate aid effectively and provide for 
recipients development. Studies and interviews with agency staff show aid officials care 
about their work and believe in the goals of their agencies (Butterfield 2004; Gibson et al. 
2005). Even Easterly, who often admonishes the bureaucracy of aid, states that many aid 
bureaucrats are “smart, hardworking, dedicated professionals [who] toil away” at their jobs 
(2003, 3). A survey of the staff of the Swedish aid agency, Sida, showed that more than 70% 
of respondents were motivated by the goals and vision of Sida, enough to pursue and argue 
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for those goals outside of the organization (Gibson et al. 2005, 142). Similar motivations 
were found in bureaucrats within the Canadian International Development Agency, with 
experts arguing that problems facing CIDA were due to the political management system 
rather than the dedication of staff to development (Stewart 2009). Just as governments, not 
all bureaucrats have the same motivations and preferences.  
Overall though, aid bureaucracies tend to prefer an aid policy based on aid 
effectiveness and recipient needs. As one former aid bureaucrat noted  
Most of the aid workers could earn much more, and live more comfortable 
and less stressful lives, if they did something else. Aid workers don’t want to 
get rich: they want to help make the world a better a place. And though they 
are often teased for being self-righteous, it is a genuinely noble and admirable 
motive. (Barder 2010) 
 
Development is what drives aid bureaucrats, by in large. They have chosen this profession in 
order to “make a difference” for those in recipient countries. While not perfectly altruistic 
individuals, the focus of the aid bureaucracy is less complicated and more altruistic than 
governments. 
Role of Autonomy in Aid Policy 
Bureaucrats face both an external stimulus based on the institutional structure of the 
agency and an internal motivation from their personal experience (Gibson et al. 2005). How 
these agents choose to give aid is then determined by the level of autonomy they have from 
the government. I define autonomy as the degree of discretion and freedom of action 
available to an agent (Hawkins et al. 2006; Pollack 1997, 2003). As with all bureaucracies, 
autonomy determines whether bureaucrats will follow their own motivations and expertise 
for the task they are given or follow the preferences of the government. Bureaucracies will 
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tend to give aid based on the preferences of the government, since they are primarily driven 
by a desire to keep their positions. However, the aid bureaucracy, given its own inclination 
towards need-based aid, will only follow the preferences of the government when the 
institution has low autonomy. Under high autonomy, regardless of the government’s 
preferences, the bureaucracy will tend to give aid based on needs of recipients. It is likely 
that there will still be some adherence to the government’s preferences if they are strategic 
though, given there is never complete autonomy. Based on this typology, I argue that the 
level of autonomy of the institution affects the bureaucracy and that this plays a key role in 
shaping foreign aid policy. 
Therefore, my hypotheses are: 
H1: A domestic aid bureaucracy with a high degree of autonomy will tend to focus on 
recipient needs and effective practices in its aid policies and allocations. 
H2: A domestic aid bureaucracy with a low degree of autonomy will tend to focus on 
political and strategic goals in its aid policies and allocations. 
I use these motivations (political vs. need) to encompass the two preferences each actor 
faces regarding foreign aid policy. This is obviously a simplistic view, as there are many 
different choices made regarding aid (country, sector, amount, implementing agency, etc.). 
However, I view these two choices as the overall big policy picture that actors have for aid 
allocation. These two choices then encompass many subsequent choices within them 
regarding specific issues, but they diverge in meaningful ways that I will analyze in this 
dissertation. 
These differences in aid focuses and motivations are critical in determining the 
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effectiveness of aid allocation and increasing economic development as these agencies 
profess to. I focus on three aspects of aid policy—selectivity in donor selection of recipients 
and sectors, duration and consistency of agenda, and responsiveness and involvement in the 
aid community. Table 2.1 describes the agency outputs associated with each of these aspects 
of aid policy, how they are measured, and how they relate to hypotheses 1 and 2. These 
measures reflect previous scholarship, especially the best practices literature (Alesina and 
Dollar 2000; Easterly and Pfutze 2008; Easterly and Williamson 2011; Schraeder, Hook, and 
Taylor 1998). 
Table 2.1 Aid Policy Variables of Interest 
Variables of 
Interest 
Definition H1: High 
Autonomy  
H2: Low 
Autonomy 
A:  
Selection of 
Aid 
Recipients 
and Sectors 
The choice of recipients and 
sectors, which is representative of 
the motivations for allocation. 
Need-based: Aid 
given to LDCs, 
countries with low 
health indicators, 
untied aid 
Strategic-based: 
Aid given to 
former colonies, 
allies, trading 
partners, tied aid 
B: 
Consistency 
and 
Duration of 
Agenda 
The stability of an agency’s policy 
agenda over time and whether 
the focus is long-term or short-
term. 
Consistent in 
agenda, recipients, 
sectors; focus on 
long-term planning 
Agenda fluctuates 
over time with 
different goals, 
recipients, sectors; 
focus on short-
term objectives 
C: 
Aid 
Community  
The agency’s involvement in the 
aid community as well as its 
responsiveness to the 
community’s agreements and 
findings, especially transparency 
of information.  
Signs international 
aid agreements 
with steps towards 
implementation; 
follows best 
practices 
Does not 
participate in 
international 
agreements or 
work with other 
donors; lacks 
transparency 
 
Aid selectivity most clearly reflects actors’ motivations for aid allocation. Donors who 
focus on recipient needs will allocate aid that is known to help those in need most. Often 
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stressed through many international agreements, aid to least developed countries (LDCs) or 
countries with low health indicators (such as life expectancy or daily caloric intake) target 
those who are most in need. Choosing recipients based on these categories reflects donor’s 
motivation to end poverty and help these states. Conversely, aid to allies, trading partners, 
and former colonies reflect strategic and political motivations as these do not take into 
account aid needs. A further type of aid that reflects strategic motivations is tied aid, which is 
aid with conditions that funds are spent on goods within the donor country. These aid flows 
are criticized throughout the aid community as actually being very ineffective (Easterly and 
Pfutze 2008; Easterly 2003). Based on these differing motivations for these aid selections, I 
argue that:  
H1A: A domestic aid bureaucracy with a high degree of autonomy will tend to allocate 
aid to least developed countries (LDCs), countries with the lowest life expectancy, 
countries with the lowest caloric intake, and refrain from allocating tied aid. 
H2A: A domestic aid bureaucracy with a low degree of autonomy will tend to allocate 
aid to former colonies, trading partners, allies (based on UN voting and international 
agreements), and aid that is tied back to the donor country. 
It is important to note here that it is difficult, if not impossible, to clearly separate a 
given aid allocation into these two categories. Often recipients are both in need and have 
some strategic interests for donors. In order to circumvent this, I follow the standard in the 
literature of examining the percentage of total aid flows giving to these different recipient 
types. This is not a perfect solution, however, so I also investigate other areas of aid policy to 
present a comprehensive picture. 
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As discussed, there are perverse motives within the bureaucracy to focus on easily 
observable outputs and short-term goals in order to demonstrate effort for the government. 
However, these practices are largely ineffective in promoting development and there has 
been a push to focus on long-term and broader goals (United Nations 2000). Furthermore, 
countries with consistency of agenda will be able to realize this larger goals rather than 
shifting aid among recipients each year – leaving an atmosphere of uncertainty. It may be 
beneficial for donors who are not as driven by need to focus on these short-term, easy to 
measure loans as they are with less effort and still provide the opportunity to exhibit their 
“role” in aid. For donors’ agendas, I contend: 
H1B: A domestic aid bureaucracy with a high degree of autonomy will tend to have a 
consistent agenda over time that focuses on long-term planning and goals. 
H2B: A domestic aid bureaucracy with a low degree of autonomy will tend to have an 
inconsistent agenda, which fluctuates over time especially with government turnover, 
and focus on short-term goals and outputs. 
Involvement in the international aid community reflects an eagerness to cooperate 
with other donors as well as develop a joint agenda for aid, such as the MDGs. Donors who 
are motivated by strategic preferences would not be interested in cooperating with others as 
it would divert them from their political goals. These donors may still participate in these 
conferences and agreements due to norms of the community, but they will not be responsive 
to the aid community. However, donors with need-based motivations would strive to 
incorporate the policies the aid community has found to be effective. In particular, given the 
large amount of international pressure within the aid community, transparency and 
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availability of allocation information should be emphasized by agencies with a focus on 
need. Concerning the international aid community, I assert: 
H1C: A domestic aid bureaucracy with a high degree of autonomy will tend to have an 
active role in the aid community, often participating in meetings and signing 
international agreements, and is responsive to the findings of this community, by 
using agreed to best practices for aid allocation. 
H2C: A domestic aid bureaucracy with a low degree of autonomy will tend to not 
participate or cooperation with the aid community, and if they do, it is empty 
promises without actual responsiveness or changes. 
Each of these hypotheses encompasses the need-based and strategic-based 
frameworks respectively that I argue reflect the level of autonomy of aid bureaucracies. I, 
therefore, use these as measures of the overall framework of an aid institution. Through an 
examination of these measurable policies of an agency, I can then assess the effect that 
various levels of autonomy have on the focus of aid agencies. Given the previous 
determination that aid bureaucracies as a whole lean towards being more altruistic than 
governments, greater autonomy allows for more focus from bureaucrats on the needs of 
recipient countries and creating the most effective aid projects. Conversely, less autonomy 
puts pressure on bureaucrats to disburse aid quickly to countries and sectors that with 
known approval and that are valued by the government.  
I then argue, opposing most principal-agent literature, less control by the principal 
can lead to more “optimal” results with respect to foreign aid. In this case, more “optimal” 
results are in respect to recipient countries and their development. With the vast amount of 
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time and resources donor countries use to research and evaluate aid, there should be an 
incentive to achieve the “effectiveness” that is so often referenced. Perhaps by allowing for 
more discretion, these stated goals could be reached.7 The flipside of this, obviously, is that 
for governments focused on their own interests which do not care about recipient needs, 
this would lead to less optimal results from their perspectives. 
Autonomy 
Given the focus on an institution’s level of autonomy, it is important to define 
autonomy and how it is measured and compared across these agencies. Autonomy is defined 
here as the degree of discretion and freedom of action available to an agent (Hawkins et al. 
2006; Pollack 1997, 2003). Autonomy is what the bureaucracy can do and determines how it 
does the job it has been delegated. Some level of autonomy is necessary given delegation, but 
there can be great variation in the amount of autonomy across different bureaucracies and 
countries. Though autonomy represents the freedom an agency has from the government, it 
is often measured in terms of the control mechanisms put in place. Autonomy is then 
measured by the lack of control mechanisms. Governments determine the level of autonomy 
to allocate to a bureaucracy and must balance the costs associated with these control 
mechanism against the benefits of having prefect alignment of their preferences. 
Types of Autonomy  
Autonomy can be and has been viewed in a number of different ways. Some scholars 
have focused on formal autonomy, or de jure autonomy, and the stated control mechanisms the 
                                                
7 These are merely the stated goals of donors as demonstrated through their mission statements and international agreements. However, past 
scholarship shows that these statements should not be taken at face value. Governments certainly face other motivations for giving aid than making 
sure it is effective. 
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government has in an agency’s statute. Formal autonomy often refers to the stated legal 
autonomy of an agency, the explicit power, or lack thereof, given to an agency in its bill of 
creation. Christensen (2001, 115) defines formal autonomy as “the formal exemption of an 
agency head from full political supervision by the departmental minister.” On the opposite 
side of this is the de facto autonomy an agency has or the lack of control mechanisms in place in 
the culture of an agency. Olsen (2009, 442) defines de facto autonomy as “both the absence 
of external interference and the capability of an agency or institution to exploit available 
spaces to manoeuvre.” Formal autonomy is, therefore, the specific rules that regulate an 
institution, while de facto autonomy is the culture and norms in which an institution 
operates. These are very similar measures, but not the same. Both formal and informal 
autonomy can represent different categories of autonomy, which I will discuss in more detail 
below. 
Another way to view autonomy is to look at ex ante control versus ex post control. Ex 
ante control mechanisms are the control the government has over the agency prior to any 
actions by the agency. These might be general guidelines given to agency over how to 
conduct policy or a formal a priori approval procedure before decisions are finalized 
(Verhoest et al. 2004). Ex post control mechanisms, on the other hand, are the control the 
government has in changing the agency or the policies it makes after the agency’s actions. 
These might include reporting procedures or formal audits as well as formal sanctioning 
abilities available to the government (Verhoest et al. 2004). Using ex ante versus ex post to 
understand autonomy results in a focus on where in the decision-making process the 
government can and does intervene. 
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A final way to group autonomy, and the categorization used in this dissertation, is to 
look at the subject of these control mechanisms. There are a number of possible categories 
that scholars have used including policy autonomy, managerial autonomy, structural 
autonomy, interventional autonomy, financial autonomy, and more. These categories look at 
what aspects of agency function these control mechanisms oversee. For example, 
interventional autonomy is defined as the degree of punishment an institution may face from the 
government through the government’s ability to monitor the agency’s actions. These are 
measured by the requirements of an agency to produce reports and evaluations for the 
government as well as government audits (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987). The threat 
of punishment affects the decision-making calculus of these bureaucrats since they are being 
judged by the government and not by their performance towards the agency’s goals. 
While all of these aspects of autonomy are important and worth studying, I focus on 
two aspects that I believe to be key for understanding foreign aid bureaucracies – policy 
autonomy and structural autonomy. These two aspects of autonomy, I believe, are among 
the most important variations for bilateral foreign aid institutions. These categories capture a 
large aspect of the government’s ex ante (political) and ex post (structural) control 
mechanisms. They also look at closely at the decision-making within a bureaucracy from 
policy creation freedom (policy) and freedom from government inputs (structural). 
Furthermore, other categories of autonomy have little to no variation across agencies. For 
instance, all of the agencies studied here receive all their funding from the government, so 
there is no variation for financial autonomy. It is my goal to extend autonomy, and my 
dataset, to include other categories in the future, as I do believe that other aspects of 
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autonomy could play a role in shaping foreign aid outcomes. 
Policy Autonomy 
I define the policy autonomy of the institution as its freedom and range of possible 
decisions. Policy autonomy represents the role the bureaucracy has in determining policy. 
For example, a foreign aid bureaucracy might receive a list of aid priorities from the 
government or it could receive a list of recipients and target amounts. Clearly, the former 
bureaucracy is provided with greater autonomy as they are given the freedom to decide how 
to implement the government’s priorities, while the government tells the latter bureaucracy 
where and how much aid to give.  
Policy autonomy is shaped by ex ante government control mechanisms, as it is the 
freedom given to an agency before its actual actions. In determining the level of policy 
autonomy to give to an agency, the government often considers the technical complexity of 
the policy and preference alignment it has with the bureaucracy (Huber and Shipan 2002). A 
government then would choose to give a greater level of autonomy to an agency overseeing 
a task requiring a great deal of expertise as well as to an agency that it believes to have similar 
goals to itself. Foreign aid is a fairly complex topic given the vast amount of actors involved 
and various ways aid can be allocated. This complexity exists whether aid is given for 
altruistic or strategic reasons as altruistic aid strives to make real developed differences and 
strategic aid strives to push forth a country’s power while also being covert about this goal. 
As discussed above, the bureaucracy tends to have differing preferences from the 
government over aid policy leading the government to give the bureaucracy less policy 
autonomy. Again though, the government must weigh the costs of control mechanisms 
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against the benefits of delegation. 
Policy autonomy is measured by the restrictiveness of the agency’s law of creation as 
well as any political directives concerning discretion of process, objectives, and instruments. 
However, this is a very difficult aspect to measure, as most agencies and government do not 
list outright what they are restricted from doing. Ideally, policy autonomy will be measured 
using survey data from bureaucrats within these agencies, which will be the plan of my future 
work. One can measure some aspects of policy autonomy from what is available about these 
agencies. For instance, an agency that describes how it determines which recipient countries 
it allocates with is likely to have more policy autonomy than one that does not. This 
presumes that countries that describe this decision-making process have a say in that process 
while those without this description do not. While not ideal, this measure does provide a 
viable proxy for policy autonomy for the time being. 
Structural Autonomy 
I define structural autonomy as the extent of freedom an institution has from 
government influence within the institution. This is conceived as government control of 
appointments within the institution and is measured by the percentage of politically 
appointed staff within an aid institution, including the members of the supervisory board, if 
in place (Lewis 2008; Moe 1985). By appointing loyal members of the government to the 
institution, especially in leadership positions, the government influences the policies of that 
institution.  
This aspect of autonomy reflects how involved the government is in overseeing from 
within agency. It is an ex post control mechanism from the government as it is how the 
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government can influence current actions of the bureaucracy rather than the choices it gives 
it at the beginning. Structural autonomy can be thought of in terms of who is a bureaucrats’ 
boss. Ultimately, the government is the “boss” of all bureaucracy as it is the principal and 
creator of the institution. However, when there is a low amount of structural autonomy, the 
bureaucracy has actual members of the government within the institution itself as their actual 
“boss.” More distance from the government leads to greater autonomy and less threat of 
losing one’s job. 
The measurement of structural autonomy is more straightforward and available than 
policy autonomy. In order to determine the structural autonomy of an agency, I examine the 
amount of political appointments within the institution and the location of the agency within 
the government. For instance, an agency that is administratively autonomous from the 
government clearly has more autonomy than an agency that is within a ministerial institution 
and has a politically appointed director. 
Autonomy Index 
While governments have the power to place controls on the bureaucracy and limit its 
ability to shirk, given the fact of delegation, the government must give up some control and 
autonomy to the bureaucracy. Without some level of autonomy, there are no benefits of 
delegation. Autonomy is defined as the degree of discretion and freedom of action available 
to an agent (Hawkins et al. 2006; Pollack 2003). I operationalize an aid institution’s autonomy 
as the amount of control mechanisms the government has in place to constrain the actions 
of that institution (Verhoest et al. 2004). The greater the number of control mechanisms a 
government puts in place, the less autonomy a bureaucracy has. I further disaggregate 
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autonomy into types as described above based on which mechanisms the government uses 
that are described in  
Table 2.2. By disaggregating autonomy, I am able to understand how different types 
of control mechanisms affect international outcomes. These types will then be assessed 
individually and through an index of autonomy. 
Table 2.2 Definitions of Types of Autonomy 
 Definition Example 
Policy 
Autonomy 
The extent of freedom and range of 
decisions an institution has regarding 
objectives, instruments, target groups, and 
procedures. 
Rules, Norms, and Standards 
Set by the Government; e.g. 
detail and complexity of bill 
of agency creation 
Structural 
Autonomy 
The extent of freedom an institution has 
from government influence within the 
institution. 
Political Appointments to 
Bureaucracy or Supervisory 
Board; e.g. the Secretary of 
State 
 
Since governments and bureaucracies have different incentives and preferences, the 
level of autonomy, across all types, given to a bureaucracy plays a key role in determining 
political outcomes. An institution’s level of autonomy is an essential factor in determining, 
and understanding, international policy outcomes. The importance of autonomy may be 
especially pronounced in the case of foreign aid due to an even larger divergence of 
preferences between the government and the bureaucracy as I discuss below. 
While it is the interplay between government preferences and the institution’s level of 
autonomy that determines aid policy, I focus on the bureaucracy and its level of autonomy in 
my analysis for three main reasons. First, the bureaucracy is currently understudied in 
international relations. Most scholarship still views the state as a unitary actor and if not, 
focuses on the political government as the essential decision-maker. It is then necessary to 
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focus on the bureaucracy to present novel information about their role in determining 
international decisions. Second, most governments in fact tend to have more political and 
strategic motivations for aid giving (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 
1998). There is certainly variation across states; however, it is not unrealistic to assume that 
most states tend to have these more strategic motivations and preferences. Third, even if 
some states do have more altruistic motivations, autonomy would still shape aid policies 
across states. This is due to the mix of motivations among states as well as within 
governments. Meaning, with low autonomy and altruistic motivations, I would still expect to 
see different types of aid allocations than with high autonomy due to government turnover 
and pressure on the government from constituents and interest groups.  
Testing the Role of Autonomy 
As outlined in this chapter, I argue that the level of autonomy given to an aid agency 
determines the foreign aid policy of that donor. Agencies with a higher amount of autonomy 
will tend to have aid policies based on the needs of recipient countries, while agencies with a 
lower amount of autonomy will tend to have aid policies based on the politically strategic 
motivations of their governments. This institutional design is essential for understanding the 
variations we see across donor countries and important for making future recommendations 
for best practices.  
In this dissertation, I test this theory through three different research designs in order 
to assess its generalizability and causality. I find that the institutional design, specifically the 
level of autonomy, of domestic aid agencies has an effect on that institution’s aid policies. 
This contradicts the previously view of foreign aid as allocated by a unified donor country or 
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by an unchallenged Executive. Aid bureaucracies have the power to shape aid policies, 
whether they go along with the government’s preferences or not. 
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Chapter 3   
Aid Bureaucracy Across Countries 
 
Donor countries vary greatly in how they allocate foreign aid, despite each donor 
having the same stated purpose for these allocations. The donor motivation literature has 
shown that donors’ strategic interests play the largest role in determining these allocations 
while altruism seems to be just for show. Even with this understanding of donors’ interests, 
donors still vary greatly in how they allocate foreign aid – which recipients they give, the 
channels they use, the amount they allocate, etc. Some donors, such as Portugal tend to 
allocate aid almost entirely to their former colonies8, while Ireland allocates most of its aid to 
least developed countries9 (OECD 2013a). What explains these differences among donors? 
I argue that this variation is due to a missing element in much of the foreign aid 
literature – the aid bureaucracy within donor countries. Donor countries should not be 
thought of as individual actors, but rather the black box should be opened to examine who 
the actors are within donor countries that determine foreign aid policy. The two prominent 
decision-makers of these policies are the elected government and the aid agency within 
donor countries. The relationship between these actors shapes the aid policy of a donor 
country, as it is these agencies that implement and compose the programs delegated to them 
by the government. 
The key aspect of this relationship for aid policy outcomes is the level of autonomy 
                                                
8 Four of Portugal’s top five recipient countries (using 2012-13 averages), receiving 82% of all Portuguese aid, were former colonies. 
9 Using 2012-13 averages, Iceland allocated 80.6% of it’s ODA to LDCs (not included unallocated aid). 
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given to the bureaucracy from the government. Autonomy is so central due to the varying 
preferences of the government and bureaucracy over what should motivate aid policy. The 
government tends to have more strategic interests for allocating foreign aid due to their 
desire for international influence and reelection. The aid bureaucracy, on the other hand, 
tends to have more altruistic motivations for allocating foreign aid due to their expertise and 
personal reasons for choosing this career. Given these differing motivations, it is through an 
agency’s autonomy that aid policy outcomes are determined. 
In order to examine the role autonomy plays for the average aid agency, it is 
necessary to compare agencies across multiple countries. Through a comparison of twenty 
agencies within the top twenty OECD DAC donor countries, I assess the generalizability 
that autonomy shapes aid policy. This design demonstrates whether the role of autonomy 
holds across multiple donor and agencies. However, currently, this design and measurement 
is not yet ideal for determining the accuracy of my theory. 
The measure of autonomy presented in this chapter is still a first stage collection of 
indicators of autonomy. In order to fully develop this measure, greater detail is necessary 
about donors as it in its current form it takes into account four indicators. The case studies 
in Chapters 4 and 5 reveal a great deal of variation that exists beyond the simplistic measures 
used here. In the future, it will be necessary to fine-tune the coding scheme in order to create 
a more precise measure that accounts for further variation. For example, the influence of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a subordinate agency can vary greatly, but my current coding 
scheme would not identify this. Another step would be to create a survey for aid bureaucrats 
to answer regarding their relationship with the government in their day-to-day activities. This 
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survey would allow for greater information of the de facto autonomy of an agency and the 
culture within it. 
While this cross-country comparison is an important test of my theory, there are 
other ways to test my hypothesis. One way to look test my theory is through case studies of 
these agencies, which I provide in Chapters 4 and 5. These allow for clear understanding of 
the causality between autonomy and aid policy through both a comparisons of agencies at a 
single point in time as well as comparing an agency over time. Rather than examining 
whether an agency is within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), a case study can look at 
the actual relationship between the agency and the MFA. These may provide a better 
estimation of autonomy as it allows more to be taken into account than my operationalize 
measure. It may also prove to be more appropriate to compare an agency’s autonomy to 
itself over time rather than comparing across donor agencies. 
While in the early stages, this chapter does present further information on how best 
to move forward in future work. By taking this first measure of autonomy and comparing 
across these top twenty donor agencies, I am able to examine whether this measure looks 
appropriate at face value based on past research of these agencies. It further allows for 
testing of models and whether they present a clear understanding of aid policies and their 
relation to autonomy. Future work will expand upon this initial work in order to provide a 
more accurate and fully developed analysis. 
Aid Agency Autonomy 
Governments delegate control over various policy sectors to bureaucracy in order to 
lessen the time and costs of doing the job themselves. Through this delegation, a certain 
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amount of autonomy is giving up by the government and given over to the bureaucracy. As 
previously mentioned, this delegation can be problematic, as the government cannot fully 
control what the bureaucracy does leading to possibly shirking. This shirking is possible due 
to the government’s and bureaucracy’s interests and motivations not fully aligning.  
In the case of foreign aid, the government tends to have strategic interests and 
motivations for allocating aid to recipient countries. The government desires to increase the 
country’s position international and so may seek to “buy” influence in developing countries. 
Those within the government also seek reelection, which may lead them to allocate tied aid 
that benefits their constituents by requiring the aid be spent in the donor country. The 
government’s interests are not purely strategic and governments can clearly differ on their 
motivations for allocating foreign aid. Rather, governments have multiple interests that can 
vary from strategic to altruistic. However, what is important for this study is that 
governments tend to have more strategic motivations when compared to bureaucracies. 
The foreign aid bureaucracy tends to have more altruistic desires due to its expertise 
and personal motivations. Bureaucrats are experts in their field with many having advanced 
degrees relating to development. This expertise is one of the key reasons for government’s 
delegation in the first place. Bureaucrats’ experience with development and developing 
countries motivates them to allocate aid that will be successful and follows the guidelines put 
forth in the field. Furthermore, bureaucrats come to this field due to some personal interest 
or desire. While personal desires will clearly play a role in any bureaucrats’ work, this 
motivation may be especially prominent for foreign aid bureaucrats due to the life changing 
and significant goals of aid. 
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As with governments, bureaucrats are not purely altruistic, but rather can differ 
across countries and bureaucrats. Beyond their personal backgrounds, bureaucrats are also 
driven by job-related motivations leading them to follow the guidelines of their boss and, 
ultimately, the government. This motivation is most likely a stronger desire than any 
personal motivations, as it is immediate and permanent to keep one’s position. However, the 
desire to keep one’s job would only shift a bureaucracy from more altruistic motivations 
when a threat from the government exists. It is therefore the institutional design of a 
bureaucracy, specifically the level of autonomy it has from the government, that shapes aid 
policy outcomes from that bureaucracy. Therefore, I argue that a domestic aid bureaucracy 
with a high degree of autonomy will tend to focus on recipient needs and effective practices 
in its aid policies and allocations due to the bureaucracy’s preferences and their freedom to 
express those preferences given that autonomy. 
Autonomy is defined as the degree of discretion and freedom of action available to an 
agent (Hawkins et al. 2006; Pollack 2003). Autonomy is what the bureaucracy can do and 
determines how it does the job it has been delegated. Some level of autonomy is necessary 
given delegation, but there can be great variation in the level of autonomy across different 
bureaucracies and countries. Though autonomy represents the freedom an agency has from 
the government, it is often measured in terms of the control mechanisms put in place. 
Autonomy is then measured by the lack of control mechanisms. Governments determine the 
level of autonomy to allocate to a bureaucracy and must balance the costs associated with 
these control mechanism against the benefits of having prefect alignment of their 
preferences. 
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My hypothesis regarding how autonomy shapes aid policy outcomes lead me to three 
sub-hypotheses on specific aspects of aid policy - the selection of recipients and sectors, the 
constituency and duration of agenda, and the involvement in the aid community. Each of 
these aspects reflects an important aid policy outcome and address different aspects of 
agency’s involvement. For this chapter, I will focus solely on the aid selectivity of aid agency 
due to methodological limitations of quantifying agendas and involvements.10  
Aid Selectivity 
The selectivity of a donor refers to how and to whom an aid agency allocates foreign 
aid. This has been the most the studied aspect of aid policy as it is the most visible and main 
output of these agencies. Donors are consider selective when choosing recipients that have 
the most need or have strong institutions as well as when choosing appropriate means for 
allocating aid. Selectivity is important in the best practices literature, as selective aid has been 
shown to be more effective and successful. Given the stated goals of foreign aid, it should be 
important for donors to allocate aid that can actually achieve those goals. While both agenda 
and community involvement are important aspects of an agency’s aid policy, these areas are 
really how agencies shape their selectivity and their actual aid outputs. 
As with each of the aid policy outcomes studied, I group them into need-based and 
strategic-based categories, following the donor motivations literature. For aid selectivity, I 
argue that agencies with a high level of autonomy will focus on the needs of recipients and 
therefore allocate aid to least developed countries (LDCs), countries with low health 
                                                
10 While one can examine the amount of aid allocation to different countries, it is more different to quantify the amount of changes to an agencies 
agenda or the amount of involvement in the international community. I hope to further develop these measures in the future, but for now I examine 
these hypotheses in the case studies presented in the following chapters. 
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indicators, and without ties back to the donor country. On the other hand, agencies with a 
low level of autonomy will focus on the strategic motivations of their government and 
therefore allocate aid to former colonies, countries they are partnered with, and with ties 
back to the donor country. 
H1A: A domestic aid bureaucracy with a high degree of autonomy will tend to allocate 
aid to least developed countries (LDCs), countries with the highest child mortality 
rates, and refrain from allocating tied aid. 
H2A: A domestic aid bureaucracy with a low degree of autonomy will tend to allocate 
aid to former colonies, trading partners, allies, and aid that is tied back to the donor 
country. 
Aid selectivity considers the outputs of a donor agency, which are often of the most interest 
to the government and scholars. In Chapters 4 and 5, I explore further aspects of aid policy, 
but aid selectivity is of key importance as it is focusing on the actual product of these 
agencies.  
Data  
I use data from a variety of sources related to donor, recipient, and agency 
characteristics. The dependent variable I examine is the aid allocation of each donor agency 
in 2012. Allocations are assessed in a variety of different ways based on the characteristics of 
recipient countries. The main independent variable is the agency’s level of autonomy. I 
create a novel dataset set of aid agency autonomy from the top twenty OECD donor 
countries. Below I describe my method of collection for this variable. I also use a number of 
recipient level variables to test whether an agency focuses on recipient need or strategic 
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interests. Finally, I use a number of recipient and donor controls. 
Aid Allocation 
The dependent variable under examination is the aid allocations of these twenty 
donor agencies. These data are available from the OECD Credit Reporting System11 and 
AidData12. I use the CRS dataset as it has been updated with allocations from 2012. Using 
the CRS dataset, I created a dataset of each agency’s allocations to recipients in 2012 as well 
as a dataset with total aid across recipients for each agency. 
I examine a number of different aspects of allocation in order to assess selectivity. 
The first involves an agency’s total aid allocation. This result assesses the importance of aid 
to that country’s institution and compares across donors who have all agree to the United 
Nations agreement to allocated 0.7% of their GDP as aid. I then examine aid allocated to 
least developed countries (LDCs) and countries with a high child mortality rate.13 These 
variables assess the needs of a recipient country for aid. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 present the 
percentage of aid given to LDCs and countries with a high child mortality rate from the 
agencies examined. This gives some perspective of the variation across these donors in how 
they allocate aid.  
                                                
11 OECD 2013 
12 Tierney et al. 2011 
13 Teorell et al. 2013 
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Figure 3.1 Percentage of Total ODA to Least Developed Countries 
 
Figure 3.2 Percentage of Total ODA to High Mortality Countries 
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When considering strategic interests of donor countries, I also assess two aspects of 
recipient countries. I first examine the amount of aid given to former colonies. This is an 
aspect of a recipient country that continually shown to be a large factor in shaping aid. 
Donors with a colonial past already have a relationship with those countries and often 
continue it in order to keep their influence within that recipient. This can only capture 
information for donors with this colonial past though, so I also look at partnerships donor 
countries have with recipients. I examine aid given to trading partners as well as military 
allies.14 These factors again demonstrate the donors’ desires to have influence within a 
country rather than focus on recipient need. 
I further examine the amount of aid allocated that is tied back to the donor country. 
Tied aid is money given by a donor to a recipient with stipulations that the money be spent 
in the donor country. For example, a country may allocate aid to recipient for vaccinations, 
but then require that these funds be used to buy vaccinations from a medical research lab 
within the donor country. Therefore, while this aid does presumably help the recipient 
country, it also serves to benefit the donor government by helping their constituents’ 
businesses. It also does not take into account that the recipient may be able to purchase the 
items for less expense from another source nor does it allow for the recipient to choose 
which should be purchased with those funds. Because of this, tied aid is argued to be 
ineffective. I therefore examine the amount of aid these agencies allocate that it is tied back 
to the donor country. Agencies that allocate a high amount of tied aid, I argue, focus more 
on the strategic interests of the government rather than the needs of recipients. Figure 3.3 
                                                
14 International Monetary Fund 2014; Teorell et al. 2013 
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presents the percentage of aid given as untied aid from the agencies examined. This provides 
some perspective of the variation across these donors in how they allocate aid. 
Figure 3.3 Percentage of Total ODA that is Untied 
 
Clearly, aid given to a least developed country that is a former colony of a donor 
would qualify as both need-based and strategic aid. It is then impossible to tell the 
motivations behind the aid itself. While this is clearly an issue when assessing aid allocations 
of aid agencies, by looking at the percentage of aid allocating in each category discussed 
above, I hope to be able to present a picture of the motivations behind this aid. For 
example, though we cannot tell the difference in a single aid project to an LDC that is a 
former colony, it is highly likely that an agency that allocates a high percentage of aid to 
LDCs and a low percentage of aid to former colonies has a need-based focus. Inspecting the 
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Furthermore, by examining the interaction between autonomy and these motivating interests 
provides information on which factors seem to be driving these agencies and whether the 
level of autonomy affects the role of these interests. 
Autonomy 
The main independent variable used through this dissertation is the level of 
autonomy of an aid agency. Autonomy is the discretion or freedom an agency has over 
foreign aid policy, and is measured in terms of the control mechanisms a government has in 
place, with more control mechanisms meaning less autonomy. As discussed in Chapter 2, I 
focus on two aspects of autonomy – policy and structural. I gathered information of these 
twenty aid agencies in the first half of 2012, largely by investigating at these agencies’ 
websites. This dataset is the first attempt at collecting an accurate and valid measure of aid 
agency autonomy. It remains unrefined with a need to further develop this measure, after 
observing how it performed in the analyses below, as well as through the case studies in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
During the first half of 2012, data were collected from the top twenty bilateral aid 
donors of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). These 
countries, in alphabetical order, are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. For the purposes of this dataset, 
the aid agencies selected from these countries were the ones with the most project counts in 
the AidData dataset.15 These agencies were selected as they were observed to be the largest 
                                                
15 Tierney et al. 2011 Please see Appendix A from PLAID 1.9.1 Codebook and User’s Guide for the list of included donors and donor agencies. 
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aid giving agencies within that country, at least in terms of the amount of aid projects given. 
Therefore, it understandable that these agencies were the most focused on development aid. 
Exceptions to this selection choice are Austria16, France, Norway, and Spain. In these 
countries, the largest aid agency was bypassed in favor of examining the second largest 
agency due to it having a clear development focus.17 These choices were made to focus on a 
country’s aid agency, if possible, in order to present an examination of the top aid agencies 
within each of these top donors. Ideally, autonomy measures would be collected for all 
agencies that allocate aid. For the purposes of this dissertation, however, I focus on these 
core agencies with the greatest focus on foreign aid. 
I focus my attention on two aspects of policy autonomy that I believe play the largest 
role in determining aid policy and where the greatest variation across agencies existed. The 
first is whether the agency listed the national interest as one of the goals of foreign aid. The 
national interest is a broad term, but it can largely be associated with a greater focus on the 
strategic interests of the government. By listing this as one of its goals, the agency is signaling 
that the government is strongly involved in shaping its aid policies. The next focus is 
whether the agency has a staff dedicated to researching future development policy. If the 
agency has a staff involved in developing policy, it has a clear role in shaping policy for the 
future. 
For structural autonomy, I again focus on two features that I believe play the largest 
                                                
16 Austria’s agencies with the largest amount of aid projects were the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BMA) and Various Ministries (MIN). 
Various ministries refers to a variety of ministries, which could not be accounted for nor would one qualify for the selection criteria alone. 
17 For Spain, the largest donor in Spain was Autonomous Governments, which are attributed to the individual autonomous governments within the 
nation. Had each of these be divided for each autonomous government, there would no longer be a single largest donor among them. This was 
bypassed in order to look at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (not an agency with a specific aid focus). 
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role in determining aid policy and where the greatest variation across agencies existed. The 
first is whether and what positions in the agency are politically appointed. Agencies with 
political appointments and ones that extend throughout the agency have a large amount of 
government involvement and oversight on their activities. I also examine the location of the 
agency within the government. Agencies that are subordinate within other institutions 
focused on other foreign policy areas lack the strength within the government to have 
control and freedom to do what they wish. 
Table 3.1 Definitions of Types of Autonomy 
 Definition Example 
Policy 
Autonomy 
The extent of freedom and range of 
decisions an institution has regarding 
objectives, instruments, target groups, and 
procedures. 
Rules, Norms, and Standards 
Set by the Government; e.g. 
detail and complexity of bill 
of agency creation 
Structural 
Autonomy 
The extent of freedom an institution has 
from government influence within the 
institution. 
Political Appointments to 
Bureaucracy or Supervisory 
Board; e.g. the Secretary of 
State 
 
 Each individual variable ranges from 0 to 1 with one meaning greater autonomy, 
except for Location. The location of the agency had five separate choices available, so the 
variable ranges from 1 to 5. In order to provide an even weight across all variables within the 
autonomy index, I transformed this variable to a 0 to 1 variable as the others. In addition, 
since national interest and the order that national interest is placed among the agency’s goals 
as well as whether there are appointments and the positions of those appointments are really 
two sides of the same variable, I combined those. I did this by adding each set of variables 
together and then dividing by two, so each variable is still a 0 to 1. In each of these cases, I 
then corrected this so that each of the new variables would be equal to 1 if either national 
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interest or appointments were equal to 1. Since if these variables were equal to 1, there 
would be no variable for the following question. 
Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Autonomy Dataset 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Autonomy 20 1.780 0.728 0.4 2.8 
Policy Autonomy 20 1.200 0.696 0 2 
Structural Autonomy 20 0.580 0.194 0.2 1 
National Interest 20 0.500 0.513 0 1 
Order of Interest 10 0.600 0.516 0 1 
Research 20 0.700 0.470 0 1 
Appointments 20 0.000 0.000 0 0 
Positions 20 0.450 0.510 0 1 
Location 20 2.900 0.968 1 5 
Location 0-1 20 0.580 0.194 0.2 1 
National Interest plus 
Order 20 0.650 0.401 0 1 
Appointments plus 
Position 20 0.225 0.255 0 0.5 
Autonomy 2 20 2.155 0.758 0.6 3.3 
Policy Autonomy 2 20 1.350 0.609 0 2 
Structural Autonomy 2 20 0.805 0.335 0.4 1.5 
 
Table 3.2 presents some descriptive statistics of the autonomy dataset for each of the 
twenty agencies studied. I indexed Autonomy—as a 0 to 1 variable—in two different ways, 
with the first using national interest, research, appointments, and location. In the second, 
Autonomy 2, I use national interest plus order, research, appointments plus position, and 
location. I further index policy and structural autonomy in the same way. As the table shows, 
Autonomy ranges from 0.4 to 2.8 with Autonomy 2 ranging from 0.6 to 3.3 with each of the 
means being about 1 point below the maximum. Regarding the individual variables, most 
have a mean between 0.5 or 0.7; this shows that some variables, such as research, tend to be 
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more autonomous for agencies across the dataset. One important note is that all agencies in 
this dataset make political appointments to at least some positions in the bureaucracy. This 
further means that appointments plus position ranges from 0 to 0.5 rather than 1. Given this 
uniformity of appointments, using the Autonomy 2 index provides more information and a 
more effective comparison across agencies.  
Table 3.3 Agency's Autonomy Values 
 
 
 
Agency 
Autonomy 
Modified 
Policy 
Autonomy 
Modified 
Structural 
Autonomy 
Modified 
Autonomy  Policy 
Autonomy 
Structural 
Autonomy 
Netherlands 0.6 0 0.6 0.6 0 0.6 
Spain 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.6 0 0.6 
Italy 1.4 0.5 0.9 0.4 0 0.4 
Austria 1.4 1 0.4 1.4 1 0.4 
Ireland 1.6 1 0.6 1.6 1 0.6 
Belgium 1.7 1 0.7 1.2 1 0.2 
Canada 2.1 1 1.1 1.6 1 0.6 
Australia 2.3 1.5 0.8 1.8 1 0.8 
Denmark 2.4 1.5 0.9 1.4 1 0.4 
Norway 2.4 2 0.4 2.4 2 0.4 
Portugal 2.4 1 1.4 2.4 1 1.4 
Switzerland 2.4 2 0.4 2.4 2 0.4 
Finland 2.6 1.5 1.1 1.6 1 0.6 
Germany 2.6 2 0.6 2.6 2 0.6 
United 
States 
2.8 1.5 1.3 1.8 1 0.8 
France 2.8 2 0.8 2.8 2 0.8 
Sweden 2.9 2 0.9 2.4 2 0.4 
Japan 3 1.5 1.5 2 1 1 
United 
Kingdom 
3.1 2 1.1 2.6 2 0.6 
Korea 3.3 2 1.3 2.8 2 0.8 
Average 2.24 1.37 0.87 1.82 1.2 0.62 
 
This dataset represents a first step toward operationalizing aid agency autonomy 
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across donors. The measure is still rudimentary and needs more specificity in order to 
provide greater validity. One issue with the measure in its current form is the difficulty in 
knowing the relationship between agencies. Currently, the measure accounts for an agency’s 
location within the government. However, there can be vast differences among agencies, 
even if both are located within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, more specificity is 
needed to distinguish between agencies following the examination in the case studies 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5. Furthermore, it can be difficult to tell agencies apart and who 
has control over each area. For example, Danida is merely the term used to describe 
Denmark’s development cooperation, but throughout the website and other scholarship, 
Danida is stated to have responsibility over aid decisions and has its own staff. This can be 
confusing when trying to look at a single agency. 
Figure 3.4 Aid Agencies Level of Autonomy 
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A further concern is that there are also some agency’s levels of autonomy that do not 
seem to make sense at face value, given previous discussions from researchers and 
practitioners. Two glaring examples would be Japan’s JICA and Korea’s KOICA, which are 
ranked one and three. However, both of these agencies are implementing organizations 
without much power over policy, as there is a mechanism for the government to establish 
policy before and veto policy after, before aid is allocated. It is clear that something is 
missing in this measurement; at the very least, a further indicator would be necessary to 
discuss veto powers and whether the agency is a policymaker (though is more difficult to 
account for). Another concern is that both Canada and Australia are noted as having a great 
deal of autonomy, but they rank in the middle of the group. This could mean something is 
missing the measure, perhaps that location within the government needs further refinement 
or that being an independent organization should be weighted more heavily than other 
indicators. 
Finally, using what is published on an agency’s website leaves some aspects of 
autonomy out of the measure completely – de facto autonomy. It is difficult to get a sense of 
the culture within the agency or the day-to-day relationship with the government. A more 
accurate measure for autonomy might then include surveys of aid bureaucrats to get a sense 
of what they can and cannot do. I plan to conduct surveys in the future to account for the 
dynamics within an agency not apparent on bills or websites. I will also create indicators with 
greater specificity as well, as I think through my weighting of these individual measures more 
carefully in my future work. 
Control Variables 
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I also use a number of control variables that have previously been show to influence 
foreign aid allocations. Two variables on the donor side that have been shown to affect aid 
outputs are the welfare policies of the country and the amount the country spends on the 
military. Welfare policies for a country’s domestic population can indicate that the country 
has a general concern for the wellbeing of others and a sense that the government should 
help those who need it. Countries with a greater amount spent of public health expenditures 
as a percentage of the country’s GDP may then allocate more foreign aid. Military 
expenditure could also increase a country’s desire to allocate foreign aid as it may indicate an 
aspiration to have a stronger influence globally. Countries with a greater amount spent on 
the military as a percentage of GDP may then allocate more foreign aid. These two donor 
characteristics also focus on two overall trends of donor countries regarding their possible 
motivations for allocating foreign aid – either recipient need or strategic interest. These 
variables then can also help to account for the overall views of the government outside of 
the level of autonomy of an agency. 
I further use two characteristics of recipient countries shown to affect the amount of 
aid they receive for the agency-recipient dyad analysis. The first is an indicator of the 
country’s economic standing – Gross Domestic Product per capita. As recipient countries 
are those without a significant economic development, those with less GDP per capita 
receive greater amounts of foreign aid. Another variable demonstrated to increase a 
recipient’s aid allocations is population size. Larger countries tend to receive a greater 
amount of foreign aid than smaller countries. For both of these variables, I take the 
logarithm of the original values due to the skewedness of their distributions. 
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One of the strongest predictors of the current year’s foreign aid allocation is the 
previous year’s foreign aid allocation. Agencies and donors tend to keep allocating aid to 
recipients with whom they already have a relationship. I use a lagged variable of aid from 
2011 to control for this tendency in donors. However, the level of autonomy of the agency 
should also influence an agency’s aid from the previous year. This control variable is then 
added as a last control. 
Research Design 
I first examine the role of autonomy by reviewing the overall allocations of these 
twenty agencies in 2012. Using an Ordinary Least Squares regression, I look at the 
percentage of total aid allocation given to certain types of recipients and through certain 
types of channels. In these regressions, I use the donor level control variables to account for 
donors with strong welfare policies or high military spending allocating more foreign aid as 
well as the amount of aid given by an agency in the previous year. 
Next, I examine how foreign aid flows dyadically from agency to recipient in 2012. 
For this analysis, I interact autonomy with different variables that are either recipient need or 
strategic interest focused. In this way, I can assess how these motivations moderate an 
agency’s level of autonomy in determining ODA allocation. Again, I use Ordinary Least 
Squares regression with robust standard errors. 
As mentioned earlier, this is simply the first stage of testing and it remains 
rudimentary. Modification of both the autonomy measure and the model will be necessary in 
order to provide a more accurate test of my theory. However, the analyses presented below 
do provide information about my theory, expectation, indicators, model, and what next steps 
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are necessary in the future. 
Within this work, I use an index with an equal weight to each four of the indicators as 
discussed above and present these results. However, I also examined my results using each 
individual autonomy measure as well as grouping by each type of autonomy—structural and 
policy. These robustness checks provide similar results for those I present and can be found 
in Appendix C. 
Empirical Findings 
The analyses presented here do not provide support for my theory. Rather, most 
results follow the opposite of my expectations – greater autonomy leads to less recipient 
focused aid and greater aid based on donor strategic interest. This is a puzzling result, which 
deserves further exploration in order to understand how autonomy is playing a role and 
whether the measures and models presented are accurate. Contradicting my theory as well as 
previous scholarship (Arel-Bundock, Atkinson, and Potter 2015; Honig n.d.), these results 
suggest further need for research in this area. At the end of this chapter, I suggest a number 
of possible reasons for this contradictory result that I plan to examine further in my future 
research. 
I first present a few simple scatter plots comparing agency’s autonomy levels to the 
percentage of aid allocated for different recipients and through different approaches. Figure 
3.5 compares autonomy to the percentage of aid agency’s allocate to least developed 
countries (LDCs). My theory predicts that agencies with a greater level of autonomy, and 
therefore more of a recipient need focus, will ten to allocate more aid to LDCs. The figure 
does not present a clear relationship between autonomy and LDC aid though. Japan’s 
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International Cooperation Agency received an autonomy score of three, yet allocates just 
10% of its aid to LDCs. The Netherland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a score of 0.6 
for autonomy, but it allocates around 70% of aid to LDCs. These agencies, and the overall 
view presented in Figure 3.5, seem to show a slightly negative relationship between 
autonomy and LDC aid. This finding is similar when disaggregating my index of autonomy. 
Figure 3.5 Aid Agency Autonomy Compared to LDC Aid 
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rate. My theory would predict that countries with a high level of autonomy would allocate 
more aid to countries with low health indicators, such as child mortality rates. Figure 3.6, 
however, supports the opposite finding. This finding is similar when disaggregating my index 
of autonomy. 
Figure 3.6 Aid Agency Autonomy Compared to High Mortality Aid 
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untied. This finding is similar when disaggregating my index of autonomy. 
Figure 3.7 Aid Agency Autonomy Compared to Untied Aid 
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then add further control variables reflecting donor interests. In Table 3.4, I present the 
coefficients for autonomy in each of these models. The complete models can be found in 
Appendix B. 
Table 3.4 OLS Regression of Agency Total Allocation 
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
% Untied 
(2) 
% LDC 
(3) 
% Colony 
(4) 
% Mortality 
          
Autonomy 
 
-5.26 
(5.03) 
-12.16* 
(5.99) 
10.90 
(9.91) 
-8.28** 
(3.92) 
Autonomy  
with health spending 
-3.88 
(4.11) 
-13.06* 
(6.92) 
10.78 
(10.18) 
-7.92* 
(4.26) 
Autonomy  
with military spending 
-2.73 
(4.85) 
-14.36** 
(6.31) 
21.80 
(12.63) 
-9.81* 
(4.79) 
Autonomy  
with donor variables 
-1.18 
(5.02) 
-15.39** 
(7.12) 
20.32 
(14.97) 
-9.43* 
(5.26) 
Autonomy 
with donor variables and lagged aid 
-0.34 
(5.36) 
-9.82 
(8.33) 
46.56*** 
(5.98) 
-5.99 
(5.56) 
     Observations 20 20 9 20 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results presented in Table 3.4 follow a similar pattern to the figures presented 
above; however, the significance of these findings is revealed. With a higher level of 
autonomy, agencies allocate less untied aid across all models and controls. However, this 
coefficient is diminishing with added controls and is never significant. In model 3, autonomy 
is positive, demonstrating a tendency for agencies with higher autonomy to allocate more aid 
to former colonies. However, this result is insignificant except when all controls are used. 
Furthermore, this model only contains nine observations, given the number of donors with 
former colonies. This small number of observations may affect the results. 
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With a higher level of autonomy, agencies allocate less aid to least developed 
countries. This result is significant except when the full controls are used. The coefficient for 
autonomy is also increasing with added donor interest controls. Model 2 then goes in the 
opposite direction of my theory suggesting that autonomy does play a role, but that more 
autonomous agencies allocate less to LDCs, therefore, less based on recipient needs. Model 
4 does not also does not support my theory. Agencies with a higher level of autonomy 
allocate less aid to countries with high child mortality rates. This result is significant across all 
models, except for when lagged aid is included. These finding is similar when disaggregating 
my index of autonomy as shown in Appendix B. 
In a number of robustness checks listed in Appendix C, I attempted to see if there is 
something grouping agencies that allocated less aid to LDCs, recipients with high mortality 
rates, or untied aid. However, I found the results held when dropping countries in the lowest 
25% for each of these categories of aid. I also dropped the outlier agencies previously 
mentioned, but the results hold for these models as well. Again, there may be an issue with 
measure to consider. We might also consider a further way to assess aid allocations by 
looking at the donor recipient relationship rather than just at total donor allocations across 
recipients. 
Following the above analyses examining total aid from each agency, I also examine 
the aid dyadically in order to explore the donor-recipient dynamic more fully and the role of 
autonomy in shaping where aid is allocated. The dependent variable is then donor-recipient 
aid logged. In order examine the role of autonomy compared to characteristics of recipient 
countries, I interact autonomy with each of these variables. In terms of recipient need, I 
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examine how autonomy interacts with a recipient country being a least developed country or 
having a high child mortality rate. My theory would predict that as both autonomy and these 
need-based characteristics increase, so would aid allocation. I also examine donor strategic 
interests using recipient characteristics – whether the recipient is a former colony, has a trade 
relationship with the donor, or is in a defense alliance with the donor. My theory would 
predict the opposite with recipient-need indicators, as autonomy and strategic interest 
indicators increase aid allocation should decrease. For these models, I again first present a 
basic version without control variables and then present the model with control variables 
below. In Table 3.5, I present the coefficient estimates for autonomy, recipient characteristic, 
and the interaction term. 
Table 3.5 Dyadic OLS Regression of Agency Allocations 
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
LDC 
(2) 
Mortality 
(3) 
Colony 
(4) 
Trade 
(5) 
Ally 
Autonomy 1.64*** 
(-0.12) 
2.55*** 
(-0.36) 
1.36*** 
(-0.11) 
-0.7 
(-0.79) 
1.35*** 
(-0.1) 
Recipient Characteristic 1.96*** 
(-0.51) 
0.73*** 
(-0.25) 
1.22 
(-0.98) 
-0.13* 
(-0.07) 
-1.28 
(-1.33) 
Autonomy*  
Recipient Characteristic 
-0.82*** 
(-0.19) 
-0.33*** 
(-0.1) 
-0.21 
(-0.37) 
0.11*** 
(-0.04) 
0.76 
(-0.53) 
Log(GDP pc) -0.56*** 
(0.09) 
-0.61*** 
(0.09) 
-0.58*** 
(0.06) 
-0.72*** 
(0.08) 
-0.60*** 
(0.06) 
Log(Population) 0.42*** 
(0.03) 
0.43*** 
(0.03) 
0.42*** 
(0.03) 
0.30*** 
(0.06) 
0.42*** 
(0.03) 
Health expenditure, public 
(% of GDP) 
0.61*** 
(0.04) 
0.61*** 
(0.04) 
0.60*** 
(0.04) 
0.58*** 
(0.05) 
0.59*** 
(0.04) 
Military expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
0.14** 
(0.07) 
0.14** 
(0.07) 
0.12* 
(0.07) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
      Constant -10.06*** 
(-1.16) 
-11.62*** 
(-1.58) 
-9.04*** 
(-0.94) 
-3.26 
(-2.53) 
-8.78*** 
(-0.95) 
Observations 1,534 1,534 1,534 1,509 1,534 
R-squared 0.3 0.3 0.29 0.31 0.29 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As autonomy of aid agency increases, aid allocation increases across the models, 
except for model 4. This does fit with my theory that greater autonomy would lead to a 
greater focus on recipient needs, thereby increasing the amount of aid available to an agency. 
By raising the importance of recipient’s needs and foreign aid in general, it is likely that 
agencies that are more autonomous would also allocate more aid.  
Least developed countries (LDCs) receive a greater amount of aid across agencies 
without a high level of autonomy (1.96). However, this effect is diminished as autonomy of 
aid agency increases (1.14). So while autonomous agencies do allocate more aid to LDCs 
than other countries, this effect is lower than it is for less autonomous agencies. Countries 
with a higher level of child mortality receive a larger allocation of aid across agencies with 
less autonomy (0.73). Again though, this effect is lessened when autonomy is included (0.4). 
More control from the government then leads to greater focus on recipient need. 
Regarding donor strategic interest, the findings are again opposite from my 
expectations. Countries that are trading partners receive less aid from agencies with a low 
level of autonomy (-0.13). However, when autonomy is included, trading partners receive a 
greater amount aid than from agencies with less autonomy (1.01). Agencies with a high 
degree of autonomy still allocate less aid to trading partners than to other recipients, but 
these agencies also allocate a greater amount of aid to former colonies than agencies with 
less autonomy. There are similar results for allies with increases in either leading to less aid 
across agencies without autonomy (-1.28). However, when autonomy is interacted with the 
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measure, aid to allies (-0.52) is greater then with less autonomy, though this is not significant. 
So agencies with a high level autonomy give less aid to allies than they do to other recipients, 
but they allocate more aid to recipients with this strategic interests for donors than do 
agencies with less autonomy. Recipients that are former colonies receive a greater amount of 
aid from agencies with lower levels of autonomy (1.22), though this coefficient is 
insignificant. This is also insignificant, but when agencies have a higher level of autonomy 
they allocate somewhat less aid to former colonies (1.01) though still more than to other 
recipients in comparison. 
The control variables generally follow my expectations. Countries with a lower level 
of GDP per capita and a large population receive more aid. These recipient level 
characteristics follow in line with previous findings and understanding about aid. The donor 
level characteristics are more mixed. Agencies in donors with higher health expenditure 
allocate more aid. These countries tend to have a greater regard for welfare, which extends 
beyond domestic politics. Agencies in donors with a higher amount spent of the military 
allocate a greater amount of aid, though this is insignificant when accounting for recipients’ 
status as allies or trading partners. My expectation was that donors with greater funding to 
the military would be less willing to give aid. However, perhaps greater military spending 
demonstrates more concern international in general and therefore an interest in protecting 
the state in a number of ways including aid. 
I have performed robustness checks with further iterations of these regressions as 
well in order to assess whether there is something about specific donors or perhaps 
something about a certain type of autonomy causing the results to be opposite from my 
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theory’s expectation. However, the results remain similar when donors are dropped and 
when assessing more specific measures of autonomy (policy and structural indicators). 
Further investigation of these models and autonomy measures is necessary. 
Conclusion 
The results present in this chapter are in the first stage of development and further 
work is necessary to create a more precise measure of autonomy as well as to find the 
appropriate model for assessing the role of autonomy across donors. However, the findings 
revealed here do not support my theoretical expectations. It is possible there are issues with 
the measures and model, but I must also be aware of the possibility that my theoretical 
implications are inaccurate, at least in terms of comparing across agencies. More work is 
necessary in order to understand whether the error lies in my theory or in the methods. 
In the future, there is more to be done with this research design to ensure both the 
measure and the design are more accurate. As the case studies show (in Chapters 4 and 5), there 
is more detail that my operationalizing of autonomy is not picking up. A first step to refine this 
measure would be to include questions that are more precise in the coding scheme. With more 
detail, this measure will be better able to distinguish between agencies that have the same 
location in the government or both state the national interest as one of their goals. A further 
adjustment to the measure is to survey aid bureaucrats within these institutions. A survey would 
provide greater information on the de facto, or informal, autonomy that exists within the culture 
of the agency. It would also provide more information about the day-to-day relationship between 
the government and the bureaucracy, which is not published online. Another possible 
modification to my measure of autonomy would be to look over time at these agencies rather 
than taking a snap shot in time. As the case studies demonstrate, there can be both minor and 
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major changes in agencies that represent large and small shifts in their levels of autonomy. It 
may be necessary to take these changes into accurate for a more accurate and valid measure. 
It is also possible that I am unable to separate the type of aid into the categories of 
need-based and strategic properly. As mentioned, it is not possible to be completely clear if 
funds are allocated for the purpose of development or political reasons as a country can be 
in need and also be a strategic ally for a donor. I attempt to get past this by examining the 
percentage of aid sent to each “type” of recipient. However, this may be inaccurate and 
could be a possible explain for this finding. Perhaps there would be a way to look more 
careful of these allocations and attempt to separate out these different motivations more 
fully.  
It may also be the case that the influence of autonomy is not as straightforward as I 
have presented in my theory. It may be that autonomy functions in different ways for 
different types of donor countries. Perhaps the influence of autonomy is stronger when 
there is a division of government or public opinion. It may be the case that countries with a 
consistent and popular view of foreign aid—whether in favor of strategic goals or recipient 
need—would have an aid institution with a high degree of autonomy. It could also be the 
case that other donor country characteristics (such as voting rules) influence the role of 
autonomy. For example, many of the countries with a high level autonomy are majoritarian. 
These factors would then affect the results presented, as different agencies would then be 
influenced in different ways by autonomy.  
There are also other ways to test my hypothesis beyond what was presented in this 
chapter. Perhaps autonomy, even with changes to the operationalization, is best understood 
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through a case study. As Chapter 4 and 5 demonstrate, there is much more detail and nuance 
that can be gathered through a case study. As recommended by Chapter 5 and the case study 
of United States Agency for International Development, it may be best to study autonomy as 
a longitudinal phenomenon. Perhaps it is necessary to compare an agency to itself overtime 
rather than across donors. A final possible research design would look more dynamically at 
autonomy and aid policies through a multilevel model. This would account for nesting 
within each donor agency so that the slopes could vary across agencies themselves. 
 While the results presented here are unexpected based on my theory, they 
demonstrate that there is a link between agency autonomy and aid allocation. Further work is 
necessary in order to fully understand the role and influence of autonomy across countries. 
In the future, I plan to investigate the possibilities presented above by looking at the 
different characteristics of donor countries and their relation to aid agency autonomy. As 
highlighted, my dataset of autonomy will be further expanded and refined with the influence 
of the findings of my case studies. This will provide greater insight into more specific 
indicators of autonomy. I will also examine different methods to understand the role of 
autonomy with two further cases presented in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 4    
Most Different Comparison of Agenda and Community 
 
Aid policy outcomes should be understood not as the result of a unitary actor’s 
preferences and motivations; rather, it is through the relationship and interplay of the elected 
government and aid bureaucracy that aid polices are determined. It is therefore necessary to 
open the black box of the donor country to explore the dynamics between these two 
important actors. As discussed in Chapter 2, the institutional design of these aid agencies 
play a major role in shaping aid policies due to the varying preferences of governments and 
bureaucracies. 
While governments are often motivated to give foreign aid due to strategic interests, 
bureaucrats are often driven by a desire to help those in developing countries. Politicians are 
primarily interested in securing their power within their own country as well as building up 
their country’s power. This drives them to follow the path their constituents wish, to secure 
reelection for themselves or their party, and foreign aid is often not a key concern of 
constituents. The focus then becomes on securing domestic concerns. Foreign aid can then 
be used as a tool of foreign policy in order to create or sustain alliances, whether for trade, 
military, or international support. Foreign aid can also benefit constituents by being tied to 
domestic industries. All of these paths lead to aid allocated for strategic and political reasons, 
if the government’s preferences are followed. 
On the other hand, bureaucrats are experts in their field, international development, 
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with many having advanced and specialized degrees. This leads to them to have knowledge 
of what works, and what does not, regarding development policy and foreign aid. 
Furthermore, it means that they were motivated to come to this field for quite some time, 
even prior to joining the foreign aid bureaucracy. Therefore, while bureaucrats inherently 
care most about keeping their jobs and their own mobility within their institution, they also 
have their own personal preferences that lead them to this job in the first place. This 
preference means they are often interested in creating development for these countries and 
ensuring aid is effective in this task. 
While I have outlined the preferences of the government and the bureaucracy as 
opposite, this is merely an ideal framework. Rather than each actor having unique and 
separate motivations for foreign aid, all actors within the government and the bureaucracy 
have a range of interests that will naturally overlap for some. It is likely that there will be a 
politician with a strong personal preference for encouraging development or a bureaucrat 
with a drive to increase their country’s overall international power. While these cases are 
possible, these examples would not be the norm. It is more likely that the bureaucracy, as a 
whole, tends to prefer aid based on the needs of the recipient country, while it is more likely 
that the government, as a whole, tends to prefer aid based on strategic interests of the donor 
country. 
Given these tendencies, the way an agency allocates aid is then determined by the 
level of autonomy given to an aid agency. With a greater amount of autonomy, a bureaucracy 
will be able to allocate aid more in line with their own preferences and therefore based on 
the needs of recipients. However, when a bureaucracy has a low level of autonomy, the 
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government has more power over the agency and aid is then more likely to be allocated 
based on the donor’s interests, following the motivation of the government. Autonomy then 
plays a key role in shaping the aid policy of an aid agency. 
While the results from Chapter 3 do not demonstrate strong support for my theory, 
there are other areas of aid policy beyond selectivity of aid recipients. In this chapter, I 
extend the examination from the previous chapter to look at the agendas and community 
involvement of these agencies. These areas of aid policy focus less on outputs of the agency 
and more on the dynamics within the agency. Applying my overarching theory to agenda and 
community involvement, I argue that agencies with a higher level of autonomy will have a 
more consistent agenda focused on long-term goals and be more involved with the aid 
community as well as following through on their international commitments. Following this, 
agencies with a low level of autonomy will tend to have an agenda focused on short-term 
goals that is likely to change with government turnover and be less active in the development 
community with less implementation of international commitments. 
In order to examine these hypotheses, I look at three aid agencies with varying 
degrees of autonomy. Quantifying measures for agenda and community involvement are 
more difficult, so I have chosen to use case studies in order to understand the influence of 
autonomy on these aspects of aid policy. The three chosen cases are Spain, Switzerland, and 
Sweden. These agencies were chosen as they represent the spectrum of possible autonomy 
with Spain have a low level autonomy, Switzerland having a medium amount of autonomy, 
and Sweden having a high level of autonomy. This represents a diverse case study 
comparison by looking at how these different levels of autonomy relate to these agencies’ 
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agendas and community involvement. 
Aid Policy Outcomes 
As it is a donor’s foreign aid bureaucracy that is ultimately responsible for 
determining the aid output of a country, it is necessary to understand how these institutions 
make those decisions and what affects that decision-making process. I argue that the level of 
autonomy plays a key role in shaping these aid outputs and policies. This is due to an 
institution’s autonomy shaping the power of both actors involved in making these decisions 
– the government and the bureaucracy. When there is a high level of autonomy, the aid 
policy of an agency will have a greater focus on the needs of recipient countries as the 
bureaucracy itself has more influence on how aid is allocated and how policies are formed. 
When there is a low level of autonomy, the government has a greater degree of influence 
leading aid policy to focus more on the strategic interests of the donor country. 
By taking into account the role of autonomy, researchers and practitioners can better 
understand why some agencies seem more apt to allocate “effective” aid. Without this 
understanding, any work done to determine what aid policies work will fall on deaf ears since 
the bureaucrats will be unable to implement these suggestions despite often wanting to. 
In Chapter 3, I focused on the first of three hypotheses involving different aspects of 
an agency’s aid policy. Regarding aid selectivity, I argue: 
H1A: A domestic aid bureaucracy with a high degree of autonomy will tend to allocate 
aid to least developed countries (LDCs), countries with the lowest life expectancy, 
countries with the lowest caloric intake, and refrain from allocating tied aid. 
H2A: A domestic aid bureaucracy with a low degree of autonomy will tend to allocate 
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aid to former colonies, trading partners, allies (based on UN voting and international 
agreements), and aid that is tied back to the donor country. 
Aid selectivity, specifically which countries receive aid and what type of aid, is one of the 
most examined aspects of donor aid policies. Aid allocations are the most visible output of 
these agencies and the easiest to quantify and examine making them an important and 
obvious choice of focus. While clearly a vital aspect of an agency’s aid policy, these outputs 
are not the only aspect one can study.  
In this chapter, I examine two other aspects of aid policy – the policy agenda of an 
agency and the agency’s involvement in the aid community. Each of these features are also 
influenced by an agency’s level of autonomy and can further demonstrate the role that 
autonomy plays in shaping their aid policy. All facets of an agency’s aid policy are influenced 
by autonomy, but these aspects also influence each other. For example, a country that has a 
higher level of autonomy and is able to be more involved in the aid community may be more 
influenced by those findings of what aid practices work. This agency, given a high enough 
level of autonomy, may then be able to add these practices into the goals of their agenda and 
mission statement thereby changing the way they select recipients and sectors. It is therefore 
important to look at all aspects of an agency’s aid policy rather than just looking at aid 
allocation outputs. 
Agency Agenda Setting 
Aid bureaucracies are charged with control over foreign aid and given power to 
determine policies of this issue. When creating an agency, there is often some form of 
mission or purpose stated for the agency reflecting the government’s belief and desires for 
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what the agency will do. This purpose is then interpreting by the agency and often restated in 
a mission statement that describes the agency’s agenda. This agenda can change based on 
external or internal influences. For example, an agency may be influenced by an international 
agreement or new research findings on what foreign aid priorities are. Alternatively, a new 
government taking office with different political leanings on how aid should be given may 
influence an agency. 
These changes in an agency’s agenda then may be influenced the level of autonomy 
an agency has. When an agency has a high level of autonomy, its agenda is likely to be more 
consistent over time as it will not change due to a new administration taking office. Rather, 
changes that do take place should not coincide with changes in political party. It is also likely 
that aid agencies with greater autonomy will focus more on longer-term planning. This is due 
to long-term planning being a more effective form of aid policy as well as the agency having 
more time available to it to make these plans and changes. An agency with greater autonomy 
can afford to plan long-term because there is less of a threat from the government changing 
the institution and its way of allocating aid. I therefore argue:  
H1B: A domestic aid bureaucracy with a high degree of autonomy will tend to have a 
consistent agenda over time that focuses on long-term planning and goals. 
H2B: A domestic aid bureaucracy with a low degree of autonomy will tend to have an 
inconsistent agenda, which fluctuates over time especially with government turnover, 
and focus on short-term goals and outputs. 
As reflected in this hypothesis, agencies with less autonomy are more susceptible to 
changes in the government and shifts in political parties. This will cause their agenda to be 
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inconsistent over time with changes in the agency’s goals, to whom they allocate aid, which 
areas they focus on, and more. These continual shifts from government involvement will 
also create a focus on more short-term objectives. This is due to governments’ desire for 
quick results as well as the agency’s need to please the government for fear of government 
punishment due to control mechanisms.  
I therefore argue that autonomy can play a large role in shaping the agenda of these 
agencies due to the different motivations of the government and the bureaucracy. 
Bureaucracies have an interest in achieving development in recipient countries using the 
knowledge they have of effective aid policy and are looking to do so long-term. With high 
autonomy, this leads to a more consistent and long-term focused agenda. When aid agencies 
have a low level of autonomy, the government has more influence over their agenda. Since 
governments focus on strategic interests and quick, obvious results, this leads to an agenda 
that fluctuates with changes in political parties and a focus on short-term outputs. 
Involvement in the Aid Community 
There is a large international community focused on the issue of foreign aid. This 
community involves donor agencies, international organizations, non-governmental 
organizations, researchers, practitioners, and more. Members of this community share 
knowledge, discuss best practices, and make international agreements. For example, donors 
stated in a United Nations General Assembly Resolution in 1970 that they would allocate aid 
at the level of 0.7% of their gross national product (United Nations 1970). This 
commitment, as well as other goals, was reaffirmed multiple times, including the Monterrey 
Consensus and Doha Declaration. Making these commitments and being involved in 
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shaping of the goals of this community holds a donor and an agency accountable to others 
and influences them to follow agreed upon practices. 
The influence of and involvement in the international aid community shaped by an 
agency’s level of autonomy. When an agency has a high level of autonomy, the bureaucracy 
can determine their own level of involvement and will often choose to be part of and 
perhaps a major player in the development community. An agency might choose this 
involvement because bureaucrats are interested in learning from others and knowing what 
has been successful. With a high level of autonomy, bureaucrats determine aid policies more 
fully and the development community may be a source of information for bureaucrats in 
making these policy decisions. Another possible reason for involvement in this community is 
due to a desire to enhance their agency’s power and sphere of influence in their own field. 
As stated in Chapter 2, bureaucrats are interested in keeping their jobs and gaining success 
for themselves and their agency. One avenue to gain success is through this international 
community. With a high level of autonomy, an agency will have more freedom to assert 
themselves within this community rather than having government control mechanisms 
hindering what they do. I therefore argue:  
H1C: A domestic aid bureaucracy with a high degree of autonomy will tend to have an 
active role in the aid community, often participating in meetings and signing 
international agreements, and is responsive to the findings of this community, by 
using agreed to best practices for aid allocation. 
H2C: A domestic aid bureaucracy with a low degree of autonomy will tend to not 
participate or cooperation with the aid community, and if they do, it is empty 
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promises without actual responsiveness or changes. 
Aid agencies with a low degree of autonomy are more closely tied to the preferences 
of the government and therefore cannot as easily shift their policies to what is agreed on by 
the international aid community. This may lead agencies to not participate at all in these 
conferences or to not sign agreements as their government would be against them or limit 
what the agency can do. However, since it might give favorable media for the government to 
participate in conferences and sign onto these agreements, the agencies might seem active in 
the community but not actually implement these commitments into their policies. 
Research Design 
In order assess the role of autonomy in shaping an aid agency’s agenda and 
community involvement, it is necessary to conduct a case study analysis. These two aspects 
of aid policy are harder to quantify for a quantitative analysis; however, I can investigate 
these facets of policy by exploring individual agencies. In order to do so, I have chosen three 
aid agencies representing a spectrum of autonomy. In this way, I am choosing “ideal” cases 
at three levels – low autonomy (Spain), medium autonomy (Switzerland), and high autonomy 
(Sweden). By selecting these diverse cases, I can present two cases with extreme values of 
autonomy and one case with an average value of autonomy. These cases then represent the 
full the range of autonomy levels possible in donor aid agencies (Gerring 2007; Seawright 
and Gerring 2008). 
Diverse case studies allow for comparison across the full range of variation in the 
variable of interest. The sample cases chosen should then be representative of the general 
population and this type of case selection is more representative than other small sample 
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techniques (Gerring 2007; Seawright and Gerring 2008). From using these three 
representative cases, I can then make a claim about the role of autonomy in the general 
population of bilateral aid agencies. Given my theory, by selecting these three diverse cases, I 
am predicting there will be contrasting results for predictable reasons allowing for me to 
assess and illustrate whether my theory works across agencies (Yin 2013). 
In order to assess these agencies’ levels of autonomy, I use the same coding scheme 
as presented in Chapter 2 and again using data from the year 2012. As I am examining a 
limited number of cases, I am able to describe these findings and other interesting aspects of 
agencies’ autonomy more deeply. To determine their agendas and involvement in the 
development community, I reviewed their websites to examine mission statements, policy 
papers, strategic plans, and what other aspects are highlighted. Through this information, I 
am able to assess whether their agendas have a long-term or short-term focus, what practices 
they use, what international agreements they emphasize, etc. I also examine peer reviews 
conducted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) 
Development Co-operation Directorate (DAC), which discuss each of these agencies in 
terms of how they are preforming and whether they are following international 
commitments. These DAC peer reviews also provide a glimpse as to whether the agency 
implemented recommended changes within the previous five years.18 
I then compare each agency’s aid policy to the others in order to examine whether my 
hypotheses hold. If my theory is accurate, I would expect Sweden’s Sida to have a long-term 
agenda and high involvement in the community and Spain’s MAEC to have a short-term 
                                                
18 DAC OECD peer reviews are conducted on each agency in a rotating cycle, every four to five years. 
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agenda and less involvement in the community, while Switzerland’s SDC should be placed 
somewhere in the middle. Through this case study analysis, I can look further into the 
different types of autonomy to see whether one or more aspects seem to have a greater 
influence. 
Case Study Comparisons 
In order to examine the role autonomy plays in shaping the aid policies of these 
agencies, I will first present their level of autonomy in 2012 using the coding scheme 
presenting in Chapter 3, and adding more detail to these indicators. Using their varying levels 
of autonomy, I examine each agency’s aid policy across all categories—selectivity, agenda, 
and community involvement. By comparing these findings to my theoretical expectations, I 
can assess whether autonomy has an impact on and a role in shaping aid agency policy.  
Autonomy 
These agencies represent a spectrum of levels of autonomy with Spain’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC) having a low level of autonomy (1.1 according to 
my coding), Switzerland’s Agency for Development of Cooperation (SDC) having a medium 
level of autonomy (2.4), and Sweden’s International Development Cooperation Agency 
(Sida) having a high level of autonomy (2.9). Table 4.1 below lists each agency’s level of 
autonomy and the coding measures used to create this index. While this measure does 
present a step in the right direction for operationalizing autonomy, further refinement is 
necessary.19 A possible means to create a better understanding of aid agency autonomy is 
through a qualitative approach, which can provide more nuance than a coding scheme. I 
                                                
19 I discuss this further in other chapters of my dissertation; so do not go into detail here about these refinements.  
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therefore further discuss the autonomy of these agencies in order to broaden our 
understanding. 
Table 4.1 Levels of Autonomy in 2012 
Agency Location Political 
Appointments 
National 
Interest 
Research Autonomy 
Spain’s 
MAEC 
Cabinet-
Level 
Ministry (0.6) 
Beyond the 
agency head 
(0.0) 
Yes, but not 
in goals for 
development 
(0.5) 
No (0.0) 1.1 (13th) 
Switzerland’s 
SDC  
Subordinate 
within 
Federal 
Department 
of Foreign 
Affairs (0.4) 
Director 
General and 
Deputy 
Director 
General (0.0) 
Not a focus 
(1.0) 
Analysis and 
Policy 
Division 
(1.0) 
2.4 (7th) 
Sweden’s 
Sida 
Subordinate 
within the 
Ministry for 
Foreign 
Affairs (0.4) 
Only 
Director-
General (0.5) 
Not a focus 
(1.0) 
Multiple 
departments 
(1.0) 
2.9 (4th) 
 
Spain’s MAEC has the second lowest level of autonomy of the twenty agencies 
examined in this dataset. Structurally, the MAEC is a cabinet-level ministry giving it some 
importance within the government. However, given its focus on foreign policy issues 
broadly, development and foreign aid are not top priorities. Furthermore, political 
appointments to MAEC go beyond the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation to a 
group of three Secretaries of State. These political appointments allow for further 
government control within the MAEC. Politically, the MAEC focuses on foreign policy 
goals meaning the national interest of Spain is at the forefront. However, when looking 
specifically at the MAEC’s goals and mission for development, Spain’s national interest is 
not present. The MAEC does not have a research department specifically for development 
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and foreign aid, demonstrating a lack of ability to create its own policies. 
The level of autonomy of Switzerland’s SDC seems to be a relatively high number – 
2.4 –  with 3.3 being the highest level an agency ranked for this dataset. However, it is in the 
middle of all agencies represented (ranking 7th out of 14 with ties across countries, receiving 
the same score as Norway and Denmark). The SDC is an agency subordinate within the 
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs; however, its focus is entirely on development 
without mention of the national interest. Its policy autonomy is further strengthened by its 
department for research and policy (Analysis and Policy Division). While policy autonomy is 
high, the SDC’s structural autonomy is low given its location in the government as well as 
political appointments to Director General and Deputy Director General. 
Sweden’s Sida received 2.9 as its level of autonomy, with only one agency with a 
higher level of autonomy.20 Similar to the SDC, Sida is an agency subordinate within the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs; however, its focus is entirely on development without mention 
of the national interest. Sida’s relationship with Sweden’s MFA is not stressed throughout 
the website suggesting that Sida has more de facto structural autonomy. Adding to its 
structural autonomy, the Director-General is the only position in Sida appointed by the 
government. Sida’s policy autonomy is also high with multiple departments overseeing some 
area of research or policy (Organisational Development, International Organisations and 
Policy Support, and Partnerships and Innovations) as well as the lack of national interest 
within its mission. 
There are clear differences, as well as some similarities, in the levels of autonomy of 
                                                
20 The United Kingdom’s Department of International Development is examined in a later chapter in my dissertation, so it was not chosen for 
evaluation in this chapter. 
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these three aid agencies. Switzerland’s SDC and Sweden’s Sida have the same location within 
the government as well as the same focus on development. However, despite having the 
same location and coding, Sida’s relationship to the MFA seems less pronounced than the 
SDC’s relationship to the FDFA. Spain’s MAEC and the SDC both have a greater number 
of political appointments to the agency. Though these would both be coded as the same, the 
MAEC has four political appointments to the agency, while the SDC has two. These further 
nuances go beyond the operationalization of autonomy to demonstrate differences even 
among those categorized as the same. The small deviations that are missed by the 
operationalization of autonomy reveal the importance of case study research as well as 
highlight areas for future development.  
Aid Selectivity 
In order to examine the role of autonomy for the MAEC, SDC, and Sida, I examine 
their allocation patterns as a percentage of their overall official development assistance 
(ODA) in 2012. I analyzed three aid selectivity categories that demonstrate a focus on 
recipient needs as well as aid effectiveness. In Figure 4.1 below, I present a graph of these 
agencies’ aid to least developed countries (LDCs), countries with a high child mortality rate, 
and aid that is untied to any donor special interests. Both LDCs and countries with mortality 
rates represent countries with an overall low level of development or those with the most 
overt need for foreign aid. If recipient needs are considered important for foreign aid 
allocation, agencies should allocate more aid to these countries. Tied aid is aid with 
conditions that the funds are spent on goods within the donor country. These aid flows are 
criticized throughout the aid community as actually being very ineffective, so agencies with 
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an interest in recipient need should allocate more untied aid. 
Figure 4.1 ODA as Percentage of Overall ODA Commitments in 2012 
 
The aid allocations of these agencies do appear to follow the expectations of my 
theory. Spain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation allocates the least percentage of 
its aid in all categories. It then appears that recipient-needs (economic and health indicators) 
as well as best practices (untying aid) are not at the forefront of MAEC’s aid motivations. 
With a higher level of autonomy, both the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency also allocate more aid based 
on the needs of recipients. Sida is the leading agency of the three with respect to percentage 
of its total aid budget allocated to countries with high child mortality rates as well as the 
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percentage of untied aid. Given its lower autonomy, I would argue that Spain’s MAEC is 
being more influenced by the government’s strategic interests while Switzerland’s SDC and 
Sweden’s Sida have more freedom to follow their own preferences for aid allocations.  
Table 4.2 T-Test Results for Agencies Aid Allocations 
 MAEC Sida t-value df p-value 
% LDCs 26.23 
(9.14) 
53.19 
(5.80) 
-7.79 20 0.00 
% Mortality 24.41 
(5.66) 
53.94 
(8.93) 
-9.52 20 0.00 
% United 56.91 
(36.91) 
94.35 
(6.77) 
-2.99 20 0.01 
 MAEC SDC t-value df p-value 
% LDCs 26.23 
(9.14) 
45.84 
(3.19) 
-6.14 20 0.00 
% Mortality 24.41 
(5.66) 
45.04 
(9.48) 
-6.40 20 0.00 
% United 56.91 
(36.91) 
92.99 
(4.19) 
-2.89 20 0.01 
 Sida SDC t-value df p-value 
% LDCs 53.19 
(5.80) 
47.84 
(4.31) 
2.49 20 0.02 
% Mortality 53.94 
(8.93) 
42.03 
(9.13) 
3.03 20 0.01 
% United 94.35 
(6.77) 
92.26 
(4.00) 
0.91 20 0.37 
Standard Deviations are reported in parentheses. 
 
In order to examine whether these differences between these agencies is meaningful, 
I conduct a number of difference in means tests. These results determine whether or not 
these agencies’ allocations are from statistically distinct populations. I present these results in 
Table 4.2 above using aid allocation data form 2008 to 2012 with the assumption that the 
autonomy of these aid agencies has remained fairly stable during those five years; in my 
research below, this does appear to be the case. I find that the differences across these 
donors are mostly significant, leading to the conclusion that these allocations are from 
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significantly different groups. I would argue that this difference is attributable to the level of 
autonomy of these agencies. That the difference between SDC and Sida is smaller, and 
mostly insignificant, supports this, given the 0.5 difference in autonomy between these 
organizations.  
These results demonstrate real substantial changes in how different agencies allocate 
aid. For example, across this five year period, Sida allocates 24% more of its aid to least 
developed countries and 15% more aid to countries with low health indicators when 
compared to Spain’s MAEC. Consider that Sida gave an average of 1.3 billion dollars of aid 
across these five years, which translates to 320 million dollars to LDCs and 200 million 
dollars to low health indicator countries. This is a substantial amount of money for 
development, even when using the MAEC’s total budget (over 935 million dollars, which 
would correspond to an increase of 225 and 140 million dollars respectively). The difference 
between untied aid in these two agencies in not significant due to some fluctuation in Sida’s 
aid over this time period, but does lead to an average of Sida giving 16% more untied aid. 
The differences between Spain’s MAEC and Switzerland’s SDC are similar to those 
discussed above, but not as large of increase from the SDC (average across this period of 
17% more to LDCs, 11% more to low health countries, and 14% more united aid). Again, 
these increases represent a substantial increase in funds to developing countries. Comparing 
both Sida and SDC to the MAEC demonstrates support for my hypothesis that countries 
with greater autonomy are more likely to allocate aid based on the needs of recipient 
countries. The lack of difference between Sida and SDC reflects their close autonomy levels, 
but may also reflect that some aspects of autonomy are more important than others. 
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Development Agenda 
The agenda of an aid agency sets out its goals and a plan to achieve them. The 
standard process is for an agency to create a mission statement or policy paper that is 
published on its website as a means to describe what they do and how they do it. The agenda 
then represents the policy orientation of the agency and should reflect the views of those 
within. However, this depends on how much autonomy an agency has in shaping its mission 
and goals. 
Spain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC) focuses on Spain’s 
foreign policy broadly. However, there is a subordinate department within MAEC, the 
Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), with a focus on 
development headed by the Secretary of State for International Cooperation and Latin 
America, a junior minister position (AECID 2012). Aid allocated by AECID is listed as 
separate from MAEC and the Ministry remains the largest allocator in Spain. Given the 
broad focus of the MAEC, it is understandable that the agency’s agenda does not place 
development at the forefront, but it is rather one of five functions of the Ministry (MAEC 
2012). 
When looking at international cooperation specifically, the MAEC’s mission 
statement focuses on creating consensus among the many national and subnational actors 
that participate in foreign aid and following the Master Plan developed with the government 
and the institutions responsible for development issues in Spain, mostly the MAEC and 
AECID. Spain has a complex institutional structure of foreign aid, with 14 government 
ministries as well as sub-national actors allocating foreign aid (OECD 2013b)
 95 
complexity, a large part of Spain’s and the MAEC’s focus has been on creating a unified plan 
with coordination across all these actors. This unification is a necessary part of Spain’s 
agenda and has been applauded by the DAC, though it was noted that more coordination 
was necessary. 
Spain and the MAEC have two areas that they have recognized as specializing in by 
the international community, which have remained consistent through three Master Plans, 
for the years 2001 to 2016. The issue area of the greatest focus is gender equality, which has 
been placed as a general principle, a priority sector, a crosscutting issue, and an area of 
special focus in the Master Plan for 2009-2012 (MAEC/SECI 2009). That gender equality 
has remained important and tools are in place to back up this commitment demonstrates a 
consistency in the MAEC’s agenda as well as specialization. Another place where Spain and 
the MAEC have specialized is in their work with middle-income countries and triangular 
cooperation (bridging middle income countries with least developed countries) 
(MAEC/SECI 2009). Given Spain’s historical relationship with Latin America, most of 
MAEC’s aid is focused there, meaning a large part of its aid is given to middle-income 
countries. While not a stated focus in 2012, Spain has become a specialist in aid to middle-
income countries and has taken on this role more prominently in the Master Plan for 2013-
2016.  
A final aspect of Spain’s MAEC agenda to examine it the length of planning of the 
agency, both for itself and with recipient, and the timeline for the goals the agency sets for 
itself. Master Plans are created every four years, leading to some broad and long-term 
planning for foreign aid and development goals. These set out objectives for Spanish foreign 
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aid and markers the country hopes to reach such as “As an intermediate goal, at least 25% of 
the geographically allocable ODA will be destined to LDCs before 2015” (MAEC/SECI 
2009, 44). While these goals are admirable and do focus long-term, the MAEC does not 
always follow through with these goals and the evaluation system in place in 2012 still 
focused on outputs rather than policy impact (OECD 2013b). This leaves the MAEC 
without the ability to monitor or evaluate these long-term goals properly. The Master Plan 
does provide for a Country Partnership Framework that creates three to five year plans with 
recipients (MAEC/SECI 2009). This framework is subject to approval by the government in 
the annual budget, but does represent a focus on working with recipients to achieve long-
term goals. 
The overall agenda of MAEC has remained largely consistent over the last ten years. 
Even with a change in government in 2011 from the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party to the 
conservative People’s Party, the Master Plan for 2013 to 2016 largely reflected the previous 
agenda of MAEC, though there is slightly more focus on the national interest. This may be 
due to the State Pact against Poverty signed by most political groups in Spain, perhaps 
locking in the importance of development. MAEC’s agenda also has some focus on long-
term goals, though the actual practices had not met those standards in 2012. 
The focus of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) is 
development and it is responsible for the overall coordination of Switzerland’s development 
activities. As it is located within the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, there is an 
underlying focus on foreign policy and the national interest. However, this is not strongly 
present in on SDC’s website. The agenda of SDC is focused on poverty reduction and 
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creating autonomy and self-reliance in recipients (SDC 2012). 
The SDC has a long-term focus in its agenda and how it collaborates with other 
countries, both recipients and other donors. Strengthen the autonomy and capacity of 
recipients is a large goal for the SDC (SDC 2012). Budget reports are multi-year 
commitments to recipients in order to achieve long-lasting goals, however, this financial 
information is not always clearly communicated by the SDC to recipients (OECD 2014a). 
The SDC could also further specialized as aid allocations are spread across a large number of 
recipients and issue areas. 
The Swiss government has remained stable for the last fifty years with a grand 
coalition overseeing the Federal Council. There has been some change in recent years with 
seats shifting parties in 2003 and again in 2008; however, there has not been a large shift in 
overall ideology represented. Without a shift in government, it is difficult to know whether 
such a change would affect the agenda of the SDC. The SDC’s agenda has remained fairly 
stable over the past ten years with some changes of key issue areas and greater involvement 
of aid effectiveness practices and following of international commitments over time. 
Development is the focus Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 
which reflects Sweden’s dedication to aid. With the importance Sweden gives to 
development, it has taken leadership in implementing policy coherence for development 
(PCD) guidelines (OECD 2014a). Through these PCD building blocks, Sweden, with Sida 
leading the way, is attempting a coherent development policy across all departments. 
The agenda of the Sida is ambitious and has a large amount of support from political 
parties (OECD 2014a). However, it may be a bit too ambitious, resulting in aid being spread 
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thinly across a large number of countries and issue areas (OECD 2014a). Without clear 
priorities, aid becomes fragmented and ineffective. While Sida can improve in this area, it is 
still specializing more than other agencies with their allocation to 33 countries (compared to 
Spain’s 50 and Switzerland’s 37) and focus on five fields of work (Sida 2012). However, 
these sectors do have a number of sub-issues and goals. 
Sida’s agenda is consistently placing development at the forefront and following aid 
effectiveness guidelines. This agenda has remained fairly consistent over time despite 
government transitions, which occurred in 2006 and 2014. Its commitment to focusing on 
development and recipient needs remains across these changes, but there is a shift in the 
number of sectors from a large number to a smaller number in 2009 and again to a large 
amount in 2014 (Sida 2012). Beyond this though, the agenda of Sida has survived these 
political shifts, demonstrating insulation from the government as well as general support 
across political parties. 
Table 4.3 Agencies Agendas in 2012 
Agency National Interest Effectiveness Length of Goals Consistency 
Spain’s 
MAEC 
Focus, but not a 
large priority in 
development 
area 
Creation of policy 
coherence, some 
specialization 
Country 
Partnership 
Framework (3 to 
5 years), not 
always followed 
Consistent 
through 
changes in 
government 
Switzerland’s 
SDC  
Not a priority, 
focus on poverty 
reduction 
Focus on country 
ownership, but not 
always transparent 
Long-term goals 
and partnership 
Consistent, but 
no large shift in 
government 
Sweden’s 
Sida 
Not a priority, 
strong 
development 
focus 
Too many issue 
areas, but more 
specialization than 
other agencies 
Long-term and 
policy coherent 
goals 
Consistent 
through 
changes in 
government 
  
 Comparing these agencies’ agendas lends support for my hypothesis that agencies 
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with greater autonomy will tend to have more of a long-term and recipient need focused 
agenda. This is the agenda that the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
has. Sida’s agenda does not focus on the national interest, but rather puts development at the 
forefront with strong strides towards more effective policies—often leading the way. On the 
other spectrum, Spain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation has begun to focus 
more long-term and add best practices into its agenda. However, these have not been fully 
implemented into the activities of the agency. The Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation has an agenda more in line with Sida, with a strong focus on recipients and 
long-term planning, though its practices could be more effective. All agencies across this 
period (2000-2012) have a stable agenda, even with some have government turnover. 
Perhaps consistency of agenda is not as impacted by autonomy as other areas or the changes 
in government have not been significant enough to produce a noticeable difference. 
International Development Community  
The international development community has become a vast and growing group of 
actors with increasing commitments and plans. Donors, recipients, international 
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and researchers come together in order to 
share ideas about what works for development aid as well as to have a say and influence on 
others’ development policies. The community can then influence aid agencies, but also be 
influenced by aid agencies. The ability for either type of influence depends on the level of 
autonomy of an aid bureaucracy, as that determines the level of freedom it has to change its 
policies and to participate in other activities not prescribed by the government. 
Spain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC) is clearly focused on 
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Spain’s role internationally. It is the institution responsible for meeting with international 
actors, such as the European Union and the United Nations, as well as overseeing Spanish 
foreign policy over a wide range of global issues. Regarding foreign aid, the MAEC takes 
international agreements, the Millennium Declaration in particular, as the starting point for 
the creation of its agenda (MAEC 2012). As noted by the DAC’s Peer Review, “[n]ot only 
has it made the international aid effectiveness agenda a beacon of its development policy, 
but it has also thoroughly re-thought and re-designed its programming process to put these 
principles into practice” (OECD 2013b, 19–20). Placing the Millennium Development Goals 
in such a prominent position demonstrates the important and credence the MAEC views to 
the international aid community. 
While Spain has made the commitments of the international community a large part 
of its agenda, it is still necessary for the MAEC to put some of the aid effectiveness findings 
into practice (OECD 2013b). The MAEC has taken the first step by creating a Master Plan 
that follows effective aid strategies. There is more work to be done in implementing these 
practices though, especially in field offices where a complete understanding of these new 
plans is not yet in place (OECD 2013b). In terms of transparency, the MAEC was ranked 
45th among all donors in 2012 (Aufricht et al. 2012). Furthermore, the MAEC would benefit 
from being more selective in its agenda. There has been progress in the MAEC in 
implementing some of the aid effectiveness principles outlined in the Paris Declaration, 
particularly regarding harmonization with other donor countries (OECD 2013b). However, 
the DAC recommends more progress for most indicators. 
The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) sees cooperation and 
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debate within the international community as important in creating policy solutions. On the 
SDC website, the SDC discusses its relationship with the United Nations, World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund, and, in particular, the European Union. Rather than merely 
accepting what these organizations suggest, the SDC takes “an active part in the debate” 
about how development should be implemented (SDC 2012). The SDC has a large role in 
multilateral cooperation and is a leader in the community “in promoting mutual 
accountability and the concept of democratic ownership” (OECD 2014a).  
While the SDC’s agenda and polices are in line with international agreements such as 
the MDGs and the Paris Declaration, there is room for improvement in implementing these 
practices. In particular, the SDC needs to work on recipient country ownership by using and 
building up local capacity in its aid projects (OECD 2014a). The SDC could be more 
selective in recipients and issue areas as well as creating more transparency for monitoring 
and evaluation purposes, following through on its commitments at Accra and Busan (OECD 
2014a). In 2012, the Aid Transparency Index ranked SDC 55th among all donors (Aufricht et 
al. 2012). The SDC is receptive to guidelines and international commitments in many areas 
and does place them within its agenda, but could go farther in actually implementing these 
practices. 
Rather than viewing aid as a part of its foreign policy, “aid is the heart of [Swedish] 
foreign policy” (OECD 2014a). The leading role that Sweden and Sida plays in the 
international development community reflects this importance. A key aspect of Sida is its 
partnerships with other donors and international organizations. In these partnerships, Sida 
often encourages other actors to follow through with international commitments. In 
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particular, Sida has been a leader in evaluations and often “provides support to build its 
partners’ capacity in this area” (OECD 2014a).  
For the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), 
implementing the best practices and honoring commitments of the international aid 
community is very important. Sweden, with Sida leading foreign aid allocation, is one of the 
few countries to achieve its commitment of 0.7% of its gross national income to official 
development assistance, allocating around 1%. Sweden has also kept this commitment above 
0.7% ODA/GNI since 1975 (OECD 2014a). Additionally, Sida has been a leader in 
transparency, ranking 5th among bilateral agencies in the 2012 Aid Transparency Index 
(Aufricht et al. 2012). 
Table 4.4 Agencies Community Involvement in 2012 
Agency Leadership Effectiveness Commitments 
Spain’s 
MAEC 
Active in the 
community, but not as 
a leader 
Brought into agenda, 
but not yet fully 
implemented in practice 
International 
commitments are now 
key part of agenda and 
framework 
Switzerland’s 
SDC  
A strong leader, 
particularly for 
partnership and 
cooperation 
Promotes mutual 
accountability, but 
could implement more 
effective practices 
Upholds commitments, 
but not fully 
implemented 
Sweden’s 
Sida 
A strong leader, also 
leading through 
example 
Effective in many areas 
(transparency, 
partnership, etc.) 
Commitments are at 
forefront and has lead 
the way in 
implementation of 
many, but still room for 
improvement 
 
The international aid community is an important guiding force for the MAEC and 
has a real influence on its policies and agendas. Looking to the community for guidance the 
MAEC to reassess its previous planning framework and as of 2012 has a clear and aid 
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effectiveness focused path forward. There is still more work to be done in order to put these 
policies into practice though. Overall, the SDC is a leader in the international aid 
community, often encouraging other donors to adhere more fully to commitments. The 
SDC clearly values this role, strives to assert its influence, and tries to implement best 
practices. However, there is still room for improvement for implementation. Sida has been 
and continues to be a leader in the international aid community, striving to encourage other 
actors while also still implementing best practices themselves. 
All of these agencies have placed an emphasis on the international community and 
have used international commitments as guideposts for their own policies. However, the 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency have done more to actually implement these 
commitments and best practices within their agencies. Both SDC and Sida are also leaders 
within the community, not just following guidelines but also helping to set them and 
encouraging others to follow through. Sida takes on this leadership role a bit more. That 
these organizations, especially Sida, have this strong involvement with the international 
community supports my theory. With a high level of autonomy, agencies are more likely to 
be active in the aid community and follow through on international commitments. Spain’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation does look to the development for guidance and 
has brought some of these ideas into its agenda. However, these have yet to be implemented 
into MAEC’s practices. I would argue this is due to the lower level of autonomy of the 
MAEC, leading to greater government control and less ability for the bureaucracy to follow 
through on these commitments. 
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Conclusion 
This diverse case study used aid agencies with different levels of autonomy to 
represent “ideal” types that could be generalized to the entire population. Overall, these 
comparisons supported my theory that greater autonomy leads to aid policies focused more 
on recipient need rather than strategic interests. This was especially true when comparing 
Spain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation to Sweden’s International Development 
Cooperation Agency, the two extreme cases. Sida and the MAEC differed greatly on their 
levels of autonomy, situated at opposite ends of the twenty aid agencies I examined. They 
also had differing aid policies in all categories. 
Spain’s MAEC allocated less aid to least developed countries, those with low health 
indicators, and gave less as united aid than Sweden’s Sida. This reflects a greater interest in 
the needs of recipients for Sida when compared to the MAEC. Regarding agency agenda, the 
differences are subtler, with both agencies incorporating best practices into their goals. 
However, Spain’s MAEC has yet to fully implement many of these goals. This lack of 
implementation is also true for international commitments for the MAEC. In contrast, Sida 
is a leader in the international aid community, both following guidelines and encouraging 
other donors. 
The aid outputs from Swiss Agency for Development and Sida are not 
distinguishable from each other, while the differences between the SDC and MAEC are 
similar to those discussed above. In examining the autonomy differences across these 
agencies, there is clearly a large difference between MAEC (1.1) and the two other agencies 
(2.4 and 2.9). This may explain the only small differences seen between SDC and Sida. It 
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may also be that specific aspects of autonomy play a more important role than others. For 
example, the MAEC is a cabinet-level ministry and therefore scores higher on its structural 
autonomy than both the SDC and Sida. Perhaps then location is a less important aspect of 
autonomy than having the national interest as a goal (which both SDC and Sida do not) or 
having a research staff (which both SDC and Sida do). The national interest and a research 
staff are both aspects of policy autonomy rather than structural autonomy, so it is perhaps 
more important to have freedom from the government to make policy decisions on which 
countries to work with than the composition of the bureaucracy itself. 
It is also significant to note that through case study analysis, greater distinctions 
between agency’s levels of autonomy were discovered. These nuances go beyond what is 
reported in the operationalization of autonomy and demonstrates there are differences even 
in measures categorized as the same. The findings in Chapter 3 may then be missing these 
subtle variations across autonomy, while the results presented in this chapter are able to 
consider and evaluate these nuances.   
Given that policy autonomy appears to play an important role in shaping agency’s aid 
outcomes, it is important to further this examination of autonomy in order to provide a 
more accurate measure. Currently, this measure of policy autonomy is a proxy as agencies do 
not post on their websites everything the government does or does not allow them to do. It 
is then necessary to conduct further collection of these data through surveys of bureaucrats, 
which is a future step of this research. This chapter and the data collected on aid agency 
autonomy will allow for a greater understanding of the relationship between governments 
and aid bureaucracies as well as the decision-making process for aid allocation. Furthermore, 
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it will allow for greater accuracy in evaluation of agencies’ practices in order to provide aid 
that is more effective in the future.  
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Chapter 5   
USAID and DFID Most Similar Comparison 
 
As the previous two chapters have demonstrated, there is a link between the 
autonomy of an organization and its aid policy. Aid agencies with a greater degree of 
autonomy have more freedom over their decisions and tend to favor policies that focus on 
recipient needs, whereas aid agencies with a less autonomy must follow the government’s 
preferences and tend to have policies focused on political and strategic interests of the donor 
country. This is due to the differing preferences between the government and the 
bureaucracy. When an agency has a high degree of autonomy, it has the freedom to allocate 
aid based on bureaucrats’ personal motivations that tend to be more altruistic than the 
government. 
While I have demonstrated this through a comparison of aid agencies at one point in 
time, these agencies have not remained stagnant over time. Rather, most have changed 
substantially across their existence or have taken the place of other agencies with different 
organizational designs. As governments create agencies and their institutional structures, they 
can also reorganize them and grant them different levels of autonomy. This shift requires a 
large amount of work in order to make new laws, but it requires less work than dismantling 
an entire agency. The level of these agencies’ autonomy has then fluctuated over time, which 
I explore in the first part of this chapter.  
This chapter furthers our knowledge of the effects of autonomy through multiple 
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most-similar case comparisons (Mill 1872). First, I compare the United States’ Agency for 
International Development (USAID) to itself over time. In this temporal examination, I 
present a fuller picture of the changes that take place regarding USAID’s level of autonomy 
and how that affected its aid policy. By comparing USAID today to previous institutional 
design of the agency, I am able to hold many variables constant and focus on what effect a 
change in the level of autonomy has. USAID provides an excellent case to study given the 
length of time it has been in existence as well as the amount of aid allocated by the United 
States. 
Given the strong case USAID represents, I have taken this example further for the 
second half of this chapter. Again, I seek to hold variables constant in a most similar design; 
however, I compare USAID to the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development (DFID). USAID and DFID are both large aid donors in wealthy countries 
with a long history of allocating foreign aid. Given the similarity of these countries and status 
of these aid agencies, this most- similar comparison reveals the role of autonomy in 
influencing the aid policies of the two of the most important bilateral donors. Rather than 
simply comparing them within a single year, I look at both USAID and DFID from 2000 
until 2012 to see how their aid policies shifted or stayed the same over time. 
The focus of this chapter is comparisons of agencies within similar environments – 
USAID to itself and USAID to DFID. These comparisons allow me to focus on the role of 
autonomy and how it shapes aid policies, while holding other contextual variables near 
constant. I can then study whether a domestic aid bureaucracy with a high degree of 
autonomy will tend to focus on recipient needs and effective practices in its aid policies and 
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allocations. 
Aid Agency Reorganization 
When a bureaucracy is created, the government allocates power to it over a certain 
subject matter, here foreign aid. In this creation, the bureaucracy is given a certain amount of 
autonomy to make decisions regarding foreign aid. As discussed previously, the government 
balances the benefits it receives from delegation with the cost of potential shirking and puts 
a number of control mechanisms in place in order to oversee the bureaucracy. One 
important control mechanism the government has over a bureaucracy is the ability to 
dismantle the institution. This is often a difficult task for a government to do, as it can 
require agreement across parties, branches, citizens, etc., as well as a clear plan for what 
organization (new or current) will  take over the implementation of foreign aid policy. 
Due to the difficult nature in changing an existing organization, many bureaucracies 
are not dismantled, but instead reorganized in some way. This can mean changing the 
structure of the organization, transferring it into a different department, adding more 
political appointments in the agency, or changing the tasks the agency has jurisdiction over. 
This again requires a government to have support and a clear plan of how a bureaucracy 
should be changed and is still a difficult task. It can also be difficult to change the culture of 
an organization, which may persist even with formal rule changes. Most bureaucracies are 
rather stagnant with some changes over time, but day-to-day staying rather similar. 
Foreign aid bureaucracies have experienced changes that are more dramatic over time 
than many other types of institutions. This may be due to a general lack of interest from 
citizens in most countries in foreign aid and the long-reported failures of foreign aid efforts. 
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Whatever the reason, these agencies have changed and continue to change drastically over 
time through reorganizations and creations of new agencies. These changes often follow a 
clear shift from more autonomy to less autonomy and vice versa, many times changing with 
a transition to a new party in power as discussed previously in Canada and Australia recently. 
Given these changes, it is clear that governments view these bureaucracy as having some 
power and influence since they then feel the need to rein them in at times. 
Other changes may take place due to political pressure or a new practice emerging or 
influence from other governments or aid agencies. Since these changes often result in a 
change of level of autonomy, I exploit that in order to examine what effect these shifts have 
on aid policy over time. I focus on the main aid agency in the United States, the Agency for 
International Development. As the U.S. is the largest donor and has one of the longest 
histories of aid allocation, this case study provides insight into how donors construct their 
bureaucracies today and in the past. I then compare USAID to the United Kingdom’s 
Department for International Development, in order to view similarities and differences 
with an equally focused and important agency in another large donor. 
Research Design 
Agencies in Similar Environments 
While looking at United States Agency for International Development over time 
sheds light on the importance of autonomy and its influence on aid policy, this can be 
furthered through comparisons between USAID and other agencies. I examine how USAID 
compares to a similar agency in the United Kingdom, Department for International 
Development. In this comparison, both agencies have a similar role with the country and are 
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the main institutions responsible for aid allocation within these countries. These countries 
are large and historically prominent aid donors, giving them a shared starting place for 
development policy. 
Using a case study analysis allows me to parse out subtle differences in the levels of 
autonomy of agencies as well as minor changes in aid policies. A large-N comparison of 
countries misses much of these nuances. However, in this comparison, I am able to present 
a more complete picture of both autonomy and aid policy of these agencies. As in Chapter 4, 
this chapter reveals the benefits of case study analysis for capturing subtle yet important 
discoveries. 
Case Selection 
The United States Agency for International Development provides an excellent case 
study for exploring the role of autonomy due to its long history and the changes that have 
occurred in its organization. USAID was first formed in 1961, but its role has shifted within 
the government. At times, USAID had a great deal of autonomy as an independent agency, 
while its autonomy was diminished in other instances. By comparing these different eras of 
USAID, I am able focus on how aid policies shifted with these changes in the agency’s level 
of autonomy. I explore these changes through an examination of USAID’s history using my 
coding of autonomy as a starting point. I look through the agency’s history as reported on its 
website, by OECD evaluations, through acts and laws, and in previous scholarship. I then 
compare the different eras of autonomy to USAID’s aid policies – selectivity, agenda, and 
community involvement. 
After examining USAID over time, I compare USAID, from 2000 to 2014, to the 
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United Kingdom’s Department for International Development during this same time. A 
most- similar case study analysis relies on choosing cases that have similar background 
variables, but are different on the variable of interest (Gerring 2007; Seawright and Gerring 
2008). This comparison again provides an opportunity to hold many things constant, but 
also allows for greater generalizability as I am comparing across agencies. Using my coding 
of autonomy, I examine agency websites and laws regarding agency structure to determine 
the level of autonomy of DFID and compare that to USAID’s autonomy. I then examine 
DFID’s aid policies – selectivity, agenda, and community involvement – compared to 
USAID. 
U.S. Agency for International Development 
The United States has been one of the largest bilateral foreign aid donors, in terms of 
amount allocated, since the beginnings of foreign aid after World War II. In fact, the United 
States’ European Recovery Act, often known as the Marshall Plan, was instrumental in 
providing the institutional basis for foreign aid today (Lancaster 2008, 64–65). As the world’s 
largest and oldest donor country, the system in place for allocating foreign aid has changed 
greatly over time, with various organizations having control over some aspect of foreign aid.  
The one organization that has been the key agency in charge of foreign aid has been 
the United States’ Agency for International Development. USAID was founded with the 
passing of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (US Congress 1961). Before this, many 
different organizations and programs dealt with foreign assistance. The creation of USAID 
merged these programs together, creating for the first time a single institution in charge of 
foreign economic development. As an agency within the State Department, USAID is 
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subject to the decisions made by the Secretary of State and is subordinate in the planning of 
those decisions. However, the focus of USAID has always been on working with recipient 
countries and providing for their basic needs (USAID 2014). There have always been strong 
ties to the State Department, however, so the emphasis on foreign policy concerns of the 
U.S. was always present. 
There have been many changes within the framework of USAID over the years, most 
involving moving the agency from within the State Department to a separate independent 
agency. This first was attempted in 1978 with a cabinet-level position created for the 
International Development Cooperation Agency, which would supervise USAID instead of 
the State Department. However, in practice, the State Department retained control over 
USAID decisions. President Clinton lessened some of the powers of USAID in 1997 by 
abolishing the IDCA, but did not go so far as to abolish USAID (USAID 2005). This left the 
State Department with control over more foreign aid programs as well as leaving fewer 
decisions up to USAID. 
Under the Bush administration, the State Department continued to gain more control 
over foreign assistance through the creation of the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign 
Assistance and the dismantling of the USAID’s Development Policy office (USAID 2005). 
USAID was further cut with the creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Under 
President Obama, USAID has slowly gained more power over U.S. foreign assistance. 
Programs within the State Department have moved, or will move, back under the USAID 
and a development planning office was again established (USAID 2014). While USAID 
technically is an independent agency from the State Department, it has always been 
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subordinate to the Secretary of State and therefore, the current administration. 
USAID provides a good case to explore the role of autonomy for a number of 
reasons. First, it is a main domestic aid agency in the largest bilateral donor country. 
Therefore, USAID provides the most amount of bilateral aid allocation, making it the 
fundamental agency to test out my theory. Second, USAID has undergone many changes 
over the past fifty years, providing natural comparisons between different levels of 
autonomy. Furthermore, despite these many changes, the agency itself has remained intact 
rather than dissolving into a new institution. The United States’ Agency for International 
Development then provides an excellent case study for comparison over time and to other 
domestic aid institutions. 
The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 outlined the structure of USAID as well 
as the goals of American foreign aid policy (US Congress 1961). It was established as an 
independent federal agency, but it was specified that the Secretary of State would oversee the 
programs from USAID. As USAID was an independent agency when it was created, it had a 
level of autonomy. However, structural autonomy was still limited as it was not a cabinet 
level position and it remained under the authority of the Secretary of State and President. 
Given its independence, the agency had freedom to choose policy goals and how to allocate 
aid, making policy autonomy high. As outlined in FAA 1961, USAID’s policies focused on 
long-term planning based on specific needs of the recipient countries. FAA 1961 stressed 
the importance of increasing development across the globe, but also sought to promote the 
“foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States” through foreign aid. At 
this time, containment of Communism was a key concern of the United States and foreign 
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aid policy reflected this. USAID was required to report allocation agreements to Congress, 
provide an annual report summarizing the previous year’s allocations, and provide a plan for 
the next year’s aid programs (US Congress 1961).  
In 1978, Senator Hubert Humphrey drafted legislation to create the International 
Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA) as an attempt to consolidate and unify 
development policy across U.S. departments (USAID 2014). President Carter signed an 
Executive Order creating the IDCA as a cabinet-level position in 1979. The purpose of the 
IDCA was to create a clear U.S. policy on development and oversee all foreign assistance. In 
practice, however, little changed in how development policy was implemented and the 
IDCA had no real power (Butterfield 2004, 198). Two years after the creation of IDCA, 
President Reagan appointed the USAID administrator to be the director of the IDCA, 
essentially getting rid of the IDCA. 
The formal structure of USAID has remained fairly stable over time, though its link 
to and influence from the State Department has been ever increasing. This link has become 
more present since the end of the Cold War when foreign assistance programs were slowly 
transferred from USAID to the Department of State (Atwood, McPherson, and Natsios 
2008). These changes, along with the growing number of institutions within the U.S. 
allocating aid, left USAID with less funding, staff, and influence. The Clinton Administration 
officially abolished IDCA and created USAID as a statutory federal agency with the USAID 
Administrator required to “report to and be under the direct authority and foreign policy 
guide of” the Sectary of State (S. B. Epstein 1998, 7). The Foreign Affairs Reform and 
Restructuring Act of 1998 formalized this relationship with the State Department and 
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coordination between the two institutions increased. 
The diminishment of the agency’s autonomy culminated in 2006 when an executive 
order from President George W. Bush effectively merged USAID into the State Department 
by placing the administrator of USAID within State (Atwood, McPherson, and Natsios 
2008). The Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance was created with its Director also serving the 
role of USAID Administrator more formally tied USAID to the State Department. This 
transition also took focus away from recipient nations to the interests of the U.S. 
government, particularly concerning national security. With this change, USAID and the 
Department of State began to publish a joint strategic plan. The Bureau for Policy and 
Program Coordination of USAID was also phased out, officially being removed in 2008 
(USAID 2014). This left USAID without a research and policy branch, instead relying on 
policy from the State Department.  
The U.S. Agency for International Development went from being the key U.S. 
foreign assistance institution to one of many and with little control over its policies after 
2006, despite technically remaining an independent agency. There has been some shift back 
under the Obama Administration, striving to give USAID greater autonomy and returning 
more foreign assistance programs to its control. In 2010, President Obama published the 
first-ever Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development. This report outlined the 
principles and guidelines for all U.S. foreign assistance efforts with one of the key 
approaches being “to make USAID the world’s premier agency and re-establish it as the 
leader on development within the Administration, through modernising and strengthening 
the agency” (OECD 2013c, 17). 
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The USAID Forward reform agenda sought to bring this about through reforms in 
seven areas. In terms of autonomy, a new policy bureau was established (Bureau of Policy, 
Planning and Learning) as well as a bureau for budget management (Office of Budget and 
Resource Management), giving USAID increase power over its policy and budget (USAID 
2013). While taking some steps to increase USAID’s separation from the State Department, 
the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance remained (though the Director no longer had the dual 
role as USAID Administrator) and strategic plans are still published jointly between the two 
agencies. USAID did regain more control over greater aid areas though. 
The level of autonomy of USAID is of an intermediate level over time with less and 
less freedom available to the agency, both structurally and politically. Today, USAID has 
gained more prominence within the Obama Administration and its Administrator no longer 
serves in the State Department. While technically remaining an independent aid agency, 
USAID is still connected more closely with the State Department than it had been in 
previous years. This leaves the autonomy of USAID, especially in structural autonomy, lower 
than during its creation. It is possible that it will continue to strengthen in its independence 
as some argue that it should be made into a cabinet-level position. However, given the large 
number of agencies that allocate aid in the United States, some others suggest a complete 
dismantling of USAID. 
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Table 5.1 United States Agency for International Development Autonomy 
US 
Era 
Location Political 
Appointments 
National Interest Research Autonomy 
1961 
to 
1978 
Independent 
agency, but 
subordinate to the 
State Department, 
not cabinet level 
Yes, 
administrator of 
USAID is 
appointed by the 
President and 
confirmed by the 
Senate 
A key priority for 
the organization 
Program 
Coordination Staff 
1963-1964; Office 
of Program 
Coordination 
(1964-1967); 
Office of Program 
and Policy 
Coordination 
(1967-1970) 
2.8 
1979 
to 
1997 
Independent 
agency, but 
subordinate to the 
State Department, 
cabinet-level 
position for 
IDCA 
Yes, 
administrator of 
USAID is 
appointed by the 
President and 
confirmed by the 
Senate 
A key priority for 
the organization 
Bureau for Policy 
and Program 
Coordination 
(1970) 
 
2.8 
1998 
to 
2005 
Independent 
agency, but 
subordinate to the 
State Department, 
not cabinet level 
(IDCA abolished) 
Yes, 
administrator of 
USAID is 
appointed by the 
President and 
confirmed by the 
Senate 
A key priority for 
the organization, 
focus on business 
Bureau for Policy 
and Program 
Coordination 
 
2.8 
2006 
to 
2009 
Retains 
independent 
status, but head of 
USAID is also 
Director of U.S. 
foreign assistance 
in State 
Department 
Yes, 
administrator of 
USAID is 
appointed by the 
President and 
confirmed by the 
Senate 
Development 
becomes a major 
part of national 
security and 
foreign policy 
(2003 and then 
more officially in 
2006) 
Policy department 
moved out of 
USAID (vacant 
since 2007 and 
officially removed 
in 2008) 
1.4 
2010 
to 
now 
Independent 
status, retain 
Office of U.S. 
foreign assistance 
in State 
Department, but 
gives USAID 
greater control 
over budget and 
some separation 
Yes, 
administrator of 
USAID is 
appointed by the 
President and 
confirmed by the 
Senate 
Development as 
pillar of national 
security, but less 
emphasized in 
mission 
statement 
Creation of new 
Bureau of Policy, 
Planning and 
Learning 
2.8 
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After examining USAID’s autonomy since its inception in 1961, I will now focus on 
the aid policies of USAID with an emphasis on the years 2000 to 2014. As noted in Table 5.1 
some of the bigger shifts as far as the agency’s relationship to the State Department occur 
during this time and reflect the biggest change in my measure of autonomy. There is also a 
shift on the emphasis of the national interest and the role of research from within the 
organization. Looking at this period, I examine the selectivity of foreign aid, the agenda set 
by USAID, and the agency’s involvement within the international aid community. 
Aid Selectivity 
Given USAID’s mandate, there has always been a strong tie to national security 
interests, especially during the Cold War, as is the case with many countries at this time. At 
its inception, USAID’s policy focused on long-term planning (five years) with recipient 
involvement, along with encouraging democracy and opening up their economic markets. 
Given the opposition to the Vietnam War, foreign aid was seen as too focused on the 
military and not producing results. Congress blocked the budget for USAID for 1972 and 
1973 and ended up working with USAID to shift the focus to basic human needs. There was 
then less emphasis on technical assistance and budget support and more emphasis on 
specific social sectors such as agriculture (USAID 2014). In the 1980s, USAID followed the 
international trend of promoting market-based principals based on the Washington 
Consensus principles. With the end of the Cold War, levels of aid allocation dropped and 
there was a push to focus on democracies. 
The past decade provided a large shift in policy to reconstruction as well as linking 
global economic development to U.S. national security more formally (USAID 2014). There 
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was a large increase in foreign aid allocation from the United States to support the massive 
efforts within Afghanistan and Iraq. With the merger into the State Department in 2006, 
there was an uptick in aid to business and security sectors. After the shift back to a more 
separate USAID in 2010 and 2011, there was an increase of aid to agriculture, basic health, 
and disaster prevention. 
Figure 5.1 USAID ODA as Percentage of Overall ODA Commitments 
 
The graph above shows USAID’s aid allocation to least developed countries, 
countries with high child mortality rates, the amount of untied aid, and aid to countries with 
defensive alliance with the United States from 2000 to 2012. There does not appear to be a 
clear indication of changes occurring as a result of changes in autonomy (after 2006 and 
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2010). The amount of untied aid increases greatly across this period due to a change in 
legislation that had required aid to be tied to domestic interest (Shah 2012). However, 
USAID implemented this change prior to this official change in the law in 2005, during a 
time when the agency was about to have less autonomy. Aid to LDCs gradually increased 
over most of this period. There is a slight uptick in aid to countries with a high child 
mortality rate in 2010, but this coincides with an increase in aid to defensive allies as well. 
Unfortunately, for aid selectivity, there do not appear to be discernable changes occurring 
with changes in autonomy. A possible reason for the overall consistency in Figure 5.1 is a 
lasting historical culture of the agency and how it allocates aid. Given the quick changes in 
the level of autonomy, from high to low and back to high within five years, it may not have 
had the time to have a clear effect. 
Development Agenda 
Turning to the agenda of USAID, it is clear that the national interest of the United 
States has been emphasized quite a bit throughout the organization. Beginning in 2003 under 
President George W. Bush, the national security of the U.S. becomes of greater focus for 
development. However, prior to this, there was still an emphasis on what good foreign aid 
for the U.S., in particular for businesses and increasing America’s strength as world leader 
(USAID 2014). In 2000, USAID’s mission states that development “creates demand for U.S. 
goods and services and expands cooperative relationships between the United States and 
assisted countries” (USAID 1997, 1). It is clear that USAID’s agenda has long involved 
justification based on the interests of domestic constituents. 
Part of the reason for this continuous emphasis on the national interest of the U.S. 
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may be due to the lack of domestic knowledge and interest in foreign aid (World Public 
Opinion 2010). Due to this low level of interest by constituents, it then becomes necessary 
for the government to justify the reasons for foreign aid. This need to conform to 
constituency wishes demonstrates, again, the influence of the government in the aid 
bureaucracy. While this also reveals that the preferences of a country’s population plays a 
role in shaping aid policies, it does not diminish from the role autonomy. In a society that 
has a strong preference for development, the bureaucracy will have an aid policy that focuses 
on recipient-need regardless of the level of autonomy. However, in a country without a 
strong preference from the constituency and the government for development, autonomy 
plays a key role in shaping development policy. Furthermore, we know it tends to be the case 
that constituents do not see aid as a top priority and governments tend to prefer to use it as 
a tool for their own strategic reasons.  
As mentioned, in 2003, President Bush put a strong emphasis on development as a 
means to ensure U.S. national security. This was finalized in 2006 with the restructuring of 
USAID and the creation of Bush’s 2006 National Security Strategy. In this plan, 
development was clearly stated to be an instrument of U.S. foreign policy and was made one 
of the three pillars of national security (US White House 2006). This lead to two different 
things – foreign aid was given a more prominent place within the administration while at the 
same time devaluing the development objectives for their own merit. This shift coincided 
with the greater integration of USAID in the State Department with the dual role of the 
USAID Administrator and linking the strategic plan with the State Department. 
During this period, there were a great deal of presidential initiatives introduced 
 123 
focusing on many different topics and issues (USAID 2014). There was not a great deal of 
specificity in USAID’s agenda and it seemed to have spread itself thinly in many areas. Two 
emphasized issues areas were HIV/AIDS and democratic governance. HIV/AIDS has been 
an important issue area for USAID since 1986, but President Bush pushed this to the 
forefront by making a new office for this issue as well as launching President's Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief. Democratic governance became an important issue area due to the 
new focus on development for national security as well as seen as a symbol of U.S identity 
(USAID 2014). 
In 2010, President Obama signed the Presidential Policy Directive on Global 
Development, which stressed the importance of development and called for a new approach 
(US White House 2010). Part of this reform was through the creation of USAID Forward, 
which set aside guidelines of how to strengthen the agency and create sustainable 
development (USAID 2013). The United States’ foreign policy and national interest 
continued to be used as justification for the need for development; however, development 
was also elevated in importance on its own. 
USAID continued to have a large number of issue areas, but within the Presidential 
Policy Directive on Global Development, three initiatives were highlighted – food security, 
health, and climate change (US White House 2010). Democracy and governance also 
remained a top priority for USAID (USAID 2014). The use of Country Development 
Cooperation Strategies (CDCS) represented a change in the length of planning with 
recipients. The CDCS began with USAID Forward as a new planning tool for the creation 
of country-specific strategies for a multi-year approach to their development (USAID 2013). 
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An issue that has halted USAID’s ability to focus on long-term goals, especially in 
planning with recipients, is the United States’ continual use of earmarks in order to provide 
funds to specific projects, usually for the benefit of constituents (OECD 2013c). This has 
been and continues to be an issue for USAID and U.S. foreign aid in general. Part of the 
reason for this is linked to the necessity to justify foreign aid for the American public. While 
understandable when looking from a politician’s perspective, these earmarks are detrimental 
to long-term planning as well as limit the ability to provide recipient ownership. Tied aid, as 
discussed above, has further limited recipient local capacity, though tied aid will hopefully be 
further limited over time.  
Table 5.2 USAID’s Agenda 2003 to 2012 
US 
Era 
National Interest Effectiveness Length of 
Goals 
Consistency 
2003 Strong emphasis, 
development as 
one of the pillars 
of U.S. security 
Many issue areas, 
many countries 
Focus on 
short-term 
goals 
Consistent focus on 
HIV/AIDS, becomes 
more prominent and 
more on democratic 
governance, but 
addition of more issues 
2006 National Security 
Strategy, aid as 
instrument of 
foreign policy 
Many issue areas, 
many countries 
Focus on 
short-term 
goals 
Continuing focus on 
HIV/AIDS and 
democratic governance, 
but addition of more 
issues 
2010 Foreign policy still 
justification, but 
more focus on 
development 
Many issue areas, 
many countries, 
trying to link all 
development policy 
(PPDGD) 
CDCS 
creating multi-
year plans, but 
still at the 
whim of 
annual budget 
Continuing focus on 
HIV/AIDS and 
democratic governance, 
but addition of more 
issues 
 
Some changes take place in USAID’s agenda linked to changes in its level of 
autonomy. In 2010, while aid is still justified due to national security, this plays less of a role 
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in USAID’s agenda than it had in the past. There is also a shift to include some best 
practices through an overarching development policy as well as longer term planning with 
recipients. There is also some consistency across this period as USAID has taken on a 
leadership role internationally over the issues of HIV/AIDS and democratic governance. 
However, new administrations also bring about further sectors and goals on which to focus. 
This changing, expanding, and shifting of focus for USAID demonstrates its lack of 
autonomy over its agenda; and can lead to a lack of ability to create effective aid. 
International Community 
USAID has always been involved in the international aid community and had a 
leadership role there given its status as the largest bilateral donor country. This status may 
have left the United States and USAID more willing to go on their own rather than 
following the community’s guidelines or commitments. Beginning in 2003, USAID 
demonstrates a greater interest in donor coordination and working with international 
organizations (USAID 2005). However, this area of the website was then not updated for 
seven years and there is not a clear commitment of how USAID would follow through on 
their international commitments such as the Monterrey Consensus. Despite having pushed 
for many of these international commitments, including the Paris Declaration, these 
practices were not implemented within USAID (OECD 2013c). 
Under the Obama administration, USAID shifted focus towards implementing and 
following through on its international commitments. It also represented resurgence in the 
United States’ role as a leader in the international aid community and in making USAID the 
world’s premier development agency (US White House 2010). These goals demonstrate the 
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importance of being part of the community as well as the influence that these community 
has on the shaping USAID at this time. A further sign of this influence was “The United 
States’ Strategy for Meeting the Millennium Development Goals” published in 2010. This 
outlined a concrete plan for how the U.S. and USAID would meet the MDGs. 
Table 5.3 USAID’s Community Involvement 2003 to 2012 
US Era Leadership Effectiveness Commitments 
2003 - 
2009 
Leader given size 
of aid budget 
Not following through on best 
practices 
Stated on website, but 
not update and not 
implemented 
2010 - 
present 
Role of USAID as 
world’s premier 
agency 
Creating overarching agenda, 
lengthening recipient planning, 
some progress 
Concrete plan to meet the 
MDGs, some progress 
 
The role of USAID in the international aid community has always been a large one, 
simply by the nature of being the largest donor agency in the largest donor country. 
However, the level of involvement has shifted with a more recent interest in participating 
actively in this community and following through on the commitments and suggestions by 
that community. This shift coincides with a shift in the level of autonomy of USAID, 
however, it could also just be attributed to a shift in government. It will be necessary to see if 
and how USAID changes its involvement in the international community with a future 
government transition. 
USAID and the Role of Autonomy 
Examining the United States’ Agency for International Development over time 
demonstrates some evidence of the role that autonomy plays in shaping the aid policy of this 
institution. This is truer for agenda and community involvement than in aid selectivity. 
However, these shifts also occur with changes in the government of the United States. 
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Given that the main relationship between autonomy and aid policy are in areas that are more 
talk than action may have more to do with changes in the government’s interests than in the 
role of autonomy. Furthermore, the fact that USAID has seen shifts in its placement within 
the government and over the areas it oversees suggests that its autonomy is rather lacking, 
despite receiving a high score within my coding scheme. 
 There were periods when the autonomy of USAID was high which corresponds with 
a high degree of focus on the needs of recipients and vice versa when the autonomy of 
USAID was low. This analysis further demonstrates the importance governments place on 
shifting the level of autonomy of an aid agency when they feel it is going against, or would 
go against, their interests. It is clear that the autonomy of an aid agency is viewed as an 
important factor influencing a country’s aid policy. 
In the development policy of the United States, there is a clear norm for attempting 
to change the structure, autonomy, and policies of USAID. However, it is important to note 
that these attempts at restructuring have not always been successful, especially when trying 
to pass a new law through Congress. This failed with Senator Humphrey and with President 
Clinton’s attempt to rewrite the Foreign Assistance Act in 1994 (USAID 2005). Therefore, 
while there are clearly some shifts that have taken place due to government turnover, it is a 
difficult task to reorganize a bureaucracy and often these changes have been minor with 
regard to formal autonomy. Perhaps it is the case that USAID’s culture and de facto 
autonomy have remained rather stagnant over time, which may suggest a reason for the lack 
of a clear change in aid selectivity after 2006 and 2010. Further research can be done to 
assess this as well as consideration of what happens over the next few administrations. 
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USAID and DFID Comparison 
While this case study sheds light on the importance of autonomy and its influence on 
aid policy, a comparison between USAID and other agencies can expand this understanding. 
I examine how USAID compares to a similar agency in the United Kingdom, Department 
for International Development. In this comparison, both agencies have a similar role with 
the country and are the “main” institutions responsible for aid allocation within these 
countries. By choosing cases with similar national contexts, but are different on the variable 
of interest I am able to conduct a most-similar case comparison (Gerring 2007; Seawright 
and Gerring 2008). This affords an opportunity to keep these contextual variables 
“constant,” while also allowing for generalizability across cases.  
DFID Autonomy 
The United Kingdom’s aid has gone through many changes and reconfigurations 
over the past fifty years since its inception (DFID 2014a). These changes have sometimes 
resulted in an agency with a high degree of autonomy and at other times, an agency with a 
low degree of autonomy. It is clear from the history of aid agencies within the United 
Kingdom that the designs of these institutions have differed greatly. The UK has given some 
form of aid, particularly to former colonies, for over a hundred years. However, it was not 
until the 1960s that development aid was delegated to a separate institution with the creation 
of the Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM) in 1964. The ODM brought together 
several different smaller departments from many ministries forming a single, independent 
agency with a Cabinet level minister. However, the ODM’s status changed over the years 
with changes in UK party leadership. In 1970, it was renamed the Overseas Development 
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Administration and formally made a part of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
without its own Cabinet minister (Barder 2005). The ODA again became a separate ministry 
with a Cabinet-level minister in 1974, but was again made part of the FCO from 1979 to 
1997. In 1997, the ODA was renamed the Department of International Development 
(DFID) and reverted to an independent agency as the Labour party came to power. DFID 
was also given greater responsibilities over international economic issues beyond aid 
allocation. 
Today, DFID has the greatest level of autonomy of all past agencies with the agencies 
under the FCO having the least amount of autonomy. DFID is a very independent aid 
agency with a large amount of structural autonomy. It is its own institution, rather than 
housed within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as past UK agencies had been. The 
first head of DFID, Clare Short, actually insisted on having a cabinet position in order to 
have this influence (Barder 2005). DFID’s political appointments are a control mechanism 
of the government, thereby reducing DFID’s structural autonomy. However, only the head 
of the agency, the Secretary of State for International Development, and four others on the 
Department Board are politically appointed, with the rest of the agency being career 
bureaucrats – including the Permanent Secretary (DFID 2014b). DFID then has a large 
amount of structural autonomy, though still does have some influence from the government 
through the Secretary of State and the Department Board, though the Permanent Sectary 
and three Director Generals from the bureaucracy are also part of the Board. 
The policy autonomy of an agency is the most difficult aspect of autonomy to 
measure, as discussions of aid policy between the government and the bureaucracy are likely 
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to happen behind closed doors. Some evidence revealing the level of policy autonomy was 
that Clare Short increased the scope of DFID from only aid to overall development, 
therefore increasing the scope of the agency (Barder 2005). What are available to measure 
are legislative bills and directives from the government. The International Development Act 
2002 replaced Overseas Development and Co-operation Act 1980, locking in the policies of 
DFID as law (UK Parliament 2002). This act gave the Secretary of State a great deal of 
power over aid allocations by granting permission outright for the Secretary to allocate 
where and how as deemed in line with the aid policies objectives. While this does grant the 
bureaucracy a large degree of freedom within the state, the Secretary of State is still 
appointed by, and therefore within, the government so this does not necessarily reflect 
bureaucratic autonomy.  
Further adding to DFID’s policy autonomy is the lack of mention of the national 
interest in its agenda or mission. This demonstrates that the government’s strategic priorities 
are not an influencing factor on the agency. DFID also has a research and policy department 
(Policy & Global Programmes), which has a high place within the organization (DFID 
2014a). Conducting its own research and planning its own policy shows DFID’s autonomy. 
The Director General of Policy & Global Programmes place within the Executive 
Management Committee further demonstrates the policy autonomy allocated to DFID. 
Table 5.4 DFID’s Autonomy 
 Location Political 
Appointments 
National 
Interest 
Research Total 
Autonomy 
DFID  Independent 
Cabinet Level 
agency 
Secretary of State for 
International 
Development 
appointed 
Not a 
priority 
Policy & 
Global 
Programmes 
3.1 
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It is clear that structurally, DFID’s autonomy is higher than that of its predecessors. 
There is also evidence that DFID has greater policy autonomy. This level of autonomy ranks 
DFID as one of the highest of my autonomy index. However, the preferences of the 
government clearly shifted and coincided with some of these changes in autonomy. 
Depending on which party was in control of the government, the aid agency was given more 
or less power. However, that the Labour party did want to use aid for political reasons, but 
was unable to do so, reflects the autonomy and influence of DFID. Given the high level of 
autonomy today, I would expect DFID’s aid policies to focus need-based aid, a more 
consistent and long-term policy agenda, and more involvement and responsiveness to the 
international aid community.  
DFID and USAID Autonomy 
For structural autonomy, USAID and DFID are similar in some respects, but 
different in others. Both agencies are independent from the foreign affairs ministries in their 
countries—State Department for the U.S. and Foreign and Commonwealth Office for the 
U.K. Despite having formal independence from these institutions, they also both must 
answer to the government in some way with DFID having ministers and secretaries 
appointed to it and USAID responsible to the Secretary of State. DFID differs from USAID 
in that it is a cabinet-level position with a cabinet-level minister within the government. This 
gives DFID more influence over policy within the United Kingdom than USAID has within 
the United States. Having a cabinet-level secretary provides more autonomy for DFID as the 
secretary can push for policy, produced within DFID’s bureaucracy.  
Where USAID and DFID differ most is in their policy autonomy. Part of this is due 
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to DFID’s recent creation and that it follows best practices. This means that national 
security interest is not set as a priority in DFID’s mandate as it is in USAID. There is also a 
lack of policy autonomy at USAID due to the restructuring of the agency within the State 
Department, the takeover of more of its assistance programs, and the many other 
institutions within the U.S. allocating aid. These factors lead to less freedom for the agency 
to make its own policy decision of where and how to allocate aid. Further inhibiting 
USAID’s policy autonomy are the many number-specific policy initiatives requiring 
allocations be spent in certain sectors and countries. DFID, on the other hand, has the 
freedom to allocate aid as long as it is for the purpose of poverty reduction (DFID 2014c). 
Though both agencies have research departments, DFID’s takes a more prominent role. 
Table 5.5 DFID and USAID Autonomy in 2012 
 Location Political 
Appointments 
National 
Interest 
Research Total 
Autonomy 
USAID  Independent 
status, but 
within State 
Department 
Administrator of 
USAID is 
appointed 
Not as 
emphasized as 
prior, but still 
central goal 
Bureau of 
Policy, 
Planning and 
Learning 
2.8 
DFID  Independent 
Cabinet Level 
agency 
Secretary of State 
for International 
Development 
appointed 
Not a priority Policy & 
Global 
Programmes 
3.1 
  
The overall level of autonomy between DFID and USAID is a minor shift according 
to my coding scheme – 0.3 more for USAID. The formal autonomy across these institutions 
then seems rather similar. However, these case studies provide a more nuanced 
understanding of these indicators. The discussion of each agency’s autonomy reveals a 
greater deal of autonomy available to DFID, both structurally and politically. This is due to 
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USAID having an independent status but in practice being greatly linked to the State 
Department, as well as DFID’s research and policy division having a greater prominence 
within the agency. In turning to a comparison of aid policies, it will be interesting to note 
whether the differences across these institutions will seem more in line with their 
operationalized level of autonomy or the more nuanced view presented. 
DFID’s Aid Policy 
The UK’s aid agenda, level of transparency, and response to the aid community all 
changed together with DFID’s creation. These three aspects of aid policy are then explored 
together focusing on DFID’s 1997 White Paper, which laid out the new policy goals and 
focus of the agency. With the creation of DFID, aid policy shifted to a focus on evidence, 
outcomes rather than inputs, and increased transparency (Barder 2005, 26). This lead to a 
building up of capacity in order to collect and analyze information on developing countries 
with consultation of experts outside the government for the best recommendations. Along 
with this, DFID shifted its measurement of performance output-based measures—aid 
flows—to meeting the Millennium Development Goals. There was still a struggle, as with all 
bureaucracies, of how to measure this given their specific contribution, so measures of total 
aid or number of projects are still used along with evaluation of the recipient’s development 
and growth. 
The Department for International Development’s first White Paper spelled out the 
changes to DFID’s policy as described. The focus of the DFID’s aid policy was poverty 
reduction with a long-term focus on the International Development Targets (later to become 
the Millennium Development Goals). However, rather than focusing on spending targets, 
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they still emphasized reaching an ODA level of 0.7% of GNI, broader and more 
development-focused policies including economic growth, good governance, environment, 
etc. (DFID 1997). There was also a strong shift away from tied—officially abolished by the 
International Development Act of 2002—and commercial aid toward social aid spending. 
The White Paper also presented the single purpose of aid spending – sustainable 
development and welfare – that would become law with the International Development Act 
of 2002. This poverty focus clearly addresses the needs of recipients and discouraged any 
type of strategic aid giving, especially tied aid. The new DFID policy also encouraged 
partnerships with other UK agencies, other donors, the private sector, NGOs, and 
particularly with recipient countries reflecting many practices encouraged by the aid 
community (DFID 1997, 22). The relationship with recipient countries would allow for 
longer planning and encouragement of better practices within the recipient. Finally, the 
White Paper emphasized the decentralization of DFID management, giving field offices 
greater authority in order to promote the recipient-donor relationship.  
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Figure 5.2 DFID ODA as Percentage of Overall ODA Commitments 
 
The 1997 White Paper developed a new agenda for UK aid policy, which had 
previously focused on inputs as measures, commercial and national interest, and separation 
of aid and development within state agendas (DFID 1997). These previously held policies 
reflect a focus on political and strategic motivations for aid. With the creation of DFID, 
these policies changed by shifting focus to recipient needs and effectiveness. These resulted 
in an agenda focused on long-term poverty reduction and policy consistency over time, as 
well throughout the state. It also led to greater transparency of allocations and policies in 
general. This transparency was a result of DFID’s evidence-driven approach as well as its 
drive to increase awareness of aid throughout the UK. Another result of this new policy 
agenda was a greater focus on partnerships and cooperation throughout the aid community. 
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Not only did DFID participate in the creation of international aid agreements, including the 
MDGs, it incorporated these goals into its measures of success. There was then a clear shift 
over time in the UK’s aid policy with DFID today reflecting a much greater focus on 
recipient need. 
Easterly’s work on aid practices consistently ranked DFID as the one of the best aid 
agencies and the best bilateral donor in terms of best practices (Easterly and Pfutze 2008; 
Easterly 2006). DFID excels on its amount of transparency representing DFID’s emphasis 
on the international aid community and responding to its standards. DFID’s overhead costs 
are also low – granting $4.4 million dollars in aid per each employee (Easterly and 
Williamson 2011, 1945). These scholars further note that DFID tends to not used ineffective 
channels, especially tied aid and food aid. Some scholars are more hesitant to state that 
DFID is completely the right track. Fitzsimons, Rogger, and Stoye argue DFID is still 
emphasizing disbursement flows rather than outcome targets (2012). Further, they point to 
evidence from the Public Account Committee that DFID did not have accurate accounting 
for bilateral flows. Thus, while DFID appears to exemplify many best practices, there is still 
room for improvement. However, the strides DFID has taken would not have been possible 
without its high level of autonomy form the government. 
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Table 5.6 DFID’s Agenda Setting and Community Involvement in 2012 
DFID Agenda 
National Interest Effectiveness Length of Goals Consistency 
Not focus, poverty 
and recipient need 
are focus 
Working with 
countries, though 
ambitious goals 
Long-term focus, 
development focus 
Consistent across 
change in 
government 
DFID Community Involvement 
Leadership Effectiveness Commitments 
Leader given size of 
aid budget 
Following through on best 
practices, particularly transparency 
Part of its agenda 
 
This evidence suggests that DFID’s aid policies, along with its high level of 
autonomy, lend support for my theory. DFID now focuses on the needs of recipient 
countries with a focus on giving to LDCs and is more selective in aid giving, especially with 
its elimination of tied aid, which demonstrates support for Hypothesis 1a. DFID’s agenda 
focuses on long-term goals and seeks to develop plans with recipient countries in order to 
create a partnership between the countries, demonstrating support for Hypothesis 1b. DFID 
is very involved in the international aid community and has strived to adopt best practices, 
including transparency, demonstrating support for hypothesis 1c. 
DFID and USAID Aid Policies 
The aid policies of USAID and DFID differ with regard to their selection of 
recipients, length of agendas, and implementation of international agreements. While DFID 
emphasizes working with recipient countries to determine the best aid projects, USAID does 
not provide a great deal of recipient country ownership of aid. There has been an increase of 
funds to recipient country organizations in order to increase recipient implementation of aid 
projects; however, evaluation of this progress and what it means is unclear (US Government 
Accountability Office 2014). DFID and USAID also differ on the selection of how to give 
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aid with DFID completely outlawing tied aid and USAID still allocating about 25% of aid as 
tied aid. 
Figure 5.3 Comparing DFID and USAID ODA as Percentage of Overall ODA 
Commitments 
  
Year – 2000          Year – 2006 
  
Year – 2012  
 
The figure above presents the official development assistance of DFID and USAID 
at 2000, 2006, and 2012. By looking at these cut points, I can examine aid allocations against 
each agency as well as compare to the agency over time. DFID always has a greater level of 
united aid than USAID, but that is not the case for the other categories examined. Similarly, 
USAID always has a higher amount of aid to allies. However, this is likely due to the United 
Kingdom only having one strategic defense alliance with Turkey during this period. 
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Interestingly, both countries allocated less of their aid to countries with high child mortality 
rates across this period. USAID also increased its aid to least developed countries, while 
DFID’s aid jumps up and down over this period. 
Focusing on autonomy, DFID has more focus on recipient needs using these 
categories across the period. USAID, which had increase in autonomy from 2006 to 2012, 
demonstrates more of a focus on recipient need between these two periods. Something else 
to note is that the United Kingdom had a change from a Labour to a Conservative 
government in 2010. While one could argue that this may have affected aid to countries with 
poor health, it also coincides with a shift of more aid to countries with low economic 
indicators. It then appears that DFID’s autonomy is holding, despite a change in 
government. 
The agenda of DFID focuses on long-term goals and emphasizes creating multiyear 
plans with recipients. While USAID has emphasized long-term sustainable development in 
its rhetoric, however, USAID still focuses on short-term observable outputs as measures of 
success (Natsios 2010). While DFID’s agenda stayed remarkably similar through government 
transition in 2010, the agenda of USAID has fluctuated with the change in government. 
Most recently, with the Obama Administration, there was shift in policy focus with the new 
USAID Forward campaign in 2010.  
While both DFID and USAID are important actors in the international aid 
community, DFID has done much more to follow through on international agreements. The 
United Kingdom allocated 0.7% of GNI as aid in 2014, while the United States allocated 
0.2% of GNI as aid. The UK has strived to meet the agreed upon goal of 0.7% GNI and 
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was able to do so, due in large part to the level of autonomy given to DFID and its push for 
increased foreign aid. DFID has also pushed for the implementation of “best practices” 
agreed upon by many aid practitioners and scholars. 
The UK’s Department for International Development’s maintains a foreign aid policy 
focused on recipient needs while the US’s Agency for International Development still 
focuses more on strategic interests of the US. This difference in aid policy is across recipient 
selectivity, agenda consistency, and involvement in the aid community. Given the higher 
level of autonomy of DFID compared to USAID, especially structural and policy, this 
comparison lends support to my theory that greater autonomy lead to a greater focus on 
recipient need over national strategic interests.  
Conclusion 
These case studies reveal the influence of autonomy holding a number of other 
factors close to constant, given the similarities across these cases. The fluctuation of the 
United States’ Agency for International Development's level of autonomy correlated to 
changes in its aid policy with a greater focus on the needs of recipient countries. Today, 
USAID has again shifted toward having greater autonomy, though it is still lower than the 
United Kingdom’s Department for International Development. DFID is a more recent 
organization created with, and maintaining today, a high level of autonomy. This autonomy 
has led to a focus on the long-term improvement of recipient development with notable 
accomplishments of tied aid becoming illegal and the UK reaching the goal of allocating 
0.7% of GNI as aid. Compared to DFID, USAID lacks a consistent agenda and 
implementation of signed international agreements. 
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The United States is known to be a highly strategic and political donor. USAID has 
followed this, for the most part, in allocating aid in political ways—tied aid and aid to 
allies—rather than based on recipient needs—aid to least developed countries and countries 
with high mortality rates. However, this has improved after 2004, beginning with the Bush 
Administration. There is then not a clear link to autonomy regarding allocation overtime, 
though USAID’s allocation compared to DFID is slightly less focused on recipient aid 
today, with DFID not allocating tied aid and focusing on LDCs.  
USAID’s aid policy has shifted over the years along with its level of autonomy. 
Though there has been a large focus on the national interest since its inception, this was a 
greater stress in the Bush administration when the State Department was given more control 
over USAID. DFID, on the other hand, is and has always focused on recipient needs and 
long-term goals in its agenda. Both agencies have been involved in the international 
development community. However, DFID has been more involved in following through on 
its commitments and leading the way for others. 
Given this chapter’s results that autonomy plays a role in shaping aid policy overtime 
and across similar donor country, future work should consider institutional designs. Greater 
examinations of agencies over time is necessary, especially agencies that had a large shift in 
their levels of autonomy. Two particularly good cases to explore this research design would 
be in Australia and Canada where the agencies were completely reorganized. As the change 
in AusAid and CIDA happened just two years ago, there is still some distance needed to 
appreciate the full extent that this shift played. Another avenue for future work is to explore 
differences across aid agencies within a single donor country. This chapter used a similar 
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case study design, but this could be further implemented by holding the donor country 
constant.    
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Chapter 6  
Bureaucratic Red Tape Unraveled? 
 
Total official development assistance (ODA) in 2014 was 135 billion US dollars, with 
over half given bilaterally. With the vast amount of money being transferred each year, there 
is an understandable demand within the international community to ensure that these funds 
are being used effectively. There have been many recent international conferences and 
agreements between both donor and recipient countries on how to improve aid practices – 
Millennium Development Goals 2000, Monterrey Consensus 2002, Paris Declaration 2005, 
to name a few. International relations scholars have researched the domestic determinants of 
foreign aid in order to understand donor’s aid decisions. The drive to make aid more 
effective and determine how aid is allocated is vital; however, both policymakers and 
scholars have missed an important part of foreign aid. The role of decision-makers must be 
taken into account before policy changes are made and in order to attain a complete view of 
the aid allocation process. This work seeks to fill this gap and answer – how do states 
determine aid allocation? 
These international agreements and studies have assumed that aid allocation is a 
centralized decision-making process within a country. While the executive and/or legislature 
within a country make some foreign aid decisions, in actuality, the decision-makers are the 
bureaucrats within domestic aid institutions. These bureaucrats make budget requests, 
determine which countries should receive what amounts of aid, decide on projects and 
sectors, select the channel or organization to give the aid through, and many other important 
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aid allocation decisions. An average foreign aid bureaucrat deals with projects worth over $1 
million and makes important decisions on their implementation within a recipient country. 
In order to understand the process of allocating foreign aid, it is essential to identify what 
determines how these bureaucrats make these critical decisions. This is a crucial first step 
before policy recommendations can be made and before a complete understanding of 
donor’s reasons for giving aid is developed. 
I argue that foreign aid allocation must be understood as the interplay between the 
government and the domestic aid bureaucracy. Both of these actors play an essential role in 
aid allocation outcomes. The government (principal) delegates authority over aid allocation 
to the country’s aid agency (agent). As previous work has demonstrated, the government 
receives some costs (agency may not align with preferences) and benefits (specialization, 
expertise, etc.) from delegating to the institution. The government will, therefore, grant a 
degree of autonomy to the institution. This degree of autonomy affects how bureaucrats 
within this institution make decisions about aid allocation, as it determines the options 
available to the bureaucracy.  
The reason autonomy matters is due to the differing preferences of the government 
and bureaucracy. While the government tends to have strategic and political motivations for 
allocating foreign aid, bureaucracies focus on foreign aid tend to be motivated by recipient 
needs.  This is not a blanket statement that is true of all government officials or bureaucrats, 
but rather reflects the general predispositions of those in each position. Those in the 
government are most concerned with elections incentivizing them to focus on areas that a 
popular with their electorate. Most often, these are domestic issues and then general 
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international power concerns. The government is then motivated to allocate foreign aid that 
will benefit domestic constituents and increase international security. Bureaucrats, on the 
other hand, are experts in development who have chosen this career path above others 
where they could have earned more. They tend to be driven to actually make a difference in 
the lives of those in recipient countries. Aid bureaucrats do face the outside pressure of 
needing to maintain, and possibly advance, their career. 
Given these opposing preferences, it is the institution’s level of autonomy that 
determines an aid agency’s aid policies. Agencies with a high level of autonomy, I argue, will 
focus more on recipient needs since bureaucracies have the freedom and discretion to 
implement aid as they see fit. However, with a low level of autonomy, bureaucracies are 
under the control of the government and therefore, as they want to keep their jobs, these 
agencies will have an aid policy that focuses on the political interests of the government.  
This dissertation examined the role that autonomy plays in shaping aid policies of 
bilateral donor aid agencies. I look at three aspects of aid policy—selectivity, policy 
coherence, and involvement in the aid community. Selectivity refers to the aid allocations, or 
the outputs, of agencies. This is the most discussed and examined aspect of aid policy as it 
demonstrates the actual funds dispersed by donors. Aid policy, however, goes beyond this 
and I further examine agencies’ agendas and their involvement within the international aid 
community. Agendas of aid agencies can differ greatly in the aspects that they stress and 
highlight as important for the purpose of the agency. Involvement with the aid community 
also differs across agencies, with some very involved and demonstrating leadership, while 
others prefer to tackle aid on their own. 
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In each of these aspects, I argue that an agency with a higher degree of autonomy will 
focus more on recipients’ needs rather than the political and strategic interests of donor 
governments. For selectivity, this means a greater amount of aid allocated to least developed 
countries, countries with low health indicators, and untied aid. An agenda that is focused 
more on long-term goals and country ownership would be greater focused on recipient 
needs. Agencies that implement international commitments and are leads in agreed-upon 
practices would demonstrate a focus on recipient needs.  
Summary of Results 
The empirical chapters revealed mixed results regarding my theoretical expectations. 
The cross-country comparison in Chapter 3 revealed the direct opposite of my theory. 
Agencies with a lower level of autonomy tended to focus more on recipient needs—
allocating to least developed countries, countries with high child mortality rates, and untied 
aid, while agencies with a high level of autonomy allocated a comparatively greater amount 
based on donor strategic interests—former colonies, trading partners, and allies. These 
results go against my predictions and require further examination in order to understand 
whether the error is due to my theory or issues with the measure or methods. Given the 
results that follow my theory in Chapters 4 and 5, I believe that my measure of autonomy 
needs further development and the differences across donors deserve further exploration. 
However, this result does demonstrate that autonomy does have a role in shaping aid 
allocations, albeit in the opposite direction. 
The diverse case study presented in Chapter 4 examined three agencies with different 
levels of autonomy to represent “ideal” types that are generalizable to the entire population. 
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Overall, these comparisons supported my theory that greater autonomy leads to aid policies 
focused more on recipient need rather than strategic interests. This was especially true when 
look at Spain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation in contrast to Sweden’s 
International Development Cooperation Agency, the two extreme cases. Sida and the 
MAEC differed greatly on their levels of autonomy being at opposite ends of the twenty aid 
agencies I examined. They also had differing aid policies in all categories. 
Further in-depth comparison in Chapter 5, both temporally and across two similar 
agencies revealed more support to my theory. By using a most similar research case design, 
country-level factors were held constant, or near to constant, to allow for the role of 
autonomy to become more apparent. The fluctuation of United States’ Agency for 
International Development level of autonomy correlated to changes in its aid policy with a 
greater focus on the needs of recipient countries. Today, USAID has again shifted towards 
having greater autonomy, though it is still lower than the United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development. DFID is a more recent organization created with, and 
maintaining today, a high level of autonomy. This autonomy has led to a focus on the long-
term improvement of recipient development with notable accomplishes of tied aid becoming 
illegal and the UK reaching the goal of allocating 0.7% of GNI as aid. Compared to DFID, 
USAID lacks a consistent agenda and implementation of signed international agreements. 
These results then demonstrate the importance of autonomy and institutional design 
in shaping aid policies. Rather than looking at each donor as a unitary actor or thinking that 
all aid agencies are the same, my dissertation reveals the necessity of examining actors 
involved in the decision-making process and the role of autonomy. It advances a theory for 
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future research on foreign aid decision-making and domestic bureaucracies, which would 
lead to a more comprehensive and accurate view of international relations. 
Theoretical Implications 
By focusing on the bureaucracy and its role in determining international outcomes, 
this dissertation brings back a line of research given very little attention since the 1970s. 
While many other domestic actors and characteristics are now included within the 
international relations field, the bureaucracy is often ignored, despite being shown to be an 
important decision-maker in other fields. In order to understand how and why countries 
make the policies they do, it is necessary to examine the actors within that are responsible 
for making these policies. The bureaucracy plays an important role in the foreign aid sector 
and beyond, in shaping and implementing the international polices of a state. By answering 
Fukuyama’s call to study the bureaucracy as well as its autonomy, future work can address 
other aspects of the bureaucracy (2013). This dissertation represents the beginning of the 
field of international relations acknowledging and examining that role. 
It is further necessary to understand the decision-making process and the factors that 
affect it within a state. While the focus has been on foreign aid, the interplay between actors 
within countries and what influences the decision-making process further opens up the 
“black box” of states. This dissertation sheds an important light on this process, in particular 
the importance of institutional designs. By demonstrating the importance of autonomy, the 
path is now open to explore the power dynamics between actors within the state and how 
preexisting institutions shape them.  
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Policy Implications 
This dissertation develops a more realistic outline of how foreign aid allocation 
decisions are made by donor countries. By accounting for the role of the bureaucracy as a 
decision-maker, the motivation and determinants of bilateral aid can be fully understood. 
Previous scholarship emphasized that bilateral aid is often motivated my political and 
strategic interests. The role of institutional autonomy reveals that these motivations may be 
suppressed if agencies are given greater autonomy of allocation decisions. As opposed to 
other principal-agent problems that seek to enhance a principal’s control, foreign aid may 
actually more effective by reducing principal control. This is due to the broken feedback 
loop that exists between donors and recipients. 
Given the large amount of effort devoted by donors, the international community, 
and scholars on the topic of aid effectiveness, there does appear to be an impetus 
encouraging “successful” aid practices. It is not a stretch to then assume that a goal of aid is 
for it to be useful and beneficial for the development of these countries. This goes beyond 
altruistic motivations, as having greater development leads to a cooperative state system with 
fewer crises and greater trading partners. The design of these agencies may then lead to an 
operational route to achieve this. 
Greater autonomy for bilateral aid agencies reveals a possible solution to the many 
international agreements on aid effectiveness – Paris, Accra, MDGs. Donors continually 
emphasize the need to make aid more effective, but are actually a key reason aid is not. 
There are, without a doubt, many problems with the current aid system. However, without 
an understanding of how the actual process works, no policy solutions can be found. 
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Through this work, an attempt is made to understand that process as a first step towards 
making aid more effective in the future. 
Future Work 
There are many paths for future work that build from the theory and results 
presented in this dissertation. Many possibilities of extensions and revisions were presented 
within this work. Clearly, there is more to examine regarding donor aid agency autonomy. 
Further donor countries should be added to the dataset, especially looking at newer foreign 
aid donors to see if they behave in a similar way as more established donors. Another avenue 
would be to add more donor agencies from within countries already examined. Both of these 
paths would add to our understanding of the dynamics between government and 
bureaucracies and the role autonomy plays in shaping aid policies.  
While this dissertation has revealed much that was previously unknown about the aid 
allocation process, there is still more to be uncovered. As noted previously, there are many 
stakeholders and actors involved in foreign aid, each shaping aid allocation in some way. I do 
contend that the relationship between a donor government and aid bureaucracy is most 
important; however, understanding the role of other actors will provide the most realistic 
view possible of the aid process. Who influences aid allocation? Perhaps it is not just 
domestic pressure that aid bureaucracies face, but also international pressure from 
international organizations, international banks, multinational corporations, and international 
development banks. This influence may manifest itself through the government, but these 
actors may provide an influence on their own. This is why an examination of the international 
institutional autonomy of these aid agencies may reveal further insights into other incentives 
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bureaucrats face.  
Looking beyond donors, it would be interesting to examine the role that recipients 
play in the aid allocation process. While donors have most of the power in this relationship, 
recipients do have an influence over the aid packages they receive and have the power to 
refuse aid as well. Applying my theory of aid agency autonomy, I would expect agencies with 
a high level of autonomy to give recipient countries more influence over the aid they receive. 
Recipient country ownership has been a large discussion in the “best practices” literature as 
it places the needs and wants of recipients at the forefront of aid policy. Therefore, it is high 
autonomy agencies, I would argue, that would place a higher importance the requests of 
recipient countries. 
Another extension of this research would be to examine other aid institutions 
including international and private aid organizations. While bilateral donors have been 
shown to be highly political, it is likely that IOs and non-governmental organizations would 
have less political influence as well as more autonomy. There is a question of whether this 
would be true in the case of IOs, as the evidence is mixed of their recipient-need focus and it 
is complicated by having multiple countries as members. Regarding private NGOs, such as 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, there is no political principal overseeing their 
policies. I would therefore expect these agencies to be highly autonomous and have a large 
focus on recipient needs. It would be interesting to examine and compare autonomy levels 
and aid policies across these donors. 
The autonomy of bureaucracies beyond the foreign aid sector is a final area of 
research to which this dissertation speaks. While there are things that are unique to foreign 
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aid, my theory of bureaucratic autonomy holds across sectors. Further examination of other 
domestic bureaucracies should shed light on their importance in our dialogues for 
international policy outcomes.  
This dissertation represents the start of a fruitful line of research that examines the 
structure of agencies. By understanding the actors involved in making important policy 
decisions and the differing preferences and motivations of each, one can then understand 
how and why these decisions are made. This is a necessary first step before we can shape 
policy. For foreign aid, this can then lead to important policy choices influencing whether aid 
is “effective” from a recipient standpoint. 
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Appendix A Agency Structure Codebook 
 
This codebook describes the data collected for Unraveling Red Tape, a dissertation prepared 
for the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. The dataset described in this codebook 
has two components: the codebook describing the variables and their coding and a 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet containing the data.  
 
Data Collection  
 
During the first half of 2012, data was collected from the top twenty bilateral aid donors of 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). These countries, in 
alphabetical order, are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. For the purposes of this dataset, the aid 
agencies selected from these countries were the ones with the most project counts in the 
AidData dataset.21 These agencies were selected as they were deemed the largest aid giving 
agencies within that country, at least in terms of the amount of aid projects given. Therefore, 
it is expected that these agencies were the most focused on development aid. Exceptions to 
this selection choice are Austria22, France, Norway, and Spain. In these countries, the largest 
aid donor was bypassed in place of examining the second largest agency due to it having a 
clear development focus, except in the case of Spain23. 
 
The data collection focuses on three aspects of autonomy – policy, structural, and 
interventional. Agency websites and documents available from them are the primary source 
of data for each agency. Some variables require information from the agency’s statute or 
referenced information from in OECD documents. The sources of all information for data 
are listed in this document. 
 
Variables  
 
Basic Agency Characteristics  
 
AgencyID:  This variable is a numerical indicator that is specific to each agency.  
 
Country:  Name of country that agency is located in. 
                                                
21 (Tierney et al. 2011) Please see Appendix A from PLAID 1.9.1 Codebook and User’s Guide for the list of included donors and donor agencies. 
22 Austria’s agencies with the largest amount of aid projects were the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BMA) and Various Ministries (MIN). 
Various ministries refer to a variety of ministries, which could not be accounted for nor would one qualify for the selection criteria alone. 
23 The largest donor in Spain was Autonomous Governments, which would not be attributable to a single agency and was bypassed in order to look at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (not an agency with a specific aid focus). 
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Agency:  Name of agency.  
 
Ccode:  A three letter code for each country.  
 
AgencyCode:  A letter code abbreviation of each agency name.  
 
Website:  The home page of the agency, from where most information was 
gathered.  
 
Date of Creation: Year the agency, under its current name, was first created. There may 
be instances when the agency was reorganized after this, but its name 
was maintained. 
 
Reorganization Date: Years when the agency, under its current name, was reorganized, 
merged with another agency, or reformed in some way. These reforms 
and reorganizations usually coincide with a major change in the statute 
of the agency, but do not always result in the agency changing its name.  
 
Purpose:  The general purpose of the agency. All agencies in this current dataset 
either have a development focus, coded with a (1), or focus broadly on 
foreign policy, coded with a (2). However, in future iterations of this 
dataset, other agency purposes are possible. Agencies with a focus on 
Commerce are coded with (3). Agencies with a focus on Agriculture 
are coded with (4). Agencies with a focus on Energy are coded with (5). 
Agencies with a focus on Law and Order are coded with (6). Agencies 
with a focus on National Defense are coded with (7). Agencies with a 
focus on not listed are coded with (9). 
 
Statement:  Website where the mission statement, or clear listing of agency goals, 
can be found.  
 
Statute:  Website where the statute of creation for the agency can be found.  
 
Aid Focus:  What type of aid the agency allocates. This variable can have multiple 
answers as many agencies focus on multiple types of aid. (1) if the 
agency allocates bilateral aid. (2) if the agency allocates multilateral aid. 
(3) if the agency allocates humanitarian aid. (9) if the agency allocates 
another type of aid.  
 
Background:  The background of those politically appointed or on the supervisory 
board.  
 
Policy Autonomy 
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Goals:  This variable is coded with a (1) if the agency describes how it 
determined its goals for development and with a (0) otherwise. This 
description should be more than listing the goals of the agency. Rather, 
it should include the process through which these goals were 
determined providing some indication of the agency’s role in this 
process.  
 
Countries:  This variable is coded with a (1) if the agency describes how it 
determined the countries it allocates development aid and with a (0) 
otherwise. This description should be more than listing of the countries 
the agency partners. Rather, it should include the process through 
which these countries were chosen providing some indication of the 
agency’s role in this process. 
 
Organizations:  This variable is coded with a (1) if the agency describes how it 
determined the organizations it partners with for the implementation 
and with a (0) otherwise. This description should be more than listing 
of the organizations the agency partners. Rather, it should include the 
process through which these organizations were chosen providing 
some indication of the agency’s role in this process. 
 
National Interest:  This variable is coded with a (0) if the agency lists the national interest 
as one of the goals of the agency and with a (1) otherwise. 
 
National Interest 1:  If National Interest is coded (0), this variable is coded with a (0) if the 
agency lists the national interest as its first priority and with a (1) 
otherwise. 
 
Expertise:  This variable is coded with a (1) if the agency has expertise or 
experience requirements for political appointments in its statute and 
with a (0) otherwise. 
 
Research:  This variable is coded with a (1) if the agency has a dedicated staff for 
research and information gathering for the purpose of developing 
future policy and with a (0) otherwise. 
 
Research Staff: If Research is coded (1), this variable lists the number of staff 
dedicated to research activities. (#) 
 
Structural Autonomy 
 
Appointments:  This variable is coded with a (0) if the government makes personnel 
appointments to the agency and with a (1) otherwise. 
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Positions:  If Appointments is coded (0), this variable lists which positions are 
politically appointed. (2) The head of the agency is the only political 
appointment. (1) if the top officials within the agency are politically 
appointed, but the rest of the employees are civil service. (0) if political 
appointments extend below ministers and state sectaries to heads of 
departments and more. 
 
Board:  This variable is coded with a (0) if the agency has a supervisory board 
or commission and with a (1) otherwise. 
 
Board Appointments: If Board is coded (0), this variable is coded with a (0) if the 
government makes personnel appointments to the board or 
commission and with a (1) otherwise. 
 
Fixed Term:  This variable is coded with a (1) if the agency’s statute specifies a fixed 
term for agency heads or members of the board and with a (0) 
otherwise. 
 
Executive:  This variable is coded with a (1) if the agency is an executive 
department or a component of an executive department and (0) 
otherwise.  
 
Location: This variable describes the location of the agency within the 
government. (1) if the agency is a program within a subordinate agency. 
(2) if the agency is a subordinate agency within a cabinet/ministerial 
government institution. (3) if the agency is a cabinet/ministerial 
government institution. (4) if the agency is a separate government 
agency with administrative autonomy from a cabinet/ministerial 
government institution. (5) if the agency is a quasi-government 
organization. (9) if the agency is in another location not listed above. 
 
 
Interventional Autonomy 
 
Reports:  This variable is coded with a (0) if the agency is required to conduct 
reviews/evaluations and submit written reports to the government and 
with a (1) otherwise. 
 
Reports #:  If Reports is coded (0), this variable lists the number of written reports 
the institution is required to submit in a given year. (#) 
 
Press Releases:  This variable is coded with a (0) if the agency releases press/news to 
the public/citizens and with a (1) otherwise. 
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Legislature:  This variable is coded with a (0) if the agency is required to testify 
before the government and with a (1) otherwise. 
 
Legislature #:  If Legislature is coded (0), this variable lists the number of testimonies 
the institution is required to give in a given year. (#) 
 
Audits:  This variable is coded with a (0) if the government conducts 
independent audits on the agency and with a (1) otherwise. 
 
Audits #: If Audits is coded (0), this variable lists the number of audits 
conducted on the agency in a given year. (#) 
 
Veto Power:  This variable is coded with a (0) if the government has the power to 
veto aid allocation decisions made by the agency and with a (1) 
otherwise. This veto power should be clearly stated in the statute of the 
agency and not just seen through location of the agency in the 
government (as this is capture in the Location variable). 
 
For Cause:  This variable is coded with a (1) if the statute of the agency states that 
members of the commission or board or the agency head may only be 
removed for “neglect of duty,” “malfeasance in office,” “inefficiency,” 
or similar language; and with a (0) otherwise. 
 
Budget:  This variable is the difference between the requested aid budget and 
actual aid budget given to the agency. This number can be positive or 
negative. (#)
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Appendix B Complete Regression Tables for Chapter 3 
Table B.1 OLS Regression % Total Aid, Autonomy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES % Untied % LDC % Colony % Mortality 
          
(mean) aut2 -5.26 -12.16* 10.90 -8.28** 
 
(5.03) (5.99) (9.91) (3.92) 
Constant 101.34*** 79.75*** 4.80 49.77*** 
 
(9.53) (13.34) (19.46) (7.83) 
     Observations 20 20 9 20 
R-squared 0.09 0.22 0.14 0.23 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.2 OLS Regression % Total Aid, Autonomy and Military Expenditure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES % Untied % LDC % Colony % Mortality 
          
(mean) aut2 -2.73 -14.36** 21.80 -9.81* 
 
(4.85) (6.31) (12.63) (4.79) 
(mean) d_wdi_expmilgdp 
-4.87 4.25 -13.43 2.93 
(3.35) (4.14) (9.13) (3.41) 
Constant 103.51*** 77.86*** 9.77 48.46*** 
 
(10.06) (13.77) (19.28) (7.95) 
     Observations 20 20 9 20 
R-squared 0.16 0.24 0.27 0.26 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B.3 OLS Regression % Total Aid, Autonomy and Health Expenditure 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES % Untied % LDC % Colony % Mortality 
          
(mean) aut2 -3.88 -13.06* 10.78 -7.92* 
 
(4.11) (6.92) (10.18) (4.26) 
(mean) d_wdi_hepub 3.59 -2.34 -5.87 0.94 
 
(2.66) (2.69) (6.94) (1.76) 
Constant 71.26*** 99.40*** 50.35 41.88** 
 
(22.74) (33.08) (67.75) (18.02) 
     Observations 20 20 9 20 
R-squared 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.24 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.4 OLS Regression % Total Aid, Autonomy and Donor Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES % Untied % LDC % Colony % Mortality 
          
(mean) aut2 -1.18 -15.39** 20.32 -9.43* 
 
(5.02) (7.12) (14.97) (5.26) 
(mean) d_wdi_hepub 3.69 -2.43 -4.61 0.88 
 
(2.50) (2.85) (8.95) (1.91) 
(mean) d_wdi_expmilgdp -5.13 4.42 -11.72 2.87 
 
(3.50) (3.92) (11.12) (3.53) 
Constant 72.69*** 98.17** 44.94 41.08** 
 
(21.78) (34.39) (83.45) (17.69) 
     Observations 20 20 9 20 
R-squared 0.31 0.28 0.32 0.27 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B.5 OLS Regression % Total Aid, Autonomy and all Controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES % Untied % LDC % Colony % Mortality 
          
(mean) aut2 -0.34 -9.82 46.56*** -5.99 
 
(5.36) (8.33) (5.98) (5.56) 
lagaid -0.66 -4.44 -18.97*** -2.74 
 
(2.71) (2.97) (3.39) (2.00) 
(mean) d_wdi_hepub 4.05 -0.01 8.76* 2.38 
 
(2.84) (4.07) (4.04) (2.20) 
(mean) d_wdi_expmilgdp -5.02 5.11 -9.32* 3.29 
 
(3.81) (4.58) (3.43) (3.87) 
Constant 72.50*** 96.85** 16.38 40.26** 
 
(22.57) (37.34) (27.07) (18.20) 
     Observations 20 20 9 20 
R-squared 0.32 0.34 0.91 0.32 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
 
 
 
 
Table B.6 OLS Regression Aid by Agency-Recipient, Autonomy 
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
LDC 
(2) 
Mortality 
(3) 
Colony 
(4) 
Trade 
(5) 
Ally 
      
Autonomy 1.11*** 
(0.12) 
1.66*** 
(0.39) 
0.81*** 
(0.10) 
-1.58* 
(0.87) 
0.85*** 
(0.10) 
Recipient Characteristic 
 
2.40*** 
(0.51) 
1.11*** 
(0.26) 
-1.14 
(1.08) 
-0.16* 
(0.08) 
-3.96** 
(1.99) 
Autonomy*  
Recipient Characteristic 
-0.67*** 
(0.21) 
-0.21* 
(0.11) 
0.98** 
(0.41) 
0.13*** 
(0.05) 
1.81** 
(0.78) 
      
Constant -2.12*** 
(0.27) 
-5.35*** 
(0.89) 
-1.18*** 
(0.25) 
1.72 
(1.65) 
-1.23*** 
(0.24) 
      
Observations 1,676 1,633 1,676 1,622 1,676 
R-squared 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.06 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix C Robustness Checks 
Table C.1 OLS Regression % Total Aid, Autonomy; Dropping 25% Lowest Donors in Each 
Aid Category 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES % Untied % LDC % Mortality 
    (mean) aut2 -1.06 -4.95 -4.95 
 (2.87) (5.22) (3.61) 
Constant 95.80*** 69.89*** 44.18*** 
 (5.85) (12.93) (6.66) 
    Observations 15 15 15 
R-squared 0.01 0.07 0.12 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.2 OLS Regression % Total Aid, Autonomy; Dropping Outliers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES % Untied % LDC % Colony % Mortality 
          
(mean) aut2 -5.26 -12.16* 10.90 -8.28** 
 
(5.03) (5.99) (9.91) (3.92) 
Constant 101.34*** 79.75*** 4.80 49.77*** 
 
(9.53) (13.34) (19.46) (7.83) 
     Observations 20 20 9 20 
R-squared 0.09 0.22 0.14 0.23 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.3 OLS Regression % Total Aid, Policy Autonomy and all Controls 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES % Untied % LDC % Colony % Mortality 
     
(mean) p_aut2 3.23 -13.60* 27.21* -7.63 
 (3.37) (7.37) (11.52) (4.99) 
(mean) d_wdi_hepub 4.03 -1.98 -3.48 1.21 
 (2.55) (3.06) (8.01) (2.03) 
(mean) d_wdi_expmilgdp -6.27** 0.92 -10.19 0.58 
 (2.78) (3.90) (6.36) (3.12) 
Constant 65.03*** 85.45** 41.85 32.17* 
 (19.87) (32.71) (70.05) (17.00) 
     
Observations 20 20 9 20 
R-squared 0.33 0.17 0.44 0.16 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table C.4 OLS Regression % Total Aid, Structural Autonomy and all Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES % Untied % LDC % Colony % Mortality 
     
(mean) s_aut2 -19.41** -26.95 -37.87 -19.41 
 (8.25) (15.96) (70.75) (11.14) 
(mean) d_wdi_hepub 3.39 -1.58 -5.19 1.34 
 (2.04) (3.20) (5.67) (1.81) 
(mean) d_wdi_expmilgdp -1.66 3.63 9.31 2.97 
 (2.90) (6.27) (16.56) (4.17) 
Constant 82.60*** 81.53** 78.14 32.74** 
 (15.43) (29.22) (50.74) (15.44) 
     
Observations 20 20 9 20 
R-squared 0.48 0.16 0.15 0.22 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.5 OLS Regression Aid by Agency-Recipient, Policy Autonomy and all Controls 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
LDC 
(2) 
Mortality 
(3) 
Colony 
(4) 
Trade 
(5) 
Ally 
      
Autonomy 
1.68*** 
(0.15) 
2.80*** 
(0.47) 
1.33*** 
(0.13) 
-2.05** 
(0.83) 
1.36*** 
(0.13) 
Recipient Characteristic 
1.35*** 
(0.43) 
0.55** 
(0.22) 
0.49 
(0.85) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
-0.32 
(0.96) 
Autonomy* 
Recipient Characteristic 
-0.90*** 
(0.25) 
-0.40*** 
(0.13) 
0.06 
(0.49) 
0.18*** 
(0.04) 
0.81 
(0.68) 
Log(GDP pc) 
-0.56*** 
(0.09) 
-0.59*** 
(0.09) 
-0.58*** 
(0.06) 
-0.77*** 
(0.08) 
-0.60*** 
(0.06) 
Log(Population) 
0.39*** 
(0.03) 
0.39*** 
(0.03) 
0.39*** 
(0.03) 
0.24*** 
(0.06) 
0.39*** 
(0.03) 
Health expenditure, public 
(% of GDP) 
0.58*** 
(0.04) 
0.58*** 
(0.04) 
0.57*** 
(0.04) 
0.55*** 
(0.05) 
0.57*** 
(0.04) 
Military expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
0.37*** 
(0.06) 
0.37*** 
(0.06) 
0.35*** 
(0.07) 
0.27*** 
(0.09) 
0.32*** 
(0.07) 
      
Constant 
-8.33*** 
(1.13) 
-9.59*** 
(1.49) 
-7.53*** 
(0.90) 
-1.32 
(1.81) 
-7.32*** 
(0.91) 
      Observations 1,534 1,534 1,534 1,509 1,534 
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.27 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.6 OLS Regression Aid by Agency-Recipient, Structural Autonomy and all Controls 
  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
LDC 
(2) 
Mortality 
(3) 
Colony 
(4) 
Trade 
(5) 
Ally 
      
Autonomy 1.91*** 
(0.23) 
3.24*** 
(0.66) 
1.49*** 
(0.19) 
-0.67 
(1.46) 
1.44*** 
(0.19) 
 
Recipient Characteristic 1.13*** 
(0.36) 
0.41** 
(0.19) 
0.42 
(0.97) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
-1.67 
(1.51) 
Structural Autonomy*  
Recipient Characteristic 
-1.21*** 
(0.33) 
-0.50*** 
(0.17) 
0.62 
(1.03) 
0.11 
(0.08) 
1.62 
(1.28) 
Log(GDP pc) -0.59*** 
(0.09) 
-0.63*** 
(0.09) 
-0.61*** 
(0.06) 
-0.74*** 
(0.08) 
-0.62*** 
(0.06) 
Log(Population) 0.40*** 
(0.04) 
0.40*** 
(0.04) 
0.40*** 
(0.04) 
0.29*** 
(0.06) 
0.39*** 
(0.04) 
Health expenditure, public 
(% of GDP) 
0.49*** 
(0.04) 
0.49*** 
(0.04) 
0.48*** 
(0.04) 
0.47*** 
(0.05) 
0.49*** 
(0.04) 
Military expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
0.28*** 
(0.07) 
0.28*** 
(0.07) 
0.24*** 
(0.07) 
0.23*** 
(0.08) 
0.26*** 
(0.07) 
      
Constant -6.69*** 
(1.18) 
-7.44*** 
(1.47) 
-5.97*** 
(0.89) 
-3.20* 
(1.93) 
-5.86*** 
(0.91) 
      
Observations 1,534 1,534 1,534 1,509 1,534 
R-squared 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.22 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.7 OLS Regression Aid by Agency-Recipient, Autonomy; Dropping Outliers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES LDC Mortality Colony Trade Ally 
       
Autonomy 1.47*** 1.71*** 1.23*** -0.56 1.28*** 
 (0.14) (0.45) (0.12) (1.07) (0.12) 
Recipient 
Characteristic 
 
2.14*** 0.93*** -0.37 -0.09 -3.19 
(0.58) (0.28) (1.09) (0.10) (2.00) 
Autonomy*  
Recipient 
Characteristic 
-0.54** -0.12 0.56 0.10* 1.38* 
(0.25) (0.13) (0.42) (0.06) (0.79) 
      
Constant -2.78*** -5.43*** -1.95*** -0.36 -2.00*** 
 (0.30) (0.98) (0.28) (2.00) (0.27) 
      
Observations 1,419 1,384 1,419 1,373 1,419 
R-squared 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.14 0.10 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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